Supplementary Brief Submitted to the Joint Insurance Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_comm/1480/thumbnail.jp

Risks of High-Powered Motorcycles Among Younger Adults

Objectives. We assessed whether policies designed to safeguard young motorcyclists would be effective given shifts in ownership toward high-powered motorcycles. Methods. We investigated population-wide motor vehicle driver and motorcyclist casualties (excluding passengers) recorded in Britain between 2002 and 2009. To adjust for exposure and measure individual risk, we used the estimated number of trips of motorcyclists and drivers, which had been collected as part of a national travel survey. Results. Motorcyclists were 76 times more likely to be killed than were drivers for every trip. Older motorcyclist age-strongly linked to experience, skill set, and riding behavior-did not abate the risks of high-powered motorcycles. Older motorcyclists made more trips on high-powered motorcycles. Conclusions: Tighter engine size restrictions would help reduce the use of high-powered motorcycles. Policymakers should introduce health warnings on the risks of high-powered motorcycles and the benefits of safety equipment

Impact of state mandatory insurance coverage on the use of diabetes preventive care

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>46 U.S. states and the District of Columbia have passed laws and regulations mandating that health insurance plans cover diabetes treatment and preventive care. Previous research on state mandates suggested that these policies had little impact, since many health plans already covered the benefits. Here, we analyze the contents of and model the effect of state mandates. We examined how state mandates impacted the likelihood of using three types of diabetes preventive care: annual eye exams, annual foot exams, and performing daily self-monitoring of blood glucose (SMBG).</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We collected information on diabetes benefits specified in state mandates and time the mandates were enacted. To assess impact, we used data that the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System gathered between 1996 and 2000. 4,797 individuals with self-reported diabetes and covered by private insurance were included; 3,195 of these resided in the 16 states that passed state mandates between 1997 and 1999; 1,602 resided in the 8 states or the District of Columbia without state mandates by 2000. Multivariate logistic regression models (with state fixed effect, controlling for patient demographic characteristics and socio-economic status, state characteristics, and time trend) were used to model the association between passing state mandates and the usage of the forms of diabetes preventive care, both individually and collectively.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>All 16 states that passed mandates between 1997 and 1999 required coverage of diabetic monitors and strips, while 15 states required coverage of diabetes self management education. Only 1 state required coverage of periodic eye and foot exams. State mandates were positively associated with a 6.3 (P = 0.04) and a 5.8 (P = 0.03) percentage point increase in the probability of privately insured diabetic patient's performing SMBG and simultaneous receiving all three preventive care, respectively; state mandates were not significantly associated with receiving annual diabetic eye (0.05 percentage points decrease, P = 0.92) or foot exams (2.3 percentage points increase, P = 0.45).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Effects of state mandates varied by preventive care type, with state mandates being associated with a small increase in SMBG. We found no evidence that state mandates were effective in increasing receipt of annual eye or foot exams. The small or non-significant effects might be attributed to small numbers of insured people not having the benefits prior to the mandates' passage. If state mandates' purpose is to provide improved benefits to many persons, policy makers should consider determining the number of people who might benefit prior to passing the mandate.</p

Comment letters to the National Commission on Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987 (Treadway Commission) Vol. 1

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Hedging decisions under price and exchange rate uncertainty

Diffusion du document : INRA Unité d'Economie et Sociologie rurales rue Adolphe Bobierre CS 61103 35011 Rennes Cedex (FRA)Hedging decisions under price and exchange rate uncertainty. 2002 Meeting of the American Risk and Insurance Associatio

Hedging price risk under production flexibility and basis risk

A également fait l'objet d'une présentation au Southern Risk and Insurance Association, les 21-23/11/1999 à Orlando (USA) Diffusion du document : INRA Unité d'Economie et Sociologie rurales rue Adolphe Bobierre CS 61103 35011 Rennes Cedex (FRA)Le contrat optimal de couverture contre le risque de prix pour une entreprise disposant d'une production flexible est déterminé en présence d'un risque de base. Il contient un prix critique au-dessous ou au-dessus duquel une indemnité non linéaire est versée selon que la corrélation entre les prix sur le marché au comptant et sur le marché à terme est positive ou négative. Cet optimum de premier rang est utilisé pour analyser la stratégie optimale de couverture avec des contrats à terme et des contrats d'options en présence d'un risque de prix et de base. Des résultats de la littérature financière sont généralisés

Optimum crop insurance under joint yield and price risk

Le contrat optimal contre un risque assurable en présence d'un second risque non assurable est examiné. Dans ce contexte de marchés incomplets, des indemnités sont versées lorsque l'indice assurable est inférieur ou supérieur à un seuil critique, selon que le revenu de l'assuré croît ou décroît avec cet indice. Ces résultats sont illustrés dans un contexte agricole où le risque de production est assurable alors que le risque de prix ne peut pas être couvert. Si le principe d'incertitude croissante est vérifié, la présence d'un risque de prix incite le producteur prudent à réduire le prix auquel les pertes sur récoltes sont indemnisées. L'effet du versement de subventions directes sur ce prix dépend du comportement de tempérance du producteur