Eastern Borderlands as Europe-Makers: (How) Can neighbours redefine the EU?

A general and strategic effect of EU’s Association Agreements and DCFTAs with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has been the extension of the concept of Europe and its wider opening to neighborhoods and margins. It is on this basis that a European normative order can be differentiated from both the ‘Russian world’ and Eurasian geopolitical space. However this paper argues that the process of association is not a unilateral move, but a multilateral and reciprocal development; it is a way for Europe to know more about itself, and to politically redefine itself. The neighbourhood policy causes controversial effects on the EU. On the one hand, it consolidates the liberal minded groups within European societies eager to see the EU as a promoter of values of freedom and civic liberties to be projected eastwards and defended in EU’s neighborhood. On the other hand, the problems of practical implementation tend to solidify sceptical groups in both the EU and its associated neighbours that contest not only the deepening of EU’s engagement with Ukraine, but EU ’s normative project as a whole. The implementation of the joint strategy of the EU and its close neighbours faces a challenge of finding a proper balance between two dominant – yet to a large extent contradictory – approaches. One consists of capitalizing on these countries’ status as victims of Russia’s policies, countries whose very existence is under threat, which implies support and help from the EU. Another, requiring much more consistent efforts, is for the associated neighbouring states to emerge as positive showcases of transition, and useful partners contributing not only to the transformation process in post-Soviet area, but also to EU’s and NATO’s security. The recent three years made clear that the former alone does not guarantee to Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova a fully-fledged European voice

Biopolitical conservatism and “pastoral power”: a Russia – Georgia meeting point.

The paper applies the concept of biopolitics to the analysis of Russia's relations with Georgia. It highlights the centrality of Orthodoxy for Russia's "soft power" and religious diplomacy

From Sochi - 2014 to FIFA - 2018: a Fading Sovereignty?

In this article, we uncover the dynamics and the evolution of Russian discourses of sovereignty before and after the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games using some elements of Foucauldian methodology and constructivist reading of sovereignty as an institution. We argue that there is a discrepancy between the rhetoric of sovereign power and the institutional practices in which it is embedded. It leads us to theorize that sovereignty discourses are contextual, unstable and constitutively shaped by commitments taken as key elements of international socialization. In the case of Russia, these discourses can be divided into three groups: pre-Sochi, post-Sochi and pre-World 2018 Cup discursive formations. As we venture to demonstrate, Putin's model of sovereignty is in crisis, yet it has support, both domestic and international. In the near future, sport is likely to remain one of those spheres of high visibility where the ideology of surviving under sanctions and counter-attacking the West will be reified

Incomplete Hegemonies, Hybrid Neighbours: Identity games and policy tools in Eastern Partnership countries. CEPS Working Document No 2018/02, February 2018

This paper applies the concepts of hegemony and hybridity as analytical tools to help understand the structural changes taking place within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries and beyond. The author points to the split identities of many post-Soviet societies and the growing appeal of solutions aimed at balancing Russia’s or the EU’s dominance as important factors shaping EaP dynamics. Against this background, he explores how the post-Soviet borderlands can find their place in a still hypothetical pan-European space, and free themselves from the tensions of their competing hegemons. The EaP is divided into those countries that signed Association Agreements with the EU and those preferring to maintain their loyalty to Eurasian integration. Bringing the two groups closer together, however, is not beyond policy imagination. The policy-oriented part of this analysis focuses on a set of ideas and schemes aimed at enhancing interaction and blurring divisions between these countries. The author proposes five scenarios that might shape the future of EaP countries’ relations with the EU and with Russia: 1) the conflictual status quo in which both hegemonic powers will seek to weaken the position of the other; 2) trilateralism (EU, Russia plus an EaP country), which has been tried and failed, but still is considered as a possible option by some policy analysts; 3) the Kazakhstan-Armenia model of diplomatic advancement towards the EU, with some potential leverage on Russia; 4) deeper engagement by the EU with the Eurasian Economic Union, which has some competences for tariffs and technical standards; and 5) the decoupling of security policies from economic projects, which is so far the most difficult option to foresee and implement in practice

Hard questions about soft power: a normative outlook at Russia's foreign policy

"Political interest in the concept of soft power, introduced to the international academic community a few decades ago, has recently been revitalized after a series of mass uprisings in a number of countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Arguably, the substantive issues raised by the Arab Spring cannot merely be reduced to either energy matters or to the application of military force by the anti-Gaddafi coalition. The essence of these developments is profoundly normative, and this is how they were perceived by most European analysts, who were keen to raise a set of value-laden questions: how effective has the EU been as a 'normative power' in its relations with neighboring autocratic regimes? Can other emerging powers - above all Turkey - become a better model for the Arab world? Can we expect the revolutionary virus to spread to other areas overwhelmed by authoritarian regimes, including the Caucasus and Central Asia? Against this dynamic background, it appears that the whole gamut of soft power issues - including the role of identities, norms, and values - will increasingly shape the EU's complicated relations with its neighbors. The largest of them, Russia, often seems to mimic Europe's soft power, and yet paradoxically this has not brought Moscow and Brussels closer to each other." (author's abstract

Identity and representation in Russia's regions: Adopting a critical theory perspective

AbstractIn this paper, the author seeks to find pathways of extrapolating the critical potential of post-structuralist reasoning to the study of Russia's domestic regions' policies. He argues that ideas, norms and rhetorical frames are important ideational arguments to explain policy outcomes in specific Russia's region and in the whole system of Russian federalism. Analysis of Russian regionalism, therefore, can be enriched by engaging with and adopting the new concepts and tools bringing attention to the power of regional identities as exemplified by different types of discourses

Multipolarity in plural: resignification(s), language games, and Russia's multiple identities

"In his working paper, the author addresses the situation of linguistic uncertainty that gives obvious political effects. He approaches the concept of multipolarity, which has been well-known for decades, and demonstrates that it has multiple meanings in Russia. He challenges the almost iconic uniformity of the idea of multipolarity, showing that it hides many alternative discourses, both academic and political. As a 'Russian doll', the unpacked multipolarity breaks down into a number of fragments, which constitute a certain menu of Russia's foreign policy choices. The author invites to think more creatively about Russian foreign policy narratives by asking such questions as: how 'real' is multipolarity in the eyes of Russian experts? Is there a gap between its academic understanding and political meaning? Shall Russia and EU find a common language in their worldviews, or are discursive disconnections between them to prevail?" (author's abstract

Russia-EU: competing logics of region building

"In this paper I will argue that Russia and the European Union have different visions of their roles and instruments in their common neighborhood. Russia treats most ex-Soviet states as “naturally” belonging to the zone of its vital interests, hence the “near abroad” concept and the concomitant reluctance to admit any role for Western institutions in the region. The EU in turn relies mostly on its “soft power” resources, including norm projection, in order to foster domestic transformation in the neighboring countries and make them more compatible with the European understanding of partnership. Yet despite these obvious differences, there are similarities between Russia and the EU as well. Each tries to distance itself from the other party through a variety of means. Russia wishes to install its political and security monopoly in the “near abroad” by claiming that regional problems have to be resolved on the regional level, i. e. without involvement from the outside. The EU however increasingly prefers to focus on “regions-in-the-making” where Russia is viewed as an external power rather than as a constitutive member of regional structures (such as the South Caucasus region and Central Asia). As a result of this mutual “othering” (i. e. ascribing characteristics of difference), both Russia and the EU develop their own policy instruments and strategies for the common neighborhood instead of engaging neighboring countries in full-fledged cooperation. Both Russian and EU policies lack elements of inter-subjective interaction with their neighbors, which makes the Eastern Partnership more of an EU policy tool rather than a common forum of co-partnership with Eastern European and Caucasian countries. In a similar vein, the Customs Union project is more of a reflection of Russia’s great power ambitions in the post-Soviet area than a common approach jointly coordinated by all participating countries. This is one explanation for the preponderance of bilateral relations that both Moscow and Brussels develop with individual countries over more institutionalized forms of multilateral cooperation. Another possible explanation is the continuous process of disaggregation and fragmentation within this vast zone of the common neighborhood, which makes all attempts to propose broad institutional frameworks (like CIS institutions or the Eastern Partnership) dysfunctional. Yet Russia and the EU will eventually have to find not only a more cooperative modus operandi in managing the projects of common interest in their shared neighborhood, but also to systematically engage its neighbors in multilateral projects. Arguably, the best pathway to achieve these goals is through region building aimed at strengthening regional institutional clusters. This process is dependent on a number of factors, among which regional identities plays the crucial role. In this paper I will dwell upon four regions-in-the-making located at the intersection of EU-Russia spheres of interests: Nordic Europe, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea regions." [author's abstract]"In dieser Analyse wird argumentiert, dass Russland und die Europäische Union (EU) unterschiedliche Sichtweisen ihrer Rollen und Instrumente in ihrer gemeinsamen Nachbarschaft haben. Russland behandelt die meisten postsowjetischen Staaten so, als ob sie »von Natur aus« in seine Einflusszone gehörten, woraus das Konzept des »Nahen Auslands« und die dazu gehörende Abneigung entstanden ist, westlichen Institutionen irgend eine Rolle in dieser Region zuzugestehen. Die EU wiederum verlässt sich vor allem auf ihre »Soft Power«, wozu auch die Projektion ihres Regelwerks gehört, um in benachbarten Ländern innenpolitische Umgestaltungen zu fördern und sie damit vereinbarer mit dem europäischen Verständnis von Partnerschaft zu machen. Doch trotz dieser offensichtlichen Unterschiede gibt es auch Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Russland und der EU. Jeder der beiden versucht, sich vom jeweils anderen mittels verschiedener Instrumente zu distanzieren. Russland möchte sein Politik- und Sicherheitsmonopol im »Nahen Ausland« mit der Behauptung durchsetzen, dass regionale Probleme auf der regionalen Ebene gelöst werden müssen, d. h. ohne Einmischung von außen. Die EU dagegen legt zunehmend eher den Schwerpunkt auf »sich bildende Regionen«, innerhalb derer Russland eher als eine auswärtige Macht denn als ein konstitutives Mitglied regionaler Strukturen (wie etwa der südliche Kaukasus und Zentralasien) gesehen wird. Als Ergebnis dieses gegenseitigen »Differenzierens« (also der Zuschreibung von Unterschieden) entwickeln sowohl Russland als auch die EU ihre eigenen Politikinstrumente und Strategien für die gemeinsame Nachbarschaft, anstatt die Nachbarländer in eine voll ausgebaute Zusammenarbeit einzubeziehen. Sowohl Russland wie der EU fehlt es an Elementen intersubjektiver Zusammenarbeit mit ihren Nachbarn, was die Östliche Partnerschaft (ÖP) mehr zu einem Politikinstrument der EU macht statt zu einem gemeinsamen Forum der Teilpartnerschaft mit osteuropäischen und kaukasischen Ländern. Ganz ähnlich ist das Projekt der Zollunion eher eine Reflektion der Großmachtambitionen Russlands für das postsowjetische Gebiet anstatt eines gemeinsamen Vorgehens, im Einverständnis mit allen teilnehmenden Ländern koordiniert. Das ist eine Erklärung für das Vorherrschen von bilateralen Beziehungen, die sowohl Moskau wie Brüssel gegenüber einzelnen Ländern entwickeln anstatt mehr institutionalisierter Formen multilateraler Zusammenarbeit. Eine weitere mögliche Erklärung ist der anhaltende Prozess der Zersetzung und Fragmentierung innerhalb dieser riesigen Zone der gemeinsamen Nachbarschaft, der alle Versuche, breit angelegte institutionelle Rahmen (wie die GUS-Institutionen oder die Östliche Partnerschaft) vorzuschlagen, dysfunktional macht. Doch werden Russland und die EU letzten Endes nicht nur einen kooperativeren Modus operandi bei der Bewältigung der Projekte gemeinsamen Interesses in ihrer geteilten Nachbarschaft zu entwickeln haben, sondern auch ihre Nachbarn in multilaterale Projekte einbeziehen müssen. Sicherlich ist der beste Weg zur Erreichung dieser Ziele der Aufbau von Regionen, gerichtet auf die Stärkung von Gruppierungen von regionalen Institutionen. Dieser Prozess hängt von einer Reihe von Faktoren ab, worunter regionale Identitäten die entscheidende Rolle spielen. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich mich mit vier entstehenden Regionen beschäftigen, die an den Schnittlinien zwischen den Interessensphären der EU und Russlands liegen: Nordeuropa, die Ostsee-, Schwarzmeer- und die Region des Kaspischen Meeres." [Autorenreferat

On political semiotics

Review of Introducing Relational Political Analysis: Political Semiotics as a Theory and Method [Palgrave Studies in Relational Sociology] by Peeter Selg and Andreas Ventsel. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, 319 pp.    &nbsp