Externalidades de Rede e Tarifas de Interconexão na Rede Móvel: O Caso Brasileiro

In this paper, we aim to investigate the optimum values for the termination rate on mobile networks in Brazil. In order to do so, initially we provide an overview of the legal framework on the subject since the privatization in the beginning of the 90’s. In the second section, we provide a theoretical background on the subject and on the approaches used for the computing these prices, from the Ramsey pricing with network externalities, as used by Ofcom in the setting of termination charges for the United Kingdom, to the ones which use a framework of imperfect competition in the mobile sector, as presented in Wright (2000). The third section carries out a simulation of these approaches for parameter values of the Brazilian case. The fourth section concludes and posits some policy conclusions.Telecomunicações, Preços de Ramsey, Externalidades de Rede

SIMULAÇÃO DOS EFEITOS CONCORRENCIAIS DA FUSÃO COPENE-BRASKEM

In this paper, we aim to analyze the consequences for the competition as regards the purchase of control of COPENE by the BRASKEM group. Specifically, such operation increases the degree of horizontal concentration in Brazilian Polyethylene market (PEAD, PEBD,PEBDL), as well as the vertical concentration in the market for ethene. In order to evaluate the consequences of this operations, an analysis was carried out in order to simulate the behavior of producing companies of polyethylene and ethene as regards prices and quantities. The main conclusions of these simulations, from the formation of BRASKEM: (i) increase in average prices of polyethylene in Brazilian Market; (ii) decrease in the total quantity of polyethylene consumed; (iii) increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the sector; (iv) greater market share of BRASKEM, reinforcing its dominant position.

Simulação dos efeitos concorrenciais da fusão Copene-Braskem

In this paper, we aim to analyze the consequences for the competition as regards the purchase of control of COPENE enterprise by the BRASKEM group. Specifically, such operation increases the degree of horizontal concentration in Brazilian Polyethylene market (PEAD, PEBD, PEBDL), as well as the concentration in the market for ethene. In order to evaluate the consequences of these operations, an analysis was carried out in order to simulate the behavior of producing companies of polyethylene and ethene as regards prices and quantities. The main conclusions of these simulations, from the formation of BRASKEM enterprise: (i) increase in average prices of polyethylene in Brazilian Market; (ii) decrease in the total quantity of polyethylene consumed; (iii) Increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the sector; (iv) greater market share of BRASKEM, reinforcing its dominant position.Neste artigo são simuladas as implicações concorrenciais decorrentes da compra do controle da empresa COPENE pelo grupo BRASKEM. Mais especificamente, tal operação diz respeito aos efeitos da concentração horizontal no mercado de polietilenos (PEAD, PEBD e PEBDL), e da integração vertical no mercado de eteno. Para avaliar os efeitos da operação, foi realizada uma análise que simulou o comportamento das empresas produtoras de polietilenos e eteno em termos de fixação de preços e quantidades ofertadas. As principais conclusões destas simulações, partindo da formação da empresa BRASKEM, são: (i) elevação do preço médio dos polietilenos no mercado brasileiro; (ii) redução da quantidade total de polietilenos consumida; (iii) elevação da concentração no setor, medida pelo Índice Herfindahl-Hirschmann; (iv) maior participação de mercado da empresa BRASKEM, o que reforça sua posição dominante