29 research outputs found

    An Investigation into the Poor Survival of an Endangered Coho Salmon Population

    Get PDF
    To investigate reasons for the decline of an endangered population of coho salmon (O. kisutch), 190 smolts were acoustically tagged during three consecutive years and their movements and survival were estimated using the Pacific Ocean Shelf Tracking project (POST) array. Median travel times of the Thompson River coho salmon smolts to the lower Fraser River sub-array were 16, 12 and 10 days during 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. Few smolts were recorded on marine arrays. Freshwater survival rates of the tagged smolts during their downstream migration were 0.0–5.6% (0.0–9.0% s.e.) in 2004, 7.0% (6.2% s.e.) in 2005, and 50.9% (18.6% s.e.) in 2006. Overall smolt-to-adult return rates exhibited a similar pattern, which suggests that low freshwater survival rates of out-migrating smolts may be a primary reason for the poor conservation status of this endangered coho salmon population

    How does neopatrimonialism affect the African state? The case of tax collection in Zambia

    Get PDF
    Following the neopatrimonialism paradigm, it can be hypothesised that in African states informal politics of the rulers infringe on the collection of taxes and in turn reduce state revenue. This article tests this proposition for the case of Zambia. Neopatrimonial continuity in the country is evidenced by three factors : the concentration of political power, the award of personal favours, and the misuse of state resources. Despite this continuity, the revenue performance increased considerably with the creation of the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority. Donor pressure has been the most important intervening variable accounting for this improvement. Yet, strengthening the collection of central state revenue has been consistent with a neopatrimonial rationale, and may even have fed neopatrimonialism overall, by providing increased resources for particularistic expenditure

    Asymmetric Information and Learning by Imitation in Agent-Based Financial Markets

    No full text
    We describe an agent-based model of a market where traders exchange a risky asset whose returns can be partly predicted purchasing a costly signal. The decision to be informed (at a cost) or uninformed is taken by means of a simple learning by imitation mechanism that periodically occurs. The equilibrium is characterized describing the stationary distribution of the price and the fraction of the informed traders. We find that the number of agents who acquire the signal decreases with its cost and with agents’ risk aversion and, conversely, it increases with the signal-to-noise ratio and when learning is slow, as opposed to frequent. Moreover, price volatility appears to directly depend on the fraction of informed traders and, hence, some heteroskedasticity is observed when this fraction fluctuates

    Spatially Coevolving Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

    No full text
    corecore