The role of national trade logistics in the export trade of African countries

Background: This article critically examines the role of trade logistics in the exports of African countries. The performance of the trade logistics of African countries was analysed using the World Bank logistics performance index (LPI) and its components. The study was conducted based on the performance statistics of countries around the world in 2016. Objectives: The aim of this study was to identify African countries’ inefficient trade logistics areas based on LPI components for future improvement; and to investigate the relevance of trade logistics performance of African countries on export values in order to boost the region’s merchandise export share in the global market. Method: The methodological approach employed in this study is a combination of both descriptive and inferential data analysis. The African countries’ logistics performance in international trade was summarised using LPI median values. The effect of the performance of trade logistics on exports was explored based on a gravity model of international trade. For the estimation, the Heckman selection approach was applied to incorporate zero bilateral trades. Results: On average, African countries experience the lowest LPI score, particularly in terms of quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure, and customs and border clearance. A successful improvement in these areas would enhance African countries’ supply chain deliveries including on-time delivery, tracking and tracing and international shipments in cross-border transactions. Conclusion: The evidence from the gravity model estimates of this study suggests that an improvement in any of the LPI components can lead to significant growth in the export of African countries. This could then increase the African merchandise export share in global trade. The gravity model results also show that landlocked countries have lower trade flows than their coastal neighbours. Keywords: African, logistics performance index, export, landlocked countries of Africa, global trade, gravity modelpublishedVersio

Asymmetrical deployment of specific assets and contractual safeguarding in industrial purchasing relationships

Abstract The marketing literature based on transaction cost analysis (TCA) has only scantily explored whether the identity of the party (i.e., the buyer or the supplier) that employs specific assets is of importance in instances when alignments of contractual safeguards of specific assets occur in buyer ± supplier relationships. Imbalanced deployment of specific assets highlights the problem of asymmetrical dependence in purchasing relationships. This article draws heavily on TCA and related works in marketing in an attempt to analyze and compare interfirm dependence, exposure to opportunism, and formalization of purchase contracting (FORM) across channel dyads where the buyer and the supplier respectively carry out relation-specific investments. In particular, an investigation of 161 industrial purchasing relationships demonstrated that the level of formalized purchase contracting was significantly greater when the supplier unilaterally deployed specific assets in a relationship as opposed to situations where mainly the buyer employed assets at risk. This and other findings clarify the issue of asymmetrical dependence structures in industrial marketing relationships.

Allocation of specific assets, relationship duration, and contractual safeguarding in buyer-seller relationships

This study explores the interaction effect of bilateral dependency and relationship duration on contractual safeguarding. In particular, the study compares how the allocation of specific assets, unilateral or mutual, affects contractual safeguarding across buyer-seller relationships with short versus long prior history. Data from a survey of 157 industrial purchasing relationships demonstrates that unilateral investments in specific assets by either the buyer or the supplier are more strongly supported by contractual safeguarding as the length of the relationship is increased. On the other hand, contractual safeguarding of mutually deployed specific assets is significantly relaxed as relationships evolve over time. Keywords: Transaction costs; Asset specificity; Contractual safeguarding; Relationship duratio

Hybrid governance and governance performance in industrial purchasing relationships

Hybrid governance arrangements (e.g. joint action, long-term contracting and vertical coordination) feature regularly as an effective response to inter-firm dependence in the literature of business-to-business relationships. However, current empirical work has paid little attention to whether such governance arrangements really do improve governance efficacy and reduce transaction costs. The present study focuses on the governance efficacy of vertical coordination in industrial business-to-business relationships. Building on transaction costs arguments, the author examines whether vertical coordination is an effective means for adapting to inter-firm dependence, realized as the substantial employment of specific assets. Empirical findings from a survey of 170 industrial supplier-buyer relationships demonstrate that when asset specificity reaches a certain level, greater vertical coordination reduces ex post transaction costs significantly. On the other hand, this efficacy pattern is modest or non-existent in relationships with low asset specificity. The research findings support the basic TCA assumption that the performance of hybrid governance arrangements is highly dependent on a situation of substantial inter-firm dependence with subsequent small-number conditions.Industrial buyer-seller relationships Relationship marketing Transaction costs analysis

Inter-firm governance and structural power in industrial relationships: the moderating effect of bargaining power on the contractual safeguarding of specific assets

In the basic model of transaction cost analysis (TCA), neither market power nor power based on resource-dependence plays a significant role. In this article, we extend the TCA-perspective by combining resource-dependence theory (RDT) and TCA, and examine whether the buyer's bargaining power influences the alignment of the contractual safeguarding of buyer-specific and supplier-specific investments. Data from a survey of 160 industrial purchasing relationships provide empirical support for our theoretical predictions. The empirical findings demonstrate that the buyer's bargaining power does interfere with the safeguarding of relations-specific assets. As the buyer's relative bargaining power increases, the safeguarding of buyer-specific assets is substantially reinforced. On the other hand, the contractual protection of supplier-specific assets is significantly relaxed as the buyer's bargaining power grows. Our findings indicate that there is a tension between the alignment of contractual safeguarding arrangements and structural power in inter-firm business, and that resource-dependence considerations offer an important complement to TCA when we consider the transacting parties' ability to provide contractual safeguards for assets at risk. Further, the findings indicate that the establishment of relational ties in long-term relationships is an important antecedent to governance structure. The empirical findings demonstrate that the longer a business-to-business relationship lasts, the more the contractual governance is relaxed.

Inter-firm dependence, environmental uncertainty and vertical co-ordination in industrial buyer-seller relationships

Effective co-ordination of business-to-business relationships is an important determinant of firms' competitiveness under changing market conditions. Drawing on transaction cost analysis (TCA) and resource-dependence theory (RDT), the authors analyse the effects of inter-firm dependence and environmental uncertainty on vertical co-ordination in industrial purchasing relationships. Analysis of data from a survey of 157 industrial buyers of items repetitively used in production shows that the RDT-predicted association between environmental uncertainty and vertical co-ordination is highly contingent on the magnitude of the present safeguarding problem in supplier relationships. When asset specificity is modest, the safeguarding problem is trivial and substantial environmental uncertainty induces higher inter-firm co-ordination in order to handle the need for environmental adaptation. This pattern of inter-firm organisation is significantly modified as asset specificity increases and imposes trading hazards. Under conditions with substantial asset specificity, increased environmental uncertainty actually undermines inter-firm co-ordination. Implications for theory and practice in business-to-business relationships are highlighted.Transaction cost analysis Resource-dependence theory Industrial buyer-seller relationships Environmental uncertainty Vertical co-ordination

Allocation of specific assets, relationship duration, and contractual safeguarding in buyer-seller relationships

This study explores the interaction effect of bilateral dependency and relationship duration on contractual safeguarding. In particular, the study compares how the allocation of specific assets, unilateral or mutual, affects contractual safeguarding across buyer-seller relationships with short versus long prior history. Data from a survey of 157 industrial purchasing relationships demonstrates that unilateral investments in specific assets by either the buyer or the supplier are more strongly supported by contractual safeguarding as the length of the relationship is increased. On the other hand, contractual safeguarding of mutually deployed specific assets is significantly relaxed as relationships evolve over time. Keywords: Transaction costs; Asset specificity; Contractual safeguarding; Relationship duratio