Media bias and electoral competition

This paper examines the incentives of ideological media outlets to acquire costly information in a context of asymmetric information between political parties and voters. We consider two market structures: a monopoly media market and a duopoly one. We show that if each party has the support of a media, either party has the same probability of winning the election. However, if just one of the parties has the support of the media, the results might well change, as this party will get into office with a higher probability than the other party. We also analyze voters' welfare in this context and show that the important aspect is whether a media industry exists, and not the number of media outlets.Election, Accountability, Media, Bias

Media Competition and Information Disclosure

This paper analyzes an election game where self-interested politicians can exploit the lack of information that voters have about candidates' preferred policies in order to pursue their own agendas. In such a setup, we study the incentives of newspapers to acquire costly information, and how competition among the media affect such incentives. We show that the higher the number of potential readers and/or the lower the cost or investigating, the more the newspapers investigate. We also show that the readers' purchasing habits play a crucial role in the model. More specifically, we show that if the readers always buy a newspaper, media competition favors information disclosure; whereas if they just buy a newspaper in the case news are uncovered, competition is not so desirable.Media competition, Political accountability, Information

Voting in small networks with cross-pressure

We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens su¤er from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this e¤ect to their interest.Network; Voting; Cross-Cutting.

Strategic communication: screening and signaling in a freelance journalist - editor game

We model strategic communication as a two-period game between an advisor and a decision maker, in which the advisor has private information on a policy-relevant state of the world but does not know the motives of the decision maker. If the advisor has the desire to please the decision maker and there is a positive probability that the decision maker values information, we identify different modes of communication that lead to information disclosure. We discuss our results in the context of a freelance journalist - editor game. Among the results is that if the journalist sufficiently values second period payoff, no information is transmitted in period one and the only equilibria implies information manipulation. Additionally, we show that the quality of the communication process does not depend on who manipulates the information although welfare does.Strategic Communication, Conformity, Screening, Signaling; Mass Media

Six final absorbing states for a 20 agents system, starting from same initial condition (but different confidence levels <i>ε</i>, indicated at the upper-left corner of each panel).

<p>The initial opinions are shown in the upper-left panel of <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0164323#pone.0164323.g008" target="_blank">Fig 8</a>. The random initial network has the same number of positive and negative links, and we take <i>p</i> = 0.3. The numbers in each panel indicate the number of agents with the same opinion (the number of agents in an opinion cluster). The grey lines show the positive links between agents. In the absorbing states there are neither negative links between agents in an opinion cluster nor negative links between agents in a clique. In the cases with <i>ε</i> = 0.4 and <i>ε</i> = 1, there is consensus of opinions in each clique.</p

Typical (median) number of iterations <i>T</i>_typ -in time steps- to converge to a balanced configuration as a function of the number <i>N</i> of agents in the system for <i>p</i> = 0.1.

<p>The upper and lower curves correspond to the pure Antal (LTD) and the Constrained Triad Dynamics (CTD) models, respectively. The other three curves correspond to the BC-PF dynamics with <i>ε</i> = 0, <i>ε</i> = 0.1 and <i>ε</i> = 0.2, respectively. Each point represents the median value of 1000 different runs departing from random initial conditions with equal proportion of positive and negative links.</p

Number of different opinions <i>N</i>_op in final balanced configurations as a function of the bounded confidence parameter <i>ε</i> for 40 agents and <i>p</i> = 0.1.

<p>The grey curve corresponds to the BC model and the black curve to the BC-PF model. The curves represent the mean value of <i>N</i>_op in 8 simulations with random initial opinions. The initial links are also set at random with equal probability for friendship (+1) and for enmity (-1). The vertical bars indicate the maximum and minimum values of <i>N</i>_op in the 8 simulations.</p

Distribution of size differences <i>S</i>_dif -in per cent points- between the two cliques in a system with <i>N</i> = 100, <i>p</i> = 0.3 and <i>ε</i> = 0.2.

<p>Each colored vertical line represents the frequency of clique size differences for a different proportion of positive links <i>ρ</i>₀ in the initial conditions, as indicated in the legend. The back curve represents the mean of the previous frequencies. We run 1000 simulations for each <i>ρ</i>₀ value. Each vertical line represents the frequency in 2% bins and the different cases has been shifted each other to facilitate visualization.</p

Average of <i>D</i>⁻ in 100 runs as a function of parameters <i>ε</i> and <i>p</i> for a system of 40 agents.

<p>Average of <i>D</i>⁻ in 100 runs as a function of parameters <i>ε</i> and <i>p</i> for a system of 40 agents.</p