The Truncated Core for Games with Limited Aspirations

We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core.games with limited aspirations, truncated core.

A Survey of Allocation Rules for the Museum Pass Problem

In this paper, we consider the problem, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (Games Econ Behav 43:322\u2013325, 2003), of sharing the income from the sell of passes that allow the entrance in a set of museums. First, we recall some allocation rules and some properties presented in Ginsburgh and Zang (Mus Manag Curatorship 19:371\u2013383, 2004), Beal and Solal (Rev Econ 61:1099\u20131109, 2010), Estevez-Fernandez et al. (2010), and Casas-Mendez et al. (Eur J Oper Res 215:161\u2013168, 2011). Then, we discuss them, finding the properties satisfied by each allocation rule. The analysis of a real-world example concludes the paper

Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate

36 p.In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games

The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate

12 p.In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lowervaluebased method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function.Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologıa, FEDER and Xunta de Galicia through projects BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and PGIDIT03PXIC20701PN

Values for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate

Values for strategic games in which players cooperate ∗ Luisa Carpente1 Balbina Casas-Méndez2 Ignacio García-Jurado2 Anne van den Nouweland3 February 27, 2003 In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.

The Two-Stage Constrained Equal Awards and Losses Rules for Multi-Issue Allocation Situation

This paper considers two-stage solutions for multi-issue allocation situations.Characterisations are provided for the two-stage constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, based on the properties of composition and path independence.