Venture capital as human resource management

Part of the way venture capitalists add value to portfolio firms is by obtaining and transferring information about senior managers across firms over time. Information transfer occurs on a significant scale and takes place both among a single venture capitalists portfolio firms and between different venture capitalists firms via a network of venture capitalists, which venture capitalists use to locate and relocate managers. We collect and analyze survey data on the operation of this human resource network. Theoretical and empirical analyses indicate that cross-sectional differences among portfolio firms are associated with differences in the intensity with which venture capitalists network. The observable factors relevant in explaining the intensity with which venture capitalists network include: 1) the value of the information transmitted though the network, 2) the riskiness of the activities of the portfolio firms, 3) the size of the venture capital fund, 4) the degree of difficulty in enticing executives to manage portfolio firms, and 5) the reputation of the venture capitalist for successfully recycling managers. We show that each of these factors reflects the costs and benefits to venture capitalists of participating in the network.

An Overview of Brazilian Corporate Governance

We provide the first detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance practices in an emerging market. We report on the corporate governance practices of Brazilian public companies, based primarily on an extensive 2005 survey of 116 companies. Most firms have a controlling shareholder or group. Board independence is an area of weakness. The boards of most Brazilian private firms are comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. Many firms have no independent directors. Financial disclosure is a second area of weakness. Only a minority of firms provide a statement of cash flows or consolidated financial statements. However, many provide English language financial statements. Audit committees are uncommon, but many Brazilian firms use a home-grown substitute known as a fiscal board. A minority of firms provide takeout rights to minority shareholders on a sale of control, above the legal minimum. Shareholders agreements among the members of a controlling family or group are common. The overall picture is hard to reconcile with models in which firms optimally choose those governance structures which best meet firm-specific needs. It suggests instead the potential value of legal or institutional reforms which impose minimum quality rules on public firms

The Microstructure of the Brazilian Market for Corporate Bonds

Purpose – The Brazilian government approved regulations to foster the corporate bond market. In 2009, Instruction 476 of the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (the Brazilian capital market regulator) relaxed the requirements for issuing bonds. In 2011, Law 12,431 created infrastructure bonds, which give individuals tax exemptions. Since then, aggregate proceeds have more than tripled. We describe the Brazilian bond market and the characteristics of issues and issuers; and critically evaluate this evolution. Design/methodology/approach – Descriptive analysis. Data on aggregate issuances; bond characteristics (proceeds, maturity, yields, underwriting); issuer characteristics; secondary market (trading); performance (default and renegotiation rates); and allocation of issues. Findings – Bond issues are small and bonds present a short maturity. International agencies are the main ratings providers, using a Brazilian-adjusted rating scale. Fixed-yield bonds are rare. The vast majority of regular bonds are linked to the interbank offered interest rate (DI or CDI). Only two local universal banks dominate the underwriting activity. These banks and their related parties receive more than half of the aggregate allocation. Less than half of issues have an investment grade, and more than half are not rated at all. The incidence of ex-post credit events is most frequently in the form of renegotiations of bond terms. Strict defaults are also high. Liquidity for bonds in the secondary market is low. Originality/value – To our knowledge, this is the first article to describe the microstructure of the Brazilian bond market

Conflicts of Interest in the Underwriting of IPOs and Price Stabilization

Banks that supply capital and simultaneously underwrite securities for the same clients may benefit themselves or their clients at the expenses of investors by overpricing securities. We investigate this issue by analyzing price stabilization and short-term returns of IPOs. Our analysis suggests that equity-conflicted underwriters overprice IPOs and use price stabilization to disguise overpricing. The same does not happen with loan conflicted underwriters. We also show that the partial adjustment phenomenon may result from price stabilization, since it disappears after the stabilization is over.N/

Determinants of Success in Private Equity-Venture Capital Investments

This paper investigates the determinants of performance of the investments of private equity and venture capital (PEVC) funds in Brazil. We use two unique databases: the First Brazilian Private Equity and Venture Capital Census and the Guia-GVcepe Endeavor, with information on this industry for the period 1999 to 2007. As measures of performance we use the percentage and number of exits through IPO, acquisition by a company or by another investor. Our results indicate that the factors influencing the performance of investments are: size of the fund, number of investments, the practice of co-investment, experience and foreign origin of the managing organization, focus on late stage, intensity of contact between managers and portfolio companies and the number of seats on the boards of the invested companies. The number of successes grows with the number of investments at a declining rate. This can indicate 1) a limit to the ability of managers or 2) that a large number of investments allows for greater diversification of risk, directing investments to companies of high risk but with a high upside

Capital de risco e gerenciamento de resultados em IPOs

We investigate earnings management (EM) in IPOs and the role of private equity/venture capital (PEVC) in hampering such practice. We show that when analyzing EM, PEVC and non-PEVC-sponsored firms should be treated as different samples: if one splits the sample, R-squared increases drastically for both subsamples. For PEVC-sponsored IPOs EM is marginal, mostly related to firms’ characteristics and little related to the phases of the IPOs. Differently, for non-PEVC-sponsored IPOs EM is significant, mostly related to the phases of the IPO and little related to firms’ characteristics. Finally, the reputation of the auditor is important only for PEVC-sponsored IPOs, suggesting that the choice of auditor is more meaningful for PEVC-sponsored firm, i.e, the choice of reputed auditor represents a compromise not to manage earnings.Investigamos o gerenciamento de resultados (GR) em ofertas públicas iniciais de ações (IPOs) e o papel de gestores de capital de risco (private equity/venture capital – PE/VC) em dificultar tal prática. Quando analisamos o GR, as empresas investidas por PE/VC e as empresas não investidas por PE/VC verificamos que estas deveriam ser tratadas como amostras diferentes. Ao dividirmos a amostra, o R2 aumenta significativamente para ambas as sub-amostras. Para os IPOs de empresas com investimento de PE/VC, o GR é marginal, geralmente relacionado às características das empresas e pouco relacionado às fases do IPO. De forma diferente, para os IPOs de empresas não investidas por PE/VC o GR é significativo, geralmente relacionado às fases do IPO e pouco relacionado às características das empresas. Finalmente, a reputação do auditor é importante apenas para os IPOs com investimento de PE/VC, sugerindo que a escolha do auditor é mais significativa para a empresa investida por PE/VC, isto é, a escolha de um auditor com boa reputação representa um compromisso de não gerenciar os resultados

Methods for Multicountry Studies of Coporate Governance: Evidence from the BRIKT Countries

We discuss empirical challenges in multicountry studies of the effect of firm-level corporate governance on firm value, focusing on emerging markets. We assess the severe data, “construct validity,” and endogeneity issues in these studies, propose methods to respond to those issues, and apply those methods to a study of five major emerging markets -- Brazil, India, Korea, Russia, and Turkey. We develop unique time-series datasets on governance in each country. We address construct validity by building country-specific indices which reflect local norms and institutions. These similar-but-not-identical indices predict firm market value in each country, and when pooled across countries in firm fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) regressions. In contrast, a “common index” that uses the same elements in each country, has no predictive power in FE regressions. For the country-specific and pooled indices, FE and RE coefficients on governance are generally lower than in pooled OLS regressions; and coefficients with extensive covariates are generally lower than with limited covariates. These results confirm the value of using FE or RE with extensive covariates to reduce omitted variable bias. We develop lower bounds on our estimates which reflect potential omitted variable bias

The effect of institutional development on the growth of Brazilian firms

This article focuses on the determinants of firm's growth in Brazil. In particular it investigates the individual characteristics of firm that determine its growth; how institutional development affects firm's performance, and how institutional development differently affects small and large firms. We find that, consistently with the learning models, growth is decreasing on age and negatively correlated to size. As expected, firms that belong to an economic group, export and maintain operations abroad grow faster. Growth is negatively correlated to profitability. Furthermore, we observe that shortcomings in institutional development, when measured in terms of corruption, inefficiency of the judicial system and lack of financial development, have a negative impact on firms' growth. This negative impact of corruption and inefficiency of the judicial system is stronger for smaller firms. Large firms benefit the most with financial development. Overall our results indicate that improvement in institutions can be an important mechanism to promote growth. Furthermore, institutional underdevelopment has the perverse effect of promoting concentration.<br>Este artigo foca nos determinantes da taxa de crescimento das firmas no Brasil. Em particular, investigamos as características individuais das empresas que determinam o seu crescimento, como o desenvolvimento institucional afeta a performance da firma e como o desenvolvimento institucional afeta de maneira diversa pequenas e grandes empresas. Nossos resultados, consistentemente com os modelos de crescimento, indicam que taxas de crescimento decrescem com a idade e tamanho da empresa. Conforme o esperado, empresas que pertencem a um grupo econômico, exportam ou mantêm operações no exterior crescem mais rapidamente. Crescimento é negativamente correlacionado com lucratividade. Observamos também que fraco desenvolvimento institucional, mensurado em termos de corrupção e ineficiência do sistema judiciário e baixo desenvolvimento financeiro, tem impacto negativo sobre o crescimento das empresas. O impacto negativo da corrupção e ineficiência do sistema judiciário é mais acentuado em firmas menores. As grandes empresas são as que mais se beneficiam do desenvolvimento financeiro. No geral, nossos resultados indicam que o desenvolvimento institucional pode ser um mecanismo importante para a promoção do crescimento. Além do mais, o baixo desenvolvimento institucional tem o efeito perverso de promover a concentração

The Effect of Institutions on the External Financing of The Brazilian Firms

Based on an analysis across Brazilian states, this article investigates whether the level of institutional development affects the pattern of external financing of firms. The analysis is based on a unique dataset stratified across firms from 10 to 10,500 employees (of which 71.9 percent are micro and small firms), 13 Brazilian states and 9 industries. Our main results indicate that lack institutional development – measured through corruption and efficiency of the judicial system and financial development – makes the use of bank credit and formal sources less frequent. Moreover, this effect seems to be stronger for small firms

Human resources management, a non-financial benefit of venture capital

This article addresses the question of whether venture capital brings non-financial benefits to the firms it funds. I propose that venture capital adds value because venture capitalists are able to transfer information about senior managers across firms and time. For this transfer to exist on a significant scale, it is necessary that venture capitalists operate a network, within which they are involved in locating and relocating managers. Results obtained through a survey of venture capitalists based in the US confirm the existence of such a network: The majority of the respondents affirm that it is common for them 1) to act on suggestions from their colleagues when hiring managers; and 2) to recommended managers to other venture capitalists. Econometric analysis shows that the factors relevant to explain the intensity with which venture capitalists network include: 1) the value of the information transmitted though the network; 2) the degree of risk that venture capitalists attribute to their investments; 3) how difficult venture capitalists find it to entice executives to manage firms funded with their capital; and 4) the gains that the venture capitalists who suggest managers can obtain when enticing managers to accept job offers.Este artigo procura verificar se venture capital adiciona valor às empresas que financia. Eu proponho que venture capitalistas adicionam valor porque transferem informação sobres  executivos seniores através das empresasem seu portfólio. Paraque esta transferência ocorra em uma escala significante é necessário que os venture capitalistas operem uma rede envolvida em localizar e realocar gerentes. Resultados obtidos por meio de uma pesquisa entre venture capitalistas dos Estados Unidos confirmam a existência da rede. A maioria dos participantes afirmam que é comum para eles 1) tomar sugestões de outros venture capitalistas quando contratam executivos; e 2) recomendar executivos para outros venture capitalistas. Uma análise econométrica mostra que entre os fatores relevantes para explicar a intensidade com a qual os venture capitalistas participam do network encontramos: 1) o valor da informação transmitida via network; 2) o grau de risco que os venture capitalistas atribuem aos seus investimentos; 3) o grau de dificuldade que os venture capitalistas encontram para convencer executivos a administrar suas empresas; e 4) os ganhos que os venture capitalistas, que recomendam executivos, podem obter ao convencer outros executivos a aceitar ofertas de trabalho