La Politique Agricole Commune

La Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) est l’objet de ce numéro spécial de Regards économiques. Deux articles y sont consacrés. Le premier propose une analyse des effets économiques probables de la réforme récente de la PAC sur l’agriculture belge. Quant au second, il se demande comment rendre la PAC plus juste et plus efficace. La PAC : Une analyse de la réforme récente Les autorités régionales belges doivent se prononcer sur les différentes options de réforme de la PAC proposées par l'accord européen de juin dernier. Cet article examine les effets économiques probables de ces options sur l'agriculture belge à l'aide de deux modèles économiques complémentaires. Ce numéro donne aussi des pistes de réflexion sur quelques questions préoccupantes liées à cet accord et à l'évolution de la PAC. La PAC : Pour la rendre plus juste et plus efficace La PAC est examinée par le biais de trois questions. D’abord, quelles justifications normatives peut-on apporter à un subside de l’activité agricole pour elle même ? Ensuite, qui sont les bénéficiaires ultimes de la PAC dans ses versions passées et présente ? Enfin, peut-on reformuler une PAC dont les effets objectifs répondraient aux critères normatifs énoncés plus haut ?

Discontinuous Galerkin method for multifluid Euler equations

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/106454/1/AIAA2013-2595.pd

Income and welfare effects of input subsidies across representative agricultural households of rural Rwanda

Subsidies for intermediate inputs represent considerable transfers from governments to farmers and, are implemented on a large scale in many developing countries to primarily achieve objectives of (1) national food security and (2) raising incomes for the poor and technology constrained farmers. Clearly, a trade-off exists between the two objectives whereby targeting beneficiaries for achieving pro-poor growth may lead to equity at the expense of efficiency. Nevertheless, knowing which group of farmers benefit more or less from these budgetary transfers is essential in order to re-allocate scarce budgetary resources more effectively. Taking the case of Rwanda as an example, this study uses an empirical modelling approach to assess the income and welfare effects of subsidies for intermediate inputs (i.e. fertilizers and improved seeds) across a heterogeneous set of agricultural households, under competitive and monopolistic input market structures. The results show positive policy outcomes for all representative households and these outcomes are twice higher when the input market structure is competitive. Although subsidies for inputs eventually help poor households to overcome cost burdens and participate in markets, a large share of the policy transfers is captured by large-scale producers who generally have the liquidity to purchase unsubsidized inputs. Acknowledgement : This paper analyses the income and welfare effects of government subsidies for intermediate inputs across heterogeneous farmers' households in Rwanda. Authors wish to acknowledge that the analysis relies on the Development Policy Evaluation Model (DevPEM) developed by the OECD. The study was conducted as part of the Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural Policy (MAFAP) program implemented in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, USAID, and the governments of the Netherlands and Germany

Multi-input multi-output farm-level cost function : a comparison of least squares and entropy estimators

We introduce a modification of the quadratic-Leontieff multi-output cost function that is particularly suitable for the data of the Farm Accountancy Data Network. We present least squares and entropy estimates of that function and compare their results for a sample of crop farms. Our results are encouraging for the use of entropy estimators in cases in which farms are not assumed to share the same technology. Our approach can be seen as an extension of the Positive Mathematical Programming approach (Howitt, 1995). The extension consists in an explicit specification of inputs in the cost function and in the possibility of modeling several farms simultaneously

Organisation of knowledge transfer in agricultural policy analysis

This chapter starts from the complex knowledge flow linked with quantitative policy analysis. An overview is given of the different stakeholders, their conflicting interests, the asymmetry in information flow and the asset specificity of a decision support system. Reflections on this predominantly communication problem lead to questions about appropriate institutional arrangements to increase knowledge transfer efficiency. First insights are in favour of a hybrid governance structure integrating long-term contract with spot market knowledge production. The working term "communication facilitator" (CF) is introduced to assign the functional, technical and organisational elaboration of a better knowledge transfer. These aspects are illustrated through the set-up of a policy analysis consortium and a pocket example of evaluating the EU-CAP mid-term review