ethical reasons and political commitment

Political commitments to resist oppression play a central role in the moral lives of many people. Such commitments are also a source of ethical reasons. They influence and organize ethical beliefs, emotions and reasons in an ongoing way. Political commitments to address oppression often contain a concern for the dignity and well-being of others and the objects of political commitments often have value, according to ideal moral theories, such as Kantian and utilitarian theory. However, ideal moral theories do not fully explain the ethical reasons political commitments engender. First, ideal moral theories do not explain the normative priority that agents give to politically committed ethical reasons. Their profound effect on a politically committed agent’s ethical deliberation and choice and the precedence they are given over other ends cannot be wholly understood through the moral obligations within ideal theories. Second, although politically committed reasons are valuable in ideal theory for the benefits they bring to others, they are not fungible with other reasons ideal theory would regard as having equal ethical value. A person might substitute another beneficial humanitarian aim for that to which she is politically committed and nevertheless regard herself as having done a morally wrong thing for failing or betraying her commitment. Politically committed ethical reasons are also motivated and informed by the social location of agents and their relationship to structures of oppression. Although there are universal ethical reasons to oppose oppression, this means that some of a person’s actual ethical reasons will be irreducibly particular

WATER REPELLENT RENDERINGS FOR THE DAMP-PROOFING OF MONUMENTS

The global transitional justice tool kit—involving the use of criminal prosecutions, amnesties, and other mechanisms to address past human rights abuse—has become a primary means for thwarting future human rights violations and consolidating democracy. Nevertheless, evidence on the consequences of transitional justice remains mixed and amenable to contradictory interpretations. Existing studies fail to adequately address issues of selection, the difference between short- and long-term effects of transitional justice mechanisms, and qualitative and quantitative differences in state practices. This article uses a new database of transitional justice mechanisms to address these concerns and test propositions from realist, constructivist, and holistic approaches to this set of policy issues. We find, among other things, that prosecutions increase physical integrity protections, while amnesties increase the protection of civil and political rights. Our analysis suggests that different transnational justice policies each play a potentially positive, but distinct, role in new democracies and in decreasing violations of human rights

Economics, Agency, and Causal Explanation

The paper considers three questions. First, what is the connection between economics and agency? It is argued that causation and explanation in economics fundamentally depend on agency. So a philosophical understanding of economic explanation must be sensitive to an understanding of agency. Second, what is the connection between agency and causation? A causal view of agency-involving explanation is defended against a number of arguments from the resurgent noncausalist tradition in the literature on agency and action-explanation. If agency is fundamental to economic explanation, it is argued, then so is causation. Third, what is the connection between causal explanation and the natural sciences? It is argued that, though the explanations given in economics and other social sciences are causal explanations, they are different in kind from the causal explanations of the natural sciences. On the one hand, then, the causal explanations of the social sciences are irreducible to those found in the natural sciences. On the other hand, the causal relations described by the social sciences are not completely autonomous; they do not float free of, or operate independently from, the causal relations charted by the natural sciences

Rationality as the Rule of Reason

The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show how this view can account for structural rationality on the assumption that intentions and beliefs as such involve competent perceptions of downstream reasons, and explore various implications of the account

Examining whether and how instructional coordination occurs within introductory undergraduate STEM courses

Instructors’ interactions can foster knowledge sharing around teaching and the use of research-based instructional strategies (RBIS). Coordinated teaching presents an impetus for instructors’ interactions and creates opportunities for instructional improvement but also potentially limits an instructor’s autonomy. In this study, we sought to characterize the extent of coordination present in introductory undergraduate courses and to understand how departments and instructors implement and experience course coordination. We examined survey data from 3,641 chemistry, mathematics, and physics instructors at three institution types and conducted follow-up interviews with a subset of 24 survey respondents to determine what types of coordination existed, what factors led to coordination, how coordination constrained instruction, and how instructors maintained autonomy within coordinated contexts. We classified three approaches to coordination at both the overall course and course component levels: independent (i.e., not coordinated), collaborative (decisionmaking by instructor and others), controlled (decision-making by others, not instructor). Two course components, content coverage and textbooks, were highly coordinated. These curricular components were often decided through formal or informal committees, but these decisions were seldom revisited. This limited the ability for instructors to participate in the decision-making process, the level of interactions between instructors, and the pedagogical growth that could have occurred through these conversations. Decision-making around the other two course components, instructional methods and exams, was more likely to be independently determined by the instructors, who valued this autonomy. Participants in the study identified various ways in which collaborative coordination of courses can promote but also inhibit pedagogical growth. Our findings indicate that the benefits of collaborative course coordination can be realized when departments develop coordinated approaches that value each instructor’s autonomy, incorporate shared and ongoing decision-making, and facilitate collaborative interactions and knowledge sharing among instructors

Why Moral Expertise Needs Moral Theory

Discussions of the nature or possibility of moral expertise have largely proceeded in atheoretical terms, with little attention paid to whether moral expertise depends on theoretical knowledge of morality. Here I argue that moral expertise is more theory-dependent than is commonly recognized: Moral expertise consists, at least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts dispensing expert counsel to non-experts. Moral experts would not be moral experts absent knowledge of moral theory, nor could they play the testimonial role we would expect them to play in moral inquiry and deliberation absent such knowledg

Recruitment and Retention Strategies for Minority or Poor Clinical Research Participants: Lessons From the Healthy Aging in Neighborhoods of Diversity Across the Life Span Study

Purpose of the study: Investigating health disparities requires studies designed to recruit and retain racially and socioeconomically diverse cohorts. It is critical to address the barriers that disproportionately affect participation in clinical research by minorities and the socioeconomically disadvantaged. This study sought to identify and rectify these barriers to recruit and retain a biracial (African American and non-Hispanic White) and socioeconomically diverse cohort for a longitudinal study. Design and Method: The Healthy Aging in Neighborhoods of Diversity across the Life Span study is a 20-year longitudinal examination of how race and socioeconomic status influence the development of age-related health disparities. One goal was to create a multifactorial recruitment and retention strategy. The recruitment paradigm targeted known barriers and identified those unique to the study's urban environment. The retention paradigm mirrored the recruitment plan but was based on specifically developed approaches. Results: This cohort recruitment required attention to developing community partnerships, designing the research study to meet the study hypotheses and to provide benefit to participants, providing a safe community-based site for the research and creating didactics to develop staff cultural proficiency. These efforts facilitated study implementation and enhanced recruitment resulting in accrual of a biracial and socioeconomically diverse cohort of 3,722 participants. Implications: Recruiting and retaining minority or poor research participants is challenging but possible. The essential facets include clear communication of the research hypothesis, focus on providing a direct benefit for participants, and selection of a hypothesis that is directly relevant to the community studie

Verbal Reports and "Real' Reasons" : Confabulation and Conflation

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of a published work that appeared in final form in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice after peer review and technical editing by the publisher. Constantine Sandis, ‘Verbal Reports and “Real” Reasons: Confabulation and Conflation’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 18(2): 267-280, first published online 18 March 2015. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9576-6 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015This paper examines the relation between the various forces which underlie human action and verbal reports about our reasons for acting as we did. I maintain that much of the psychological literature on confabulations rests on a dangerous conflation of the reasons for which people act with a variety of distinct motivational factors. In particular, I argue that subjects frequently give correct answers to questions about the considerations they acted upon while remaining largely unaware of why they take themselves to have such reasons to act. Pari passu, experimental psychologists are wrong to maintain that they have shown our everyday reason talk to be systematically confused. This is significant because our everyday reason-ascriptions affect characterizations of action (in terms of intention, knowledge, foresight, etc.) that are morally and legally relevant. I conclude, more positively, that far from rendering empirical research on confabulations invalid, my account helps to reveal its true insights into human nature.Peer reviewe

Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity

This chapter considers whether legal requirements can constitute reasons for action independently of the merits of the requirement at hand. While jurisprudential opinion on this question is far from uniform, sceptical views are becoming increasingly dominant. Such views typically contend that, while the law can be indicative of pre-existing reasons, or can trigger pre-existing reasons into operation, it cannot constitute new reasons. This chapter offers support to a somewhat less sceptical position, according to which the fact that a legal requirement has been issued can be a reason for action, yet one that is underpinned by bedrock values which law is apt to serve. Notions discussed here include a value-based conception of reasons as facts ; a distinction between complete and incomplete reasons ; and David Enoch’s idea of triggering reason-giving. Following a discussion of criticism against the view adopted here, the chapter concludes by considering some more ‘robust’ conceptions of law’s reason-giving capacity