Defense Base Act Insurance: Allocating Wartime Contracting Risks Between Government and Private Industry

More than ever before, the Department of Defense is relying on contactors to support our men and women in uniform. However, the cost of supporting these contractors has been paid not only with congressional funds but with an unprecedented number of contractor casualties. Sadly, while contractors are dying in record numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress has been preoccupied with paying less for the statutorily mandated workers’ compensation insurance that is intended to protect these workers. With the advent of Kevlar vests and armored-plated Humvees, contractors are returning home, but often with scars of war both visible and invisible. Rather than being greeted as heroes, they are treated as mercenaries, as insurance carriers deny their medical claims and reap excessive profits. Congress is now developing a new acquisition strategy for Defense Base Act Insurance to address the rising cost of premiums. Regrettably, congressional leaders have all but ignored the issue of insurance carriers denying injured contractors’ claims, especially those related to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI). While Congress and the Department of Defense debate cost-saving strategies, the more poignant question of whether the government owes a greater duty to Americans defending our freedom is subverted. This article argues that Congress must adopt a multiple-provider acquisition strategy until a government self-insurance system can be implemented in the future. These short and long-term strategies offer the government the greatest leveraging capability as it struggles to maintain accountability and morality in a system that has for the last decade exploited injured contractors and disgraced a society that prides itself in leaving no American behind

Defense Base Act Insurance: Allocating Wartime Contracting Risks Between Government and Private Industry

More than ever before, the Department of Defense is relying on contactors to support our men and women in uniform. However, the cost of supporting these contractors has been paid not only with congressional funds but with an unprecedented number of contractor casualties. Sadly, while contractors are dying in record numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress has been preoccupied with paying less for the statutorily mandated workers’ compensation insurance that is intended to protect these workers. With the advent of Kevlar vests and armored-plated Humvees, contractors are returning home, but often with scars of war both visible and invisible. Rather than being greeted as heroes, they are treated as mercenaries, as insurance carriers deny their medical claims and reap excessive profits. Congress is now developing a new acquisition strategy for Defense Base Act Insurance to address the rising cost of premiums. Regrettably, congressional leaders have all but ignored the issue of insurance carriers denying injured contractors’ claims, especially those related to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI). While Congress and the Department of Defense debate cost-saving strategies, the more poignant question of whether the government owes a greater duty to Americans defending our freedom is subverted. This article argues that Congress must adopt a multiple-provider acquisition strategy until a government self-insurance system can be implemented in the future. These short and long-term strategies offer the government the greatest leveraging capability as it struggles to maintain accountability and morality in a system that has for the last decade exploited injured contractors and disgraced a society that prides itself in leaving no American behind

Failure of the Current Anti-Corruption Strategy in Afghanistan

Corruption has come to the forefront in Afghanistan as the United States tries to balance efforts to back anti-corruption strategies while maintaining a positive relationship with the Karzai government. Stalled corruption cases suggest corruption in Afghanistan is systemic and not limited to a particular governing body or official. It is clear that corruption exists in both the upper and lower echelons of Afghan society, and will continue to exist until the U.S.-backed anti-corruption teams are accepted by the Afghan government. The strengthening of key institutions continues to be the recommended international model. As demonstrated in the United States, the integration and overlap of these institutions offers an effective means of combating corruption. These mechanisms, however, have been ineffective in a number of south-central Asia countries. Afghanistan’s unique history and clan structure may provide some rational for these failures. Two socioeconomic models, the principal-agent model and collective action theory, offer perspectives on how Afghanistan’s history and clan structure is inhibiting the implementation of traditional anti-corruption tools. A strong clan history that loathes outsiders and rewards clan loyalties will not yield to strong U.S. anti-corruption mechanisms. The Afghan drug trade offers a glimpse into the patron-client relationships that clans rely on, and demonstrates how the Taliban provide a network of resources to assist the drug mafias and transnational criminal organizations. A strong-arm approach to corruption, like that embraced by the Obama administration, will probably not succeed for a number of years. Before these regulatory mechanisms can work, the clans must be convinced of the credibility of these mechanisms

Failure of the Current Anti-Corruption Strategy in Afghanistan

Corruption has come to the forefront in Afghanistan as the United States tries to balance efforts to back anti-corruption strategies while maintaining a positive relationship with the Karzai government. Stalled corruption cases suggest corruption in Afghanistan is systemic and not limited to a particular governing body or official. It is clear that corruption exists in both the upper and lower echelons of Afghan society, and will continue to exist until the U.S.-backed anti-corruption teams are accepted by the Afghan government. The strengthening of key institutions continues to be the recommended international model. As demonstrated in the United States, the integration and overlap of these institutions offers an effective means of combating corruption. These mechanisms, however, have been ineffective in a number of south-central Asia countries. Afghanistan’s unique history and clan structure may provide some rational for these failures. Two socioeconomic models, the principal-agent model and collective action theory, offer perspectives on how Afghanistan’s history and clan structure is inhibiting the implementation of traditional anti-corruption tools. A strong clan history that loathes outsiders and rewards clan loyalties will not yield to strong U.S. anti-corruption mechanisms. The Afghan drug trade offers a glimpse into the patron-client relationships that clans rely on, and demonstrates how the Taliban provide a network of resources to assist the drug mafias and transnational criminal organizations. A strong-arm approach to corruption, like that embraced by the Obama administration, will probably not succeed for a number of years. Before these regulatory mechanisms can work, the clans must be convinced of the credibility of these mechanisms

Discharged and Discarded: The Collateral Consequences of a Less-Than-Honorable Discharge

Between 2011 and 2015, 57,141 soldiers, sailors, and airmen were separated from service with less-than-honorable (LTH) discharges for mi­nor misconduct related to mental health problems. These discharges dis­proportionately affected servicemembers of color. These veterans and others like them face daunting reintegration challenges when they return to civilian society, as federal agencies and state governments deny them the benefits that usually facilitate a veteran’s smooth transition to civilian society. This Essay adds to the scholarly discourse on military discharges by comparing these veterans’ plight to that of persons arrested or convicted of criminal offenses, who also suffer from collateral consequences related to their criminal records long after their involvement with the criminal legal system. Military review boards, the Department of Defense (DOD) agencies charged with reviewing and correcting veterans’ discharges after service, were never intended to address the collateral consequences of mil­itary discharges, and the laws governing discharge review do not provide the boards with the authority to do so; however, DOD may finally be poised to institute reforms. This Essay responds to DOD’s recent call for the mil­itary service branches to consider the collateral consequences of military discharges in reviewing veterans’ petitions for discharge upgrades. This Essay examines why current laws and regulations are inadequate to im­plement DOD’s call and asserts that reform efforts aimed at addressing the collateral consequences of arrests and convictions in the criminal le­gal system must be replicated in the military. This Essay concludes that, without reform, a permanent class of dishonored veterans will never suc­cessfully reintegrate into society

Normative Judgement, Rationality, and Reflective Agency

Normative judgements have distinctive features that call out for explanation. In this thesis I provide an explanation of these distinctive features by defending three main philosophical positions. First, I provide a novel analysis of normative concepts in terms of the concept of rationality. Secondly, I provide an account of the concept of rationality in terms of the role that it plays in the ascription of mental states. And, finally, I defend a cognitivist account of reflective agency, according to which self-governing agents regulate their own mental states by self-ascribing them. The overall picture I will be developing can be summarised as follows: normative judgements are judgements about rationality, which rationally constrain our attitudes because they rationally constrain the self-ascriptions by means of which we regulate those attitudes

Employee Covenants Not to Compete: Where Does Virginia Stand?

Courts for some time now have been forced to deal with the validity of covenants not to compete as contained in employment contracts. Considered to be a restraint against trade, these covenants under common law were viewed with disfavor, if not hostility, both nationally and in the Commonwealth of Virginia, as being contrary to the American ideals of individual freedom, competition, and the free flow of commerce. As such they were seldom upheld. It was only after the courts recognized that employers had legitimate concerns and interests worthy of protections that reasonable covenants not to compete began to be enforced by injunction following a breach

Comparison of the salivary and dentinal microbiome of children with severe-early childhood caries to the salivary microbiome of caries-free children

peer-reviewedBackground The main objectives of this study were to describe and compare the microbiota of 1) deep dentinal lesions of deciduous teeth of children affected with severe early childhood caries (S-ECC) and 2) the unstimulated saliva of these children and 3) the unstimulated saliva of caries-free children, and to compare microbiota compositional differences and diversity of taxa in these sampled sites. Methods Children with S-ECC and without S-ECC were recruited. The saliva of all children with and without S-ECC was sampled along with the deep dentinal microbiota from children affected by S-ECC. The salivary microbiota of children affected by S-ECC (n = 68) was compared to that of caries-free children (n = 70), by Illumina MiSeq sequencing of 16S rRNA amplicons. Finally, the caries microbiota of deep dentinal lesions of those children with S-ECC was investigated. Results Using two beta diversity metrics (Bray Curtis dissimilarity and UniFrac distance), the caries microbiota was found to be distinct from that of either of the saliva groups (caries-free & caries-active) when bacterial abundance was taken into account. However, when the comparison was made by measuring only presence and absence of bacterial taxa, all three microbiota types separated. While the alpha diversity of the caries microbiota was lowest, the diversity difference between the caries samples and saliva samples was statistically significant (p < 0.001). The major phyla of the caries active dentinal microbiota were Firmicutes (median abundance value 33.5%) and Bacteroidetes (23.2%), with Neisseria (10.3%) being the most abundant genus, followed by Prevotella (10%). The caries-active salivary microbiota was dominated by Proteobacteria (median abundance value 38.2%) and Bacteroidetes (27.8%) with the most abundant genus being Neisseria (16.3%), followed by Porphyromonas (9.5%). Caries microbiota samples were characterized by high relative abundance of Streptococcus mutans, Prevotella spp., Bifidobacterium and Scardovia spp. Conclusions Distinct differences between the caries microbiota and saliva microbiota were identified, with separation of both salivary groups (caries-active and caries-free) whereby rare taxa were highlighted. While the caries microbiota was less diverse than the salivary microbiota, the presence of these rare taxa could be the difference between health and disease in these children