Social transfers and conditionalities under different regime types

This paper examines the implications of political factors for social policy choices. Specifically, we explore the link between regime type and adoption of unconditional transfers versus transfers conditioned on beneficiaries’ investments in human capital. Due to the direct nature of benefits, unconditional transfers are more likely to be used to buy off opposition and prevent social unrest. As transfers that are conditioned on education and health pay off only in a relatively distant future, they are rarely initiated for political motives and rather defined by interests of long-term development and human capital accumulation. Using the new dataset on Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in developing countries, we find that transfers are indeed chosen so as to be unconditional under less democratic regimes. There is some evidence that conditional transfers are more likely to be adopted in democracies. In particular, democracies tend to increase the number of conditional schemes once any social transfer program is introduced

Non-contributory social transfer programs in developing countries: a new dataset and research agenda

Social transfer programs in developing countries are designed to contribute to poverty reduction by increasing the income of the poor in order to ensure minimal living standards. In addition, social transfers provide a safety net for the vulnerable, who are typically not covered by contributory social security. The question of how effective such programs are in achieving these aims has been the subject of numerous impact evaluations. However, the optimal design of such programs is still unclear. Even less is known about whether the adoption and implementation of transfer programs is really driven by poverty and neediness or whether other factors also have an influence. To investigate these and other research questions, we have developed a new dataset entitled Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in Developing Countries. One advantage of this dataset is that it traces 186 non-contributory programs from 101 countries back in time and presents them in panel form for the period up until 2015. The second advantage is that it contains all the details regarding the various programs’ designs as well as information on costs and coverage in a coded format and thus facilitates both comparative quantitative and in-depth qualitative analyses. While describing the data we discuss a number of examples of how the dataset can be used to explore different issues related to social policies in developing countries. We present suggestive evidence that the adoption of social transfer programs is not based only on pro-poor motives, but rather that social policy choices differ between political regimes

Internationales Engagement zeigt Erfolge: Verbesserung der Arbeitsbedingungen in Kambodschas Textilsektor

Die Arbeitsbedingungen in den Textilfabriken Asiens geraten aufgrund eklatanter Missstände immer wieder in den Blickpunkt der Öffentlichkeit. In Kambodscha versuchen internationale und lokale Akteure durch innovatives Engagement die Arbeitsbedingungen zu verbessern. Textilexporte machen etwa ein Drittel des Bruttoinlandsproduktes von Kambodscha aus. Trotz einer relativ umfassenden Verankerung von Arbeitnehmerrechten in der kambodschanischen Gesetzgebung werden diese in der Textilindustrie nach wie vor häufig nicht durchgesetzt. Das im Jahr 1999 begonnene innovative Better Factories Cambodia-Projekt der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) sollte hier Abhilfe schaffen. Im Ergebnis haben sich die Arbeitsbedingungen verbessert, aber die Erfolge sind nicht eindeutig. Während zu Beginn der gemeinsamen Initiative der kambodschanischen Regierung und der ILO deutliche Verbesserungen erzielt werden konnten, flaute diese Entwicklung seit dem Jahr 2006 merklich ab. Gründe hierfür sind u.a. Änderungen in der Anreizstruktur für Textilunternehmen. Zwischen den Jahren 2001 und 2004 wurden Kambodscha besondere Handelsvorteile gewährt, wenn das Land die Arbeitsbedingungen in der Textilindustrie verbesserte. Der Mindestlohn für Textilarbeiter sank zwischen den Jahren 2001 und 2014 in realen Werten. Nach massiven Demonstrationen und Arbeitsniederlegungen stieg der Reallohn im Jahr 2014 erstmals an. Es wird zwar ein großer Anteil der Beschäftigten in der Textilbranche durch Gewerkschaften vertreten, Gewerkschafter werden allerdings massiv unter Druck gesetzt. Befristete Arbeitsverträge werden zudem als Druckmittel gegen Textilarbeiter eingesetzt. Problematisch ist insbesondere eine Zweiteilung des Sektors in exportierende Fabriken, die streng kontrolliert werden und die Arbeitsgesetze mehr oder minder befolgen, und Subunternehmen, die durch das Raster der offiziellen Kontrollen fallen

Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes (NSTP) in Developing Countries Data Set

The NSTP data set provides a comprehensive overview of non-contributory social transfer programmes in developing countries. It covers 186 programmes in 101 countries up until 2015. We provide the data in two formats. The text format consists of a list of countries included and descriptive programme profiles. The table format was obtained by encoding all details and characteristics of the respective social transfer programmes in panel form and is accompanied by a codebook.The NSTP data set provides a comprehensive overview of non-contributory social transfer programmes in developing countries. It covers 186 programmes in 101 countries up until 2015. We provide the data in two formats. The text format consists of a list of countries included and descriptive programme profiles. The table format was obtained by encoding all details and characteristics of the respective social transfer programmes in panel form and is accompanied by a codebook

I Perceive Therefore I Demand: The Formation of Inequality Perceptions and Demand for Redistribution

This paper shows that perceptions of inequality matter for demand for redistribution and investigates how individuals form their perceptions. Using data from the ISSP, we present new evidence on the significant changes of perceptions of inequality for more than 20 countries during the last three decades and how these are not in synch with changes in objective inequality. Rather than indicating misperceptions, these discrepancies reflect a broader view of inequality that for most individuals encompasses poverty, insecurity in the labor markets, availability of public goods in addition to objective income disparities. We then show that these perceptions have much stronger correlation with demand for redistribution than objective inequality, or any of the mentioned contextual variables that mold perceptions. Ideology and self-interest also contribute to demand for redistribution. Much more than those on the left, right-leaning individuals adjust their demand for redistribution in line with their inequality perceptions.Peer reviewe

Social transfers and conditionalities under different regime types

This paper examines the implications of political factors for social policy choices. Specifically, we explore the link between regime type and adoption of unconditional transfers versus transfers conditioned on beneficiaries’ investments in human capital. Due to the direct nature of benefits, unconditional transfers are more likely to be used to buy off opposition and prevent social unrest. As transfers that are conditioned on education and health pay off only in a relatively distant future, they are rarely initiated for political motives and rather defined by interests of long-term development and human capital accumulation. Using the new dataset on Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in developing countries, we find that transfers are indeed chosen so as to be unconditional under less democratic regimes. There is some evidence that conditional transfers are more likely to be adopted in democracies. In particular, democracies tend to increase the number of conditional schemes once any social transfer program is introduced