Interpreting correlated random parameters in choice experiments

The random parameter logit (RPL) model with uncorrelated coefficients is a restrictive version of the mixed logit model, but it is one of the most frequently used models for analysing stated choice data in environmental valuation. The body of applied literature using a more flexible version, the RPL model with correlated coefficients, has been noticeably growing in the last years, but it has still been used less frequently due to its computational complexity and non- trivial interpretation. The correlation matrix of the coefficients in this model captures not only the correlation due to a behavioural phenomenon but also the correlation caused by scale heterogeneity. These two effects cannot be identified empirically. Nevertheless, this paper proposes a simple procedure that enables an interpretation of some of the estimated correlations, which can help to disentangle the unobserved preference heterogeneity. The proposed procedure consists of two simple steps. Firstly, the signs of the attributes corresponding to the utility coefficients that have a negative mean coefficient are reversed. Secondly, only negative correlations are interpreted. We propose a theoretical model accounting for correlations induced both by hypothetical behavioural phenomena and by scale heterogeneity and apply the proposed procedure to three typical cases of environmental valuation.The authors are grateful the FEDER/Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grant ECO2017-82111-R and the Basque Government through grants IT-642- 13 (UPV/EHU Econometrics Research Group) and IT783-13. The data have been obtained through collaboration of the IHOBE (Basque Environmental Agency) and the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) through the research project 2008.0101 (UPV/EHU) and under the agreement between Diputación Foral de Álava and the University of the Basque Country (Ref: 2010-2970)

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up - which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for manipulability (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Do individuals' health preferences validate the decentralisation of the public health system in Spain?

The objective of this paper is to estimate individuals' preferences about public health services in two Spanish regions, the Basque Country (BC) and Canary Islands (CI) and analyse whether they differ. This work was motivated by the actual economic situation, where it is necessary to obtain equilibrium between the needed health services and limited economic resources. With this limitation in mind, politicians have tried to design health policies that maximise individuals' welfare. Based on the theory of decentralisation, the devolution of public expenditure decisions and management to regional government maximises individuals' welfare more when individual preferences differ among regions. A discrete choice experiment was implemented with a survey designed to obtain data about individuals' choices. Using this data and discrete choice models, individual preferences for health services were estimated. Our findings indicate that these preferences differ among regions, so, for reasons of efficiency, decentralising decisions and management of public health policies to regional governments would be recommended. Once health policies are decentralised, our results provide a tool for identifying the health services most valued by the individuals in each region. This information would be useful policymakers designing health policies.We acknowledge financial support from FEDER/Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through grant PID2020-113650RB-I00. We hereby want to thank support from Maitena Poelemans and Geraldine Bachoue of the Centre de Documentation et de Recherches Europeennes (Universite de Pau et des Pays de lAdour), the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), the Ministry of Universities and the European Union through grant RECUALI21/18 for the requalification of the Spanish university system for 2021-2023, funded by the European Union-Next Generation EU. We would also like to acknowledge financial support from the UPV/EHU through grant GIU 18/147 and from the Basque Government through grant IT1336-19

Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

The Random Utility Model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this paper is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19 per centAlaitz Artabe acknowledges financial support from the Basque Government through “Programas de Ayudas para la Formación y Perfeccionamiento del Personal Investigador” and from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2009-11213). Javier Gardeazabal acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2009-09120) and the Basque Government (IT-313-07)

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up - which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for manipulability (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.This research is supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under project ECO2009-11213, co-funded by the ERDF, and by Basque Government funding to Grupo Consolidado GIC07/146-IT-377-07.The first author thanks the Basque Government for aid through the Programas de Ayudas para la Formación y Perfeccionamiento del Personal Investigador del Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación

Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

The Random Utility Model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this paper is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19 per centAlaitz Artabe acknowledges financial support from the Basque Government through “Programas de Ayudas para la Formación y Perfeccionamiento del Personal Investigador” and from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2009-11213). Javier Gardeazabal acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2009-09120) and the Basque Government (IT-313-07)

Replication data for: Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfatual

This dataverse includes STATA code and data to replicate "Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context

A multiple indicator solution approach to endogeneity in discrete-choice models for environmental valuation

Endogeneity is an often neglected issue in empirical applications of discrete choice modelling despite its severe consequences in terms of inconsistent parameter estimation and biased welfare measures. This article analyses the performance of the multiple indicator solution method to deal with endogeneity arising from omitted explanatory variables in discrete choice models for environmental valuation. We also propose and illustrate a factor analysis procedure for the selection of the indicators in practice. Additionally, the performance of this method is compared with the recently proposed hybrid choice modelling framework. In an empirical application we find that the multiple indicator solution method and the hybrid model approach provide similar results in terms of welfare estimates, although the multiple indicator solution method is more parsimonious and notably easier to implement. The empirical results open a path to explore the performance of this method when endogeneity is thought to have a different cause or under a different set of indicators. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Department of Education of the Basque Government IT-642-13 IT-783-13 Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ECO2017-82111-R University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) US15/11 CONICYT FONDECYT 1150590 Complex Engineering Systems Institute, Chile CONICYT FB081