Adverse Selection in Private Annuity Markets and the Role of Mandatory Social Annuitization

We study the effects on the macroeconomic equilibrium, the wealth distribution, and welfare of adverse selection in private annuity markets in a closed economy inhabited by overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents who are distinguished by their health status. If an agent's health type is private information there will be a pooling equilibrium in the private annuity market. We also study the implications for the macro-economy and welfare of a social security system with mandatory contributions that are constant across health types. These social annuities are immune to adverse selection and therefore offer a higher rate of return than private annuities do. However, they have a negative effect on the steady-state capital intensity and welfare. The positive effect of a fair pooled rate of return on a fixed part of savings and a higher return on capital in equilibrium is outweighed by the negative consequences of increased adverse selection in the private annuity market and a lower wage rate

Entry and fiscal policy effectiveness in a small open economy within a Monetary Union

In this article I develop an imperfectly competitive dynamic general equilibrium model for a small open economy integrated in a monetary union. Here, the type of entry in the non-traded goods’ sector affects fiscal policy effectiveness. Fiscal policy effectiveness is enlarged when aggregate demand stimuli increase intra-industrial competition (case I). This is due to the counter-cyclical mark-up mechanism generated by entry. Such a mechanism is absent in the usual monopolistic competition where entry only has a sharing effect (case II).info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Population pharmacokinetics of the von Willebrand factor-factor VIII interaction in patients with von Willebrand disease

Recent studies have reported that patients with von Willebrand disease treated perioperatively with a von Willebrand factor (VWF)/factor VIII (FVIII) concentrate with a ratio of 2.4:1 (Humate P/Haemate P) often present with VWF and/or FVIII levels outside of prespecified target levels necessary to prevent bleeding. Pharmacokinetic (PK)-guided dosing may resolve this problem. As clinical guidelines increasingly recommend aiming for certain target levels of both VWF and FVIII, application of an integrated population PK model describing both VWF activity (VWF:Act) and FVIII levels may improve dosing and quality of care. In total, 695 VWF:Act and 894 FVIII level measurements from 118 patients (174 surgeries) who were treated perioperatively with the VWF/FVIII concentrate were used to develop this population PK model using nonlinear mixed-effects modeling. VWF:Act and FVIII levels were analyzed simultaneously using a turnover model. The protective effect of VWF:Act on FVIII clearance was described with an inhibitory maximum effect function. An average perioperative VWF:Act level of 1.23 IU/mL decreased FVIII clearance from 460 mL/h to 264 mL/h, and increased FVIII half-life from 6.6 to 11.4 hours. Clearly, in the presence of VWF, FVIII clearance decreased with a concomitant increase of FVIII half-life, clarifying the higher FVIII levels observed after repetitive dosing with this concentrate. VWF:Act and FVIII levels during perioperative treatment were described adequately by this newly developed integrated population PK model. Clinical application of this model may facilitate more accurate targeting of VWF:Act and FVIII levels during perioperative treatment with this specific VWF/FVIII concentrate (Humate P/Haemate P).Thrombosis and Hemostasi

Coordinated Tax-Tariff Reforms, Informality, and Welfare Distribution

The paper studies the revenue, efficiency, and distributional implications of a simple strategy of offsetting tariff reductions with increases in destination-based consumption taxes so as to leave consumer prices unchanged. We employ a dynamic micro-founded macroeconomic model of a small open developing economy, which features an informal sector that cannot be taxed, a formal agricultural sector, and an import-substitution sector. The reform strategy increases government revenue, imports, exports, and the informal sector. In contrast to Emran and Stiglitz (2005), who ignore the dynamic effects of taxes and tariffs on factor markets, we find an efficiency gain, which is unevenly distributed. Existing generations benefit more than future generations, who (depending on pre-existing tax and tariff rates and the informal sector size) even may become worse off