11 research outputs found
Zur Entwicklung von Untersuchungsverfahren zur Bestimmung der LeistungsfÀhigkeit von Robot-Tachymetern
Compare and Contrast: How to Assess the Completeness of Mechanistic Explanation
Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a âMore Details Are Betterâ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287â319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplanâs reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the âVertical More Details are Betterâ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges
Mechanisms, laws and explanation
Mechanisms are now taken widely in philosophy of science to provide one of modern scienceâs basic explanatory devices. This has raised lively debate concerning the relationship between mechanisms, laws and explanation. This paper focuses on cases where a mechanism gives rise to a ceteris paribus law, addressing two inter-related questions: (1) What kind of explanation is involved? and (2) What is going on in the world when mechanism M affords behavior B described in a ceteris paribus law? We explore various answers offered by ânew mechanistsâ and others before setting out and explaining our own answers: (1) mechanistic explanations are a species of oldfashioned covering-law explanation and this often accounts in part for their explanatory power; and (2) B is what it takes for some set of principles that govern the features of Mâs parts in their arrangement in M all to be instanced together