96 research outputs found
Processes, pre-emption and further problems
In this paper I will argue that what makes our ordinary judgements about token causation true can be explicated in terms of interferences into quasi-inertial processes. These interferences and quasi-inertial processes can in turn be fully explicated in scientific terms. In this sense the account presented here is reductive. I will furthermore argue that this version of a process-theory of causation can deal with the traditional problems that process theories have to face, such as the problem of misconnection and the problem of disconnection as well as with a problem concerning the mis-classification of pre-emption cases
The Return of Causal Powers?
Powers, capacities and dispositions (in what follows I will use these terms synonymously) have become prominent in recent debates in metaphysics, philosophy of science and other areas of philosophy. In this paper I will analyse in some detail a well-known argument from scientific practice to the existence of powers/capacities/dispositions. According to this argument the practice of extrapolating scientific knowledge from one kind of situation to a different kind of situation requires a specific interpretation of laws of nature, namely as attributing dispositions to systems. My main interest will be to discuss what characteristics these dispositions need to have in order to account for the scientific practice in question. I will furthermore assess whether the introduction of dispositions in the context of the extrapolation argument can be described as a ârevitalizationâ or as a âreturnâ to those notions repudiated by early modern philosophers. More particularly I will argue for the following claims:
I. In repudiating scholastic terminology, including substantial forms with their causal powers, post-cartesian philosophers focussed on a concept of causation that was much stronger than 21st century conceptions of causation. For this reason alone, whatever âcausalâ is supposed to mean in todayâs causal powers, embracing causal powers is not a simple return to a pre-cartesian notion.
II. The dispositions presupposed in scientific practice need not (and should not) be construed in causal terms (whether strong or weak).
III. While some early modern philosophers contrasted the characterisation of the natural world in terms of substantial forms (and their causal powers) on the one hand and a mathematical characterization on the other and suggested that these approaches are incompatible, the dispositions postulated by the extrapolation argument to account for scientific practice are themselves characterized in mathematical terms. More precisely: The behaviour the systems are disposed to display is â at least in physics â often characterized in mathematical terms.
IV. The dispositions assumed in the law-statements in scientific practice are determinable rather than determinate properties
Reduction
Reduction and reductionism have been central philosophical topics in analytic philosophy of science for more than six decades. Together they encompass a diversity of issues from metaphysics and epistemology. This article provides an introduction to the topic that illuminates how contemporary epistemological discussions took their shape historically and limns the contours of concrete cases of reduction in specific natural sciences. The unity of science and the impulse to accomplish compositional reduction in accord with a layer-cake vision of the sciences, the seminal contributions of Ernest Nagel on theory reduction and how they strongly conditioned subsequent philosophical discussions, and the detailed issues pertaining to different accounts of reduction that arise in both physical and biological science (e.g., limit-case and part-whole reduction in physics, the difference-making principle in genetics, and mechanisms in molecular biology) are explored. The conclusion argues that the epistemological heterogeneity and patchwork organization of the natural sciences encourages a pluralist stance about reduction
Scientific practice and necessary connections
En este artĂculo presento un problema, al menos para aquellos humeanos que creen que el futuro estĂĄ abierto. ArgumentarĂ©, en particular, que el siguiente aspecto de la prĂĄctica cientĂfica no puede ser explicado por la tesis humeana del futuro abierto: la distinciĂłn entre estados que no podemos provocar (representados en los modelos cientĂficos como nomolĂłgicamente imposibles) y estados que simplemente no podemos generar. Dicha tesis no puede ofrecer un tratamiento convincente de esta distinciĂłn. Por ello fracasa al explicar por quĂ© no podemos provocar ciertos estados de cosas; no puede explicar, pues, lo que denomino "la obstinaciĂłn de la naturaleza"
Physikalismus, Materialismus und Naturalismus
Discusses and contrasts various accounts of physicalism, naturalism and materialis
A disposition-based process theory of causation
Given certain well-known observations by Mach and Russell, the question arises what place there is for causation in the physical world. My aim in this chapter is to understand under what conditions we can use causal terminology and how it fi ts in with what physics has to say. I will argue for a disposition-based process-theory of causation. After addressing
Machâs and Russellâs concerns I will start by outlining the kind of problem the disposition based process-theory of causation is meant to solve. In a second step I will discuss the nature of those dispositions that will be relevant for our question. In section 3 I will discuss
existing dispositional accounts of causation before I proceed to present my own account (sections 4 to 6) and contrast it with traditional process-theories (section 7)
Pluralism and the Hypothetical in Heinrich Hertzâs Philosophy of Science
In this paper I argue against readings of Hertz that overly assimilate him into the thought of late 20th century anti-realists and pluralists.
Firstly, as is well-known, various images of the same objects are possible according to Hertz. However, I will argue that this envisaged pluralism concerns the situation before all the evidence is considered i. e. before we can decide whether the images are correct and appropriate. Hertz believes in final and decisive battles of the kind he participated in
while doing experiments in electrodynamics. Secondly, I will argue that the concept of representation is still quite appropriately
applied to important aspects of images, namely when it comes to fundamental physical equations. In this context Hertz explicitly allows that âcharacteristics of our image, which claim to represent observable relations of things, do really and correctly correspond to themâ (Hertz [1894] 1956, 9). A final consideration is Hertzâs consistent appeal to the concept of the hypothesis. I will argue that his use of the concept does not indicate that he contributed to an increasing hypothetization of science, if this trend is understood in a strong sense, i. e. as the belief
that the correctness of scientific theories cannot be established for principled reasons. As mentioned, when it comes to experimental evidence Hertz believes in decisive battles
Ceteris Paribus Laws
Laws of nature take center stage in philosophy of science. Laws are usually believed to stand in a tight conceptual relation to many important key concepts such as causation, explanation, confirmation, determinism, counterfactuals etc. Traditionally, philosophers of science have focused on physical laws, which were taken to be at least true, universal statements that support counterfactual claims. But, although this claim about laws might be true with respect to physics, laws in the special sciences (such as biology, psychology, economics etc.) appear to haveâmaybe not surprisinglyâdifferent features than the laws of physics. Special science lawsâfor instance, the economic law âUnder the condition of perfect competition, an increase of demand of a commodity leads to an increase of price, given that the quantity of the supplied commodity remains constantâ and, in biology, Mendel's Lawsâare usually taken to âhave exceptionsâ, to be ânon-universalâ or âto be ceteris paribus lawsâ. How and whether the laws of physics and the laws of the special sciences differ is one of the crucial questions motivating the debate on ceteris paribus laws. Another major, controversial question concerns the determination of the precise meaning of âceteris paribusâ. Philosophers have attempted to explicate the meaning of ceteris paribus clauses in different ways. The question of meaning is connected to the problem of empirical content, i.e., the question whether ceteris paribus laws have non-trivial and empirically testable content. Since many philosophers have argued that ceteris paribus laws lack empirically testable content, this problem constitutes a major challenge to a theory of ceteris paribus laws
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