Frenemies: how do financial firms vote on their own kind?

The financial sector is unique in being largely self-governed: the majority of financial firms’ shares are held by other financial institutions. This raises the possibility that monitoring of financial firms is especially undermined by conflicts of interest due to personal and professional links between these firms and their shareholders. To investigate this possibility, we scrutinize the aspect of the financial sector’s self-governance that is directly observable: mutual fund companies’ voting of their peers’ stock. We find that considerations specific to investee firms’ membership in the same industry as their investors do indeed impact voting. This impact is in the direction of supporting the investee’s management. We show that the own-industry effect reduces director efficacy and lowers firm value as a result. We extend our analysis to other financial companies and show that they also tend to vote more favorably when it comes to their peers. Our results suggest that peer support is a corrupting factor in the financial sector’s governance

The Determinants of Mutual Fund Performance: A Cross-Country Study

We use a new data set to study the determinants of the performance of open–end actively managed equity mutual funds in 27 countries. We find that mutual funds underperform the market overall. The results show important differences in the determinants of fund performance in the USA and elsewhere in the world. The US evidence of diminishing returns to scale is not a universal truth as the performance of funds located outside the USA and funds that invest overseas is not negatively affected by scale. Our findings suggest that the adverse scale effects in the USA are related to liquidity constraints faced by funds that, by virtue of their style, have to invest in small and domestic stocks. Country characteristics also explain fund performance. Funds located in countries with liquid stock markets and strong legal institutions display better performance

Downside risk and the size of credit spreads

We investigate why spreads on corporate bonds are so much larger than expected losses from default. Systematic factors make very little contribution to spreads, even if higher moments or downside effects are taken into account. Instead we find that sizes of spreads are strongly related to idiosyncratic-risk factors: not only to idiosyncratic equity volatility, but even more to idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk. Idiosyncratic bond volatility helps to explain spreads because it reflects not just the distribution of firm value but is also a proxy for liquidity risk. Idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk adds to this by capturing the left-skewness of the firm-value distribution. We confirm our results both for the initial 1997-2004 sample period and also out of sample for 2005-2009, which includes the sub-prime crisis. Overall, credit spreads are large because they incorporate a large risk premium related to investors' fears of extreme losses.Bond Idiosyncratic risk Downside risk Credit spread puzzle Pricing kernel Liquidity Sub-prime crisis

Dollar-weighted returns to stock investors: A new look at the evidence

Dichev [2007. American Economic Review 97, 386-401], in an influential paper, examines the gap between the performance of major stock markets and the dollar-weighted performance of investors in these markets. He finds a significant gap of 1.3 percent per year for NYSE/AMEX and 1.5 percent internationally. We question these results. The NYSE/AMEX performance gap is actually negative in the last two thirds of Dichev's 1926-2002 period, while his international results are influenced by a dramatic increase in Datastream's coverage. When, instead of Datastream, we use a comprehensive share price database, the UK performance gap changes from 1.1 to -1.3 percent. In short, Dichev's findings are not robust.Stock market Dollar-weighted returns

Surprise vs anticipated information announcements: Are prices affected differently? An investigation in the context of stock splits

We compare the long run reaction to anticipated and surprise information announcements using stock splits. Although there is underreaction in both cases, anticipated splits are treated differently to those that are unforeseen. After anticipated splits, cumulative abnormal returns peak at one-and-a-half times the level observed after unanticipated splits although the time taken for the announcement to be absorbed into prices is the same. We explain the difference in underreaction by the degree to which split announcements are believed and hence invested in. The favorable signal conveyed in forecast splits is more credible owing to their better pre-split performance, resulting in a far more pronounced underreaction effect.