An empirical study of determinants in decision-making process

This paper presents a new social utility model, which highlights determinants in decision-making process when individuals are in strategic interactions by means of take-it-or-leave-it offer. In our model, the decision-maker seeks to maximize her utility function which depends both on her monetary payoff and payoffs differences between all individuals. We confront the predictions of our model with experimental regularities. We model decisions of player with a veto power by a dummy variable. In particular, we test the assumptions of the model with data obtained in a previous three-player dictator-ultimatum game experiment (Bonein, Serra, 2004). Regression and stepwise procedure allow us to confirm importance of personal payoff and existence of disadvantageous inequality aversion. However, our results dispute advantageous inequality aversion proposed by Fehr, Schmidt (1999). Moreover, advantageous inequality between others players becomes relevant. This last motivation was forgotten in inequality aversion models. This model decreases the importance of fairness motivation in rejection of positive offer. We show that motivation can be selfishness: the decision-maker seeks to maximize a particular utility function.

Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictator-ultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less other-regarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate.indirect reciprocity; generalized reciprocity; dictator game; ultimatum game; individual behavior

Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictatorultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less otherregarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate.

Sequential Location under one-sided Demand Uncertainty

By entering new market, firms face uncertainty about their potential demand. We depart from the usual Hotelling duopoly model with sequential entry. Firms can locate outside the city and market conditions are common knowledge. Then we introduce one-sided demand uncertainty. It results that demand uncertainty can be seen as a diferentiation force when the first entrant faces demand uncertainty and as an agglomeration force when it is the second entrant. Finally, firm 2's imperfect information implies higher welfare losses.

Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions

PsycINFO classification : 2300; 2900; 3000; 4200International audienceReciprocity considerations are important to the tax compliance problem as they may explain the global dynamics of tax evasion, beyond individual tax evasion decisions, toward a downward or upward spiral. To provide evidence on reciprocity in tax compliance decisions, we have conducted a laboratory experiment in which we introduced two types of inequities. The first type of inequity is called vertical, because it refers to inequities introduced by the government when it sets different fiscal parameters for identical taxpayers, while the second type of inequity is called horizontal because it refers to the fact that taxpayers may differ in tax compliance decisions. In this setting, taxpayers may react to a disadvantageous or advantageous inequity through negative or positive reciprocal behaviors, respectively. Our results support the existence of negative and positive reciprocity in both vertical and horizontal cases. When both inequities come into play and may induce reciprocal behaviors in opposite directions, the horizontal always dominates the vertical

L'influence de la connaissance du genre du partenaire dans les relations de confiance et de réciprocité: une étude expérimentale

Ce travail étudie l'influence de la connaissance du genre du partenaire dans les relations de confiance et de réciprocité. Il rend compte d’une expérience en laboratoire sur le jeu de l'investissement qui compare les données résultant de deux traitements : le premier, sans connaissance du genre du partenaire, et le second, qui est tel que tant les « envoyeurs » que les « répondants » connaissent le genre de la personne à laquelle ils sont appariés. Les résultats obtenus montrent une grande hétérogénéité des comportements individuels, qui va du comportement théorique d’égoïsme pur à une confiance et une réciprocité totale. La connaissance du genre du répondant par les envoyeurs n'implique pas d'envois différents, même si les hommes semblent faire plus confiance en leur partenaire que les femmes. Au niveau de la réciprocité, un phénomène de « solidarité de sexe » semble dominer : les individus ont tendance à honorer d'avantage la confiance de leur partenaire s'il est du même genre qu'eux. Le genre de l'envoyeur exerce une influence significative sur les retours lorsque celui-ci est connu des répondants. Mais la croyance usuelle selon laquelle les femmes seraient plus loyales que les hommes n'est pas confirmée par l’expérience.

Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictator-ultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less other-regarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate

Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictator-ultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less other-regarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate

L'influence de la connaissance du genre du partenaire dans les relations de confiance et de réciprocité: une étude expérimentale

Gender differences are often observed in real life-situations. We implement an experiment on the investment game which explores the influence of knowledge of partner's gender in trust and reciprocity by means of two treatments of information: the first one, without knowledge of partner's gender and the second treatment where gender's partner is common knowledge. A great heterogeneity of individuals’ behaviors is observed: from selfish behavior to complete trust and trustworthiness. Knowledge of responder’s gender does not imply different sending, even if men trust more their partners than women. However, a phenomenon of gender bias dominates in trustworthiness behavior

Une analyse théorique et empirique des déterminants sous-jacents dans la prise de décision

We propose in this article some new extensions of the well-known social preferences model of Fehr and Schmidt [1999]: the introduction of opponents? payoffs differences and a simple element of reciprocity. To test their robustness, we estimate fixed-effects Logit models with collected data on a three-player game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Results highlight a strong influence of proposed extensions that don?t display a sense of fairness but rather the self-centered concern. This new model provides a better explanation of individuals? decisions than the pioneering model of Fehr and Schmidt. Classification JEL : C25, C72, C91, D63