The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument

Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition

Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium. The present paper explores the relation of this concept to Nash equilibrium in particular classes of games, including constant-sum games, games with weak payoff externalities, and games where imitative decision rules are individually improving. An illustration of the latter is provided in the context of Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous product which allows for a characterization of the set of evolutionarily stable prices.

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule “imitate the best.” In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behaviour (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.Open Method of Coordination, Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, imitation, mobility, redistribution

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.Open Method of Coordination; Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; Imitation; Mobility; Redistribution.

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other ¯elds, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule \imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian gov- ernments and mobile welfare bene¯ciaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.

Inappropriate Technology

In this paper, we investigate incentives other than altruism that developed countries have in improving technologies specific to developing countries. We propose a simple model of international trade between two regions, in which all individuals have similar preferences over an inferior good and a luxury good. The poor region has a comparative advantage in the production of the inferior good, and the rich in the luxury good. Even when costly adaptation of the technology to the poor region's characteristics is required -- which makes the technology inappropriate for local use -- we show that there are parameter configurations for which the rich region has an incentive to incur this cost. By raising the efficiency of the productive process of the developing region, the developed region can redirect its own productive resources toward the luxury good; it can also gain access to a more diversified set of consumption choices. Indeed, there are cases where the rich region would prefer to improve the poor region's technology for producing the inferior good rather than its own. Such technology transfers can increase the welfare of both regions. We apply our model to the Green Revolution and provide a quantitative assessment of its welfare effects.Technology improvements, Dynamic trade models, Welfare analysis

The Asset Market Game

This paper models asset markets as a game where assets pay according to an arbitrary payoff matrix,investors decide on fractions of wealth to allocate to each asset,and prices result from market clearing. The only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is to split wealth proportionally to the assets´expected returns, which can be interpreted as investing according to the fundamentals. Further, the equilibrium is evolutionarily stable in the sense of Schaffer (1988). We also study the stability properties of the equilibrium in an evolutionary dynamics where wealth flows with higher probability into those strategies that obtain higher realized payoffs.

Recent changes in U.S. family finances: evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances

Data from the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances show a striking pattern of growth in family income and net worth between 1998 and 2001. Inflation-adjusted incomes of families rose broadly, although growth was fastest among the group of families whose income was higher than the median. The median value of family net worth grew faster than that of income, but as with income, the growth rates of net worth were fastest for groups above the median. The years between 1998 and 2001 also saw a rise in the proportion of families that own corporate equities either directly or indirectly (such as through mutual funds or retirement accounts); by 2001 the proportion exceeded 50 percent. The growth in the value of equity holdings helped push up financial assets as a share of total family assets despite a decline in the overall stock market that began in the second half of 2000. ; The level of debt carried by families rose over the period, but the expansion in equities and the increased values of principal residences and other assets were sufficient to reduce debt as a proportion of family assets. The typical share of family income devoted to debt repayment also fell over the period. For some groups, however--particularly those with relatively low levels of income and wealth--a concurrent rise in the frequency of late debt payments indicated that their ability to service their debts had deteriorated.Consumer behavior ; Saving and investment ; Income