The Effectiveness of the International Whaling Commission

In this article, the effectiveness of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) is discussed in relation to three criteria: stated goals, correspondence between scientific advice and political decisions, and relative improvement in relation to the status quo. Under these criteria, the IWC has a low score on effectiveness in its initial phase (1949 to mid-1960s), but increased effectiveness in the next stage (mid-1960s to late 1970s). However, in the most recent history of the IWC, effectiveness has again been decreasing. Two main perspectives have been used in trying to explain the development within the IWC; first and most important, the assumption is that effectiveness will vary according to differences in the type of problems and related state preferences; the more "malign" the problem, the lower the effectiveness. Also, it is assumed that, although to a lesser degree, effectiveness will be influenced by the problem-solving capacity related to the cooperation in question. This approach is based on the design outlined for a large comparative research project on the effectiveness of international resource and environmental management. In this article, however, this perspective is used in a very simplified form, primarily to systematize the history and performance of the IWC.Key words: effectiveness, International Whaling Commission, science, policy, international, resource, management, interests, power, institutionsDans cet article, on discute de l'efficacité de la Commission baleinière internationale (CBI) selon trois critères: les buts exprimés, l'accord entre les avis scientifiques et les décisions politiques, et l'amélioration relative par rapport au statu quo. Selon ces critères, la CBI affiche une faible efficacité dans sa phase initiale (1949 - milieu des années 60), mais augmente son efficacité dans la phase suivante (milieu des années 60 - fin des années 70). Dernièrement cependant, l'efficacité de la CBI est de nouveau en baisse. On utilise deux grands axes pour tenter d'expliquer cette évolution au sein de la CBI. On suppose d'abord et surtout que l'efficacité variera en fonction des types de problèmes et des préférences de chaque État à leur sujet; plus le problème sera «épineux», moins il y aura d'efficacité. On suppose aussi, bien qu'à un degré moindre, que l'efficacité sera influencée par la capacité de résolution de problèmes reliée à la coopération en question. Cette approche est fondée sur le plan d'un grand projet de recherche comparative sur l'efficacité de la gestion des ressources et de l'environnement au niveau international. Dans cet article, cette perspective n'est cependant utilisée que sous une forme très simplifiée, surtout dans le but de systématiser l'histoire et la performance de la CBI.Mots clés: efficacité, Commission baleinière internationale, science, politique, international, ressource, gestion, intérêts, puissance, institution

One Size Fits All? Understanding the Domestic Politics of Global Climate Change

To what extent can a common conceptual framework or model be used to study climate and energy policy trajectories of states whose political and economic systems differ widely? In this paper we are concerned with long-term policy trajectories rather than day-to-day politics. For this purpose, frameworks focusing on generic forces and essential functions in society seem to be the most useful. The paper outlines a framework and indicates how it may be applied to very different political systems such as those of the United States and China. Our point of departure is the assumption that in all systems policy development is driven by two generic forces: (societal) demand and (governmental) supply. These forces interact and co-produce policies, but the ways in which they do so vary significantly depending on characteristics of political institutions, cultures and other nation-specific factors. Moreover, building on classical contributions to political science, we assume that in all systems policy-making involves cer tain essential functions, one being the aggregation of preferences. Again, the specific institutional arrangements and processes through which preferences are aggregated will vary with nation- specific factors and be important determinants of outcomes. Yet, it seems that much of this variance can be captured and systematically analyzed by means of a model conceiving of outcomes as a function of (a) “the rules of the game”; (b) demand-supply configurations, and (c) the distribution of power. This model can be useful in understanding outcomes in autocratic as well as democratic systems, and we employ empirical illustrations from the United States and China to indicate how this kind of analysis might be designed and carried out

Calling in the Heavyweights: Why the World Bank Established the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, and What It Might Achieve

The initial key international climate policy and carbon market hub was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Over time several international organizations and networks have been added to the “international carbon market web,” such as several World Bank (WB) initiatives. As to the latter, the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC) was launched in 2015. A key question then becomes: considering an increasingly dense international environment, why was the Coalition formed? Our analysis shows the importance of taking into account institutional pathways in the Bank itself and the character of previous WB-internal initiatives. However, it is particularly important to note interaction with a strong external pull, stemming both from more “systemic” developments such as the collapse of the Clean Development Mechanism system and the explicit request for new initiatives from key actors, such as UN General Secretary Ban-Ki Moon. We suggest seeing entrepreneurship from the bureaucracies of international organizations as conditional on member-state behavior or a conducive institutional environment (or both). We also discuss main prospects ahead, both for the Coalition and the more general organizational set-up in this issue-area. Here we draw attention to the role of the WB as an international “heavyweight” and CPLC and Bank meetings held back to back.acceptedVersio

Handover Architectures for Heterogeneous Networks Using the Media Independent Information Handover (MIH)

In heterogeneous networks, network selection by nature is a multi-dimensional problem. Many parameters need to be considered for handover decision making. Apart from handover accuracy and efficiency, an important consideration is the scalability and signaling overhead of such handover algorithms. In this article we propose to break down a Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) based heterogeneous handover algorithm in two parts. The execution of the first part is carried out in an independent and proactive manner prior to the actual handover, assuming three different handover architectures. The handover architectures are differentiated based upon the level of the distribution of the handover algorithm among multiple network components. The Media Independent Handover (MIH) and its different services are used to retrieve and share information among MIH enabled nodes and for conformity among heterogeneous network standards. The proposed algorithm is evaluated with respect to handover accuracy, handover delay efficiency and signaling overhead. The evaluation is carried out for all three handover architectures using simulations. Only handovers between Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) and WiMAX (IEEE 802.16) networks are considered. But the handover framework is general and can be extended to consider other wireless and mobile communication networks

Implementing the Minamata Convention on Mercury: Will China Deliver?

China has undertaken a major shift in its position on mercury as an environmental problem over the last decade and a half. It ratified the Minamata Convention (MC) in 2016 and by doing so has committed to implement the treaty objectives. This article asks: How do we explain China’s will and ability to implement its MC obligations? There is little systematic knowledge about the main factors underlying implementation of international mercury objectives in China, hence this article contributes new research on this important topic. We examine the implementation process, focusing on the coal sector and differentiate between indirect effects from other policies and direct efforts to implement obligations. We find that China has moved toward stricter regulation of mercury emissions and direct implementation of the Minamata Convention in the coal sector. However, our study shows that local implementation capacity needs improvement.Implementing the Minamata Convention on Mercury: Will China Deliver?acceptedVersio

International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda1

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/146934/1/j.1468-2486.2007.00672.x.pd

The Role of International Courts and Tribunals in Global environmental Governance

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International Climate Negotiations: Top-down, Bottom-up or a combination of both?

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The Panel on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services

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