Fears of falling short versus anxieties of decline : explaining Russia and China’s approach to status-seeking

Although recent scholarship has advanced our understanding of status, little attention has been paid to the factors that shape states’ status-seeking behaviour. Consequently, existing theories are unable to explain why Russia has been more aggressive and confrontational in its status-seeking than China. What is missing is a detailed examination of the ways in which status-seekers’ power trajectories affect their status-seeking behaviour. Whether a status-seeker is rising or in decline shapes its propensity to take risks in pursuit of status, its calculations regarding the utility of attaining more status, and its ability to use non-confrontational and non-aggressive status-seeking strategies to induce other states to accord it higher status. Declining powers, such as Russia, engage in aggressive status-seeking to avoid imminent status losses. Decliners need to initiate confrontations with other states to compel them to recognise their status. Risers, such as China, are more cautious and restrained. Recognising that aggressive status-seeking can jeopardise imminent gains, they are conscious of the costs that accompany elevated status. Their admirable successes and growing power, moreover, make other states all the more willing to accord them higher status. Risers, therefore, can enhance their status without resorting to aggressive or confrontational methods

Ties That Do Not Bind: Russia and the International Liberal Order

The world is experiencing an unprecedented shift in wealth and power away from the West and towards the developing countries According to some estimates the combined gross domestic product of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) will surpass that of the G7 nations by 2032. India's GDP alone is predicted to surpass that of the United States by 2043 and China's GDP will be almost twice that of the US by 2050. Rising powers are using this newfound wealth to expand their global influence. China has taken the lead in investment and development in Africa. Russia is consolidating its influence in the Post-Soviet space. India is flexing its muscle on the subcontinent. Brazil is pushing for regional integration in South America and promoting diplomatic initiatives to address some of the world's most difficult problems, such as the Iranian nuclear program. What is the impact of institutions and regimes during periods of major power transition in the international system? My dissertation challenges liberal theories, which argue that the institutions and regimes established by the Western powers after World War II constitute a resilient and robust "International Liberal Order" (ILO) that will shape and restrain the behavior of rising powers. I develop a test of eight observable hypotheses for how the ILO should affect the behavior of rising and then test these against the behavior of post-Soviet Russia. I find that the Russian case fails along all eight hypotheses and that Russia has adopted a range of policies that undermine the existing order and work to transform it. The ILO's institutions and regimes have not shaped and constrained Russia's behavior in the ways that the theory predicts. Nor have the larger political and economic processes that ILO theorists believe bolster the existing order, such as global economic integration, the rise of transnational non-state actors (NGOs and big business) and the spread of liberal and democratic values, made Russia more amenable to integration into the ILO. Evaluated in this way, claims about the robustness and resilience of the existing order fail, suggesting that Russia and other rising states will look to use their growing power to bring about major changes in the international order.Interestingly, it's not only Russia's behavior that does not conform to the ILO's expectations. The leading Western powers have not been willing to give Russia a seat at the table that would give it a real say over major political and economic questions. They continue to be wary of growing Russian power and suspicious of Russia's true intentions. As a result, Russia's leaders are unsatisfied with the existing order's ability to promote their country's interests. Instead of embracing the ILO, Russia has increasingly looked to preserve its freedom of action and has followed an independent foreign policy course. The Russian case challenges the ILO's universalistic argument that all emerging states will simply find common cause within the existing framework of international institutions and regimes. It shows that rising states have a mind of their own and that they are ready to utilize a wide range of tools to realize their ambitions. They see the ILO as only one among many means to pursue their interests. But in many cases concerns about relative gains and their reluctance to enter into relationships of dependence will also make them question the wisdom of working through existing institutions. Rising states will often see the pursuit of their own power and capabilities - rather than strengthening institutional relationships - as the most reliable strategy for promoting their interests. They will also look to use their newfound power to transform international institutions so that they serve their interests more effectively. Not only is there a demand for change on the part of rising powers, but they may also be able to effect change more readily than is usually acknowledged by either realist or liberal IR theories. Both realist and liberal theories assume that rising powers only have two strategies open to them: they can either accept the existing order or wage a full-out frontal assault to overthrow it (i.e., behave as Germany and Japan did in the lead up to WWI/WWII or the Soviet Union did after WWII). Proponents of the ILO argue that rising powers will accept the established order because they will find the costs and risks of pushing for change to be prohibitive. In examining Russia's behavior, I find that rising powers have a wider menu of effective strategies and tactics available to them - from simply ignoring the parts of the ILO that they do not like, to forming new relationships and institutions that achieve specific aims. These strategies allow rising powers to resist the current order and work towards its gradual transformation without having to challenge it openly and directly. The future international order may take the form of a traditional multi-polar system where order is the product of power balancing between system's most powerful states. This does not mean that we will see a complete return to intense military completion between great powers, as some realists have claimed. Though liberal theorists tend to overstate their transformative effects, new technologies and other processes related to globalization have had a profound effect on international relations. Nuclear weapons and growing economic interdependence will moderate conflict between states and make the prospects of great power war - and even the type of hard balancing we witnessed in earlier historical periods - remote. Competition between states will be intense, though it will manifest itself primarily in the economic and ideological (soft power) realms. Nontraditional security threats will also continue to be a primary concern in the years to come. However, states will be more likely to address these threats through ad-hoc and bilateral cooperation, rather than through institutions. Change can be gradual and can come through the decay and reform of old international institutions or the creation of new ones. This last point gives us some comfort and hope for the future as we enter an era of uncertainty and unpredictability in international politics. It suggests that Western leaders need not be afraid of change. Rather than insisting that rising powers accept the existing order, it may be in the West's own long-term interests to begin looking for ways to work with rising powers to transform the international order so that it better serves the interests of all of states

From “Greater Europe” to “Greater Eurasia”: Status concerns and the evolution of Russia’s approach to alignment and regional integration

Russia’s approach to alignment and regional integration has evolved dramatically—from a focus on the West and disinterest and neglect of regional integration in the 1990s, to vigorous efforts to reintegrate the post-Soviet space under Russian leadership in the period between 2009 and 2014, to forming a “Greater Eurasia” that transcends the post-Soviet space and includes China and other non-Western powers (such as Turkey, India, and Iran) today. Status concerns are key to understanding this evolution in policy and vision as a declining Russia struggles to avoid losing great power status. Russia initially eschewed its relationships with post-Soviet states in favor of integration with Europe and the West, which seemed to offer greater status gains. When Russia failed to find a place in the Western liberal order and “Greater Europe” commensurate with its status aspirations, it shifted its attention to regional integration of the post-Soviet space, believing this would make Russia, in the words of President Putin, “one of the poles in a future multipolar world.” However, integrating the post-Soviet space proved to be an arduous task (that failed miserably in Ukraine) and did not yield the status gains Russia hoped for. The scope of Eurasian integration has now shifted to the formation of a “Greater Eurasia,” as Russia looks to gain status through its association with more dynamic rising and emerging powers

Ties That Do Not Bind: Russia and the International Liberal Order

The world is experiencing an unprecedented shift in wealth and power away from the West and towards the developing countries According to some estimates the combined gross domestic product of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) will surpass that of the G7 nations by 2032. India's GDP alone is predicted to surpass that of the United States by 2043 and China's GDP will be almost twice that of the US by 2050. Rising powers are using this newfound wealth to expand their global influence. China has taken the lead in investment and development in Africa. Russia is consolidating its influence in the Post-Soviet space. India is flexing its muscle on the subcontinent. Brazil is pushing for regional integration in South America and promoting diplomatic initiatives to address some of the world's most difficult problems, such as the Iranian nuclear program. What is the impact of institutions and regimes during periods of major power transition in the international system? My dissertation challenges liberal theories, which argue that the institutions and regimes established by the Western powers after World War II constitute a resilient and robust "International Liberal Order" (ILO) that will shape and restrain the behavior of rising powers. I develop a test of eight observable hypotheses for how the ILO should affect the behavior of rising and then test these against the behavior of post-Soviet Russia. I find that the Russian case fails along all eight hypotheses and that Russia has adopted a range of policies that undermine the existing order and work to transform it. The ILO's institutions and regimes have not shaped and constrained Russia's behavior in the ways that the theory predicts. Nor have the larger political and economic processes that ILO theorists believe bolster the existing order, such as global economic integration, the rise of transnational non-state actors (NGOs and big business) and the spread of liberal and democratic values, made Russia more amenable to integration into the ILO. Evaluated in this way, claims about the robustness and resilience of the existing order fail, suggesting that Russia and other rising states will look to use their growing power to bring about major changes in the international order.Interestingly, it's not only Russia's behavior that does not conform to the ILO's expectations. The leading Western powers have not been willing to give Russia a seat at the table that would give it a real say over major political and economic questions. They continue to be wary of growing Russian power and suspicious of Russia's true intentions. As a result, Russia's leaders are unsatisfied with the existing order's ability to promote their country's interests. Instead of embracing the ILO, Russia has increasingly looked to preserve its freedom of action and has followed an independent foreign policy course. The Russian case challenges the ILO's universalistic argument that all emerging states will simply find common cause within the existing framework of international institutions and regimes. It shows that rising states have a mind of their own and that they are ready to utilize a wide range of tools to realize their ambitions. They see the ILO as only one among many means to pursue their interests. But in many cases concerns about relative gains and their reluctance to enter into relationships of dependence will also make them question the wisdom of working through existing institutions. Rising states will often see the pursuit of their own power and capabilities - rather than strengthening institutional relationships - as the most reliable strategy for promoting their interests. They will also look to use their newfound power to transform international institutions so that they serve their interests more effectively. Not only is there a demand for change on the part of rising powers, but they may also be able to effect change more readily than is usually acknowledged by either realist or liberal IR theories. Both realist and liberal theories assume that rising powers only have two strategies open to them: they can either accept the existing order or wage a full-out frontal assault to overthrow it (i.e., behave as Germany and Japan did in the lead up to WWI/WWII or the Soviet Union did after WWII). Proponents of the ILO argue that rising powers will accept the established order because they will find the costs and risks of pushing for change to be prohibitive. In examining Russia's behavior, I find that rising powers have a wider menu of effective strategies and tactics available to them - from simply ignoring the parts of the ILO that they do not like, to forming new relationships and institutions that achieve specific aims. These strategies allow rising powers to resist the current order and work towards its gradual transformation without having to challenge it openly and directly. The future international order may take the form of a traditional multi-polar system where order is the product of power balancing between system's most powerful states. This does not mean that we will see a complete return to intense military completion between great powers, as some realists have claimed. Though liberal theorists tend to overstate their transformative effects, new technologies and other processes related to globalization have had a profound effect on international relations. Nuclear weapons and growing economic interdependence will moderate conflict between states and make the prospects of great power war - and even the type of hard balancing we witnessed in earlier historical periods - remote. Competition between states will be intense, though it will manifest itself primarily in the economic and ideological (soft power) realms. Nontraditional security threats will also continue to be a primary concern in the years to come. However, states will be more likely to address these threats through ad-hoc and bilateral cooperation, rather than through institutions. Change can be gradual and can come through the decay and reform of old international institutions or the creation of new ones. This last point gives us some comfort and hope for the future as we enter an era of uncertainty and unpredictability in international politics. It suggests that Western leaders need not be afraid of change. Rather than insisting that rising powers accept the existing order, it may be in the West's own long-term interests to begin looking for ways to work with rising powers to transform the international order so that it better serves the interests of all of states

From the Security to Insecurity Dilemma: Developing a Theory of Security for Today's Emerging Powers

Abstract: The West's attempts to isolate Russia during the Ukraine crisis have failed to win the support of the leading states of Global South. China, Brazil, India, and South Africa abstained from the UN resolution to condemn Russia's annexation of Crimea and have spoken out against further sanctions. This response reflects their receptiveness to Russia's claims that events in Kiev constituted a "color revolution" orchestrated by the West --a narrative that speaks to developing states' own feelings of internal vulnerability and weakness. The paper builds on Mohammed Ayoob's "third world security predicament" modifying this concept to fit an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world where developing states are the biggest new players. We are used to thinking of conflict between states in terms of the security dilemma, i.e. where a state's strength has the effect of making it more secure but also increases the insecurity of other states. A state's internal weaknesses can unleash a similar cycle of suspicion and conflict. If a state believes that these weaknesses will be exploited by rival powers it may look for ways to push back. In a world where the emerging powers and potential rivals to US and Western hegemony are also developing states this kind of insecurity dilemma may represent a more dangerous threat to peace between great powers. The West's attempts to isolate Russia during the Ukraine crisis have failed to win the support of the leading states of the developing world. China, Brazil, India, and South Africa abstained from the UN resolution to condemn Russia's annexation of Crimea and have spoken out against further sanctions

War in Ukraine: The Clash of Norms and Ontologies

The Russo-Ukrainian war from February 2022 represents a major inflection point in international politics. Ukraine has become the focal point for a larger contest between models of the post-Cold War peace order, with one advanced by the Euro-Atlantic allies and the other by Russia. Both were rooted in a similar normative framework but with very different ontologies. The Western powers and Russia are locked into a struggle described by the West as one between democracy and autocracy. But it runs much deeper as it is based on the two sides' conflicting understandings of the fundamental nature of international politics. The contesting parties talk past one another as if they are living in different realities, which in a sense they are. While the gulf at the normative level may be addressed through diplomacy, the ontological character of the conflict frustrates any attempts to achieve lasting peace. At the same time, countries in the Global South (except those with security ties with the US) do not perceive that their ontological security is substantively affected by the war in Ukraine. They have been reluctant to join the anti-Russian sanctions and have voiced disquiet at the Global North’s attempts to embroil them in a struggle not of their making and which reproduces their subaltern status.&nbsp

"From Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia. Status Concerns and the Evolution of Russia’s Approach to Alignment and Regional Integration’

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