A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited

This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.assignment game, fairness, strategy-proofness

Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study

This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending auction, which both identifies the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theortical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of investigated measures (consistent reporting, efficiency etc.). In addition, we find that the performance of the ascending auction is increasing over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such tendency.Auctions; Non-manipulability; Efficiency; Experiments

Moment-method calculations on multiple apertures using singular basis functions

The transmission properties of perforated perfectly conducting screens are of practical interest. The treatment of non-periodical structures by numerical tecniques, such as the method of moments, is very computer intensive. In this paper it is shown that using well adapted basis functions, the number of unknowns can be drastically reduced. Advantages and limitations of the method are discussed. Numerical results illustrating transmission properties of arrays of square and rectangular apertures

Moment-method calculations of scattering by a square plate using singular basis functions and multipole expansions

The method of moments is used to solve electromagenetic boundary value problems numerically. It is known that the choice of basis functions is crucial for the numerical efficiency. Fast convergence is achieved provided the basis functions efficiently approximate the unknown function. In this paper the far field (incl. RCS) of a thin square conducting plate is calculated. Basis functions with correct edge and corner singularities are shown to greatly enhance the convergence compared to ordinary "rooftop" functions. The calculations of the matrix elements as well as the right side of the matrix equation and the scattered field are simplified by the use of a multipole technique

Optimal Trade-Off Between Economic Activity and Health During an Epidemic

This paper considers a simple model where a social planner can influence the spread-intensity of an infection wave, and, consequently, also the economic activity and population health, through a single parameter. Population health is assumed to only be negatively affected when the number of simultaneously infected exceeds health care capacity. The main finding is that if (i) the planner attaches a positive weight on economic activity and (ii) it is more harmful for the economy to be locked down for longer than shorter time periods, then the optimal policy is to (weakly) exceed health care capacity at some time.Comment: 12 pages, 2 figure

An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations

Resource dependency, costs and revenues of a street festival

The financial position of a tourism-oriented street festival in Sweden is examined within the context of resource dependency and stakeholder management theory, focused on testing two hypotheses derived from this theoretical base. Data from a five-year period revealed how costs associated with the strongest stakeholders (that is, with the greatest bargaining power) greatly increased relative to costs associated with weak stakeholders. The festival was also more able to increase its revenues from weak stakeholders than from those in strong bargaining positions. Conclusions are drawn on how this case confirms and elaborates upon theory, particularly by applying it to the festival sector. Management implications are also drawn on how festival organizations should manage relationships when they hold strong or weak positions relative to stakeholders

Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings

This version: August 15, 2017 (original version: December 7, 2016)Cette version: 15 août 2017 (version originale: 7 décembre 2016)The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, several obstacles for successful integration remain. This paper focuses on one of these obstacles, namely the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, the focus is restricted to the situation in Sweden during 2015–2016 and it is demonstrated that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, because almost all accommodation options are exhausted in Sweden, the paper investigates a matching system, closely related to the system adopted by the European NGO “Refugees Welcome”, and proposes an easy-to-implement algorithm that finds a stable maximum matching. Such matching guarantees that housing is provided to a maximum number of refugees and that no refugee prefers some landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to his current match

Preferences for Short-Term Versus Long-Term Bonuses for Stock Investments

Performance-related bonuses in the finance sector are considered important tools to provide incentives. An example is that stock portfolio managers are awarded bonuses conditionally on their portfolios producing superior returns either relative to an index or equivalent funds. Concerns are however expressed that bonuses to portfolio managers are based on too short time intervals, which may impact negatively on the degree to which environmental and social factors are taken into account in investment decisions. The question addressed in this article is how bonus schemes can be designed so that delayed payouts will be equally motivating as short-term payouts. We have conducted two experiments to investigate preference for bonus payments that are paid out either frequently of infrequently. In Experiment 1 employing 27 undergraduates, preferences were measured for one certain long-term bonus versus four certain bonuses evenly distributed across time. A majority chose the short-term bonuses, and in order for a long-term bonus to be equally preferred the results showed that it needs to be approximately 40 percent higher than the four combined short-term bonuses. Experiment 2 employing another 36 undergraduates introduced uncertainty of outcomes which more accurately reflects the setting faced by stock investors. A four-year bonus is compared to four one-year bonuses. Uncertainty was the same, decreasing or increasing over the four years. The results showed that decreasing uncertainty made a majority prefer the four-year bonus to the added one-year bonuses. In conclusion, introducing uncertainty in choices concerning future outcomes is shown to reduce the extent to which future bonus outcomes are discounted relative to immediate bonus outcomes.Portfolio management; Performance-related bonus; Time discounting

Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

Advances in medical technology have made kidney transplants over the blood group barrier feasible. This paper investigates how such technology should be implemented when designing pairwise kidney exchange programs. The possibility to receive a kidney transplant from a blood group incompatible donor motivates an extension of the preference domain, allowing patients to distinguish between compatible donors and half-compatible donors (i.e., blood group incompatible donors that only become compatible after undergoing an immunosuppressive treatment). It is demonstrated that the number of transplants can be substantially increased by providing an incentive for patients with half-compatible donors to participate in kidney exchange programs. The results also suggest that the technology is beneficial for patient groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in kidney exchange programs (e.g., blood group O patients). The positive effect of allowing transplants over the blood group barrier is larger than the corresponding effects of including altruistic patient-donor pairs or of allowing three-way exchanges in addition to pairwise exchanges