Of Rats and Names (Reflections on Hate)

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The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy

Tekst jest fragmentem książki The Jew, The Arab. A History of the Enemy poświęconej historii wrogości między Arabami i Żydami, a także historii związku tego konfliktu z kształtowaniem się zarówno tożsamości w Europie, jak i tożsamości samych Arabów i Żydów. Śledząc rozważania takich filozofów jak Carl Schmitt czy Jacques Derrida, autor stara się przedstawić mechanizmy odpowiedzialne za tworzenie różnic pierwotnych względem tożsamości i jednocześnie dla ich konstrukcji niezbędnych. Różnice te są niezbędne do tworzenia par pojęciowych takich jak „wnętrze–zewnętrze” czy „wróg–przyjaciel”. Problem konstrukcji pojęcia wroga jako konstrukcji różnic i tożsamości zostaje tu zbadany na płaszczyźnie teologii, polityki i prawa, a także jako zagadnienie związane z różnicami etnicznymi oraz z pojęciem „Europy”.The text is a fragment of a book titled The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy, which is devoted to the history of hostility between Arabs and Jews, as well as to the connection of this conflict with the shaping of both identities in Europe and the identities of Arabs and Jews themselves. Following considerations by such philosophers as Carl Schmitt and Jacques Derrida, the author tries to present the mechanisms responsible for creating primary differences as the necessary conditions for identity creation. These differences are essential for creating conceptual pairs such as "inside-outside” or "enemy-friend." The problem of constructing a concept of the enemy as well as of forging differences and identities is examined at the crossroads of theology, politics, law and ethnic differences, as well as in its function in the very creation of the concept of "Europe.

On the Political History of Destruction

This essay seeks to reframe the question of continuity (or discontinuity) between Orientalism and Islamophobia as, underlying the question, is an enduring conception of history as agentive, as a “making,” a “construction,” or a “production” (“Men make their own history …”). Turning our attention instead toward destructive power—distinct from repressive and coercive and from productive and enabling modes of power (Foucault, Said)—a distinct history, or anti-history, emerges, which necessitates a different lexicon. Political or subject formations might still be at stake, but another logic or illogic, a different politics may become visible where the main concern is not the making of world (Arendt), but its undoing; not the production of collectives or of individual subjects, but their destruction. Torture, as Jean Améry described it, is one such destruction of world. It may thus become possible to ask whether, between Orientalism and Islamophobia, the Muslims or Muselmänner of the Nazi camps were a “product,” whether they were “made” into subjects. The essay builds on earlier reflections where elements of a lexicon and analytics of destruction were considered (Heidegger, Derrida), along with preliminary answers to the question: what is destruction? Or here: is there a history of destruction? </p

The Forgetting of Christianity

What is Christianity? What is its sense? Is it a religion, a religion like all other religions? In joining a chorus of European philosophers who have returned to Paul or to Christianity, Jean-Luc Nancy retains the Latin word “religion” as the uninterrogated marker of Christianity and other “world religions.” Religion is thus the site of an ambiguous “sharing,” of which Christianity partakes perhaps more than others — but within which limits? Besides its deconstruction, has there been a critique of Christianity

Trouble with zombies: Bare life, Muselmanner and displaced people

This article considers the increase in media representations of zombies during the first decade of the 2000s. It argues that a connection can be read between the new preoccupation with zombies and anxieties over the apparent threat posed by those without rights attempting to enter Western countries. The article sets up a theoretical argument using the work of Giorgio Agamben. Taking on board Agamben's discussion of ‘bare life’, the article follows Agamben in making a link between this idea and the Muselmann, the Jew reduced to the walking dead in the concentration and death camps. For Agamben, bare life is central to the functioning of the modern state. The article suggests that bare life is a way of connecting the Muselmann with the zombie as that monster has been elaborated in films since George Romero's Night of the Living Dead (1968). Indeed, where Agamben argues that the werewolf was the characterising monster of the premodern era, this article argues that the zombie is the characterising monster of the modern era. The article goes on to make the connection between bare life, Muselmänner, zombies and displaced people, most commonly understood as asylum seekers

Conférences de M. Gil Anidjar

Anidjar Gil. Conférences de M. Gil Anidjar. In: École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire. Tome 114, 2005-2006. 2005. pp. 173-174

II. « La destruction semble être quelque chose de purement négatif »

Qu’appelle-t-on destruction ? Je commencerai, au sujet de Heidegger, par une remarque un peu longue, un peu sommaire, mais qui me semble dès à présent nécessaire, même si on pourra sans doute tenter de la nuancer plus tard. Cette remarque la voici : aucun philosophe avant Heidegger ne s’était préoccupé avec une attention aussi soutenue de destruction, de la destruction sous tous ses noms et sous tous ses titres, sous toutes ses formes aussi. Aucun philosophe n’avait exprimé ainsi, ni même don..

I. « Qu’est-ce qu’un titre intitule, désigne, délimite ? »

« Le titre de ce cours était, je le rappelle : Heidegger, la question de l’être et l’histoire. » Nous sommes le 29 mars 1965 et Jacques Derrida s’apprête à conclure la neuvième et dernière séance de son premier cours à l’École normale supérieure. C’est le dernier paragraphe et Derrida rappelle donc son titre. Il en appelle au rappel, à la mémoire et au souvenir, à l’histoire. Derrida nomme les mots, les trois mots et le nom ; il rappelle sa justification des mots et du nom, de chacun des mots..