Media bias and electoral competition

This paper examines the incentives of ideological media outlets to acquire costly information in a context of asymmetric information between political parties and voters. We consider two market structures: a monopoly media market and a duopoly one. We show that if each party has the support of a media, either party has the same probability of winning the election. However, if just one of the parties has the support of the media, the results might well change, as this party will get into office with a higher probability than the other party. We also analyze voters' welfare in this context and show that the important aspect is whether a media industry exists, and not the number of media outlets.Election, Accountability, Media, Bias

Media Competition and Information Disclosure

This paper analyzes an election game where self-interested politicians can exploit the lack of information that voters have about candidates' preferred policies in order to pursue their own agendas. In such a setup, we study the incentives of newspapers to acquire costly information, and how competition among the media affect such incentives. We show that the higher the number of potential readers and/or the lower the cost or investigating, the more the newspapers investigate. We also show that the readers' purchasing habits play a crucial role in the model. More specifically, we show that if the readers always buy a newspaper, media competition favors information disclosure; whereas if they just buy a newspaper in the case news are uncovered, competition is not so desirable.Media competition, Political accountability, Information

Voting in small networks with cross-pressure

We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens su¤er from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this e¤ect to their interest.Network; Voting; Cross-Cutting.

Distribution of size differences <i>S</i>_dif -in per cent points- between the two cliques in a system with <i>N</i> = 100, <i>p</i> = 0.3 and <i>ε</i> = 0.2.

<p>Each colored vertical line represents the frequency of clique size differences for a different proportion of positive links <i>ρ</i>₀ in the initial conditions, as indicated in the legend. The back curve represents the mean of the previous frequencies. We run 1000 simulations for each <i>ρ</i>₀ value. Each vertical line represents the frequency in 2% bins and the different cases has been shifted each other to facilitate visualization.</p

Political competition when media create candidates’ charisma

This paper studies the location decisions of political parties. We propose a game where agents vote according to ideology and valence, and media create candidates’ charisma. The results we obtain show that candidates realize the power of media and therefore, locate themselves at some point between the position of the median voter and that of the media. We further obtain that depending on the media outlets the voters choose to see, the equilibrium location of candidates may differ. Thus, when voters choose among the outlets, candidates may differentiate their platforms. Differently, when voters are exposed to all the outlets, candidates tend more to moderate their ideology, in an attempt to get the favor of all the media. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006