BGP-like TE Capabilities for SHIM6

In this paper we present a comprehensive set of mechanisms that restore to the site administrator the capacity of enforcing traffic engineering (TE) policies in a multiaddressed IPv6 scenario. The mechanisms rely on the ability of SHIM6 to securely perform locator changes in a transparent fashion to transport and application layers. Once an outgoing path has been selected for a communication by proper routing configuration in the site, the source prefix of SHIM6 data packets is rewritten by the site routers to avoid packet discarding due to ingress filtering. The SHIM6 locator preferences exchanged in the context establishment phase are modified by the site routers to influence in the path used for receiving traffic. Scalable deployment is ensured by the stateless nature of these mechanisms.Publicad

Fault Tolerant Scalable Support for Network Portability and Traffic Engineering

The P-SHIM6 architecture provides ISP independence to IPv6 sites without compromising scalability. This architecture is based on a middle-box, the P-SHIM6, which manages the SHIM6 protocol exchange on behalf of the nodes of a site, which are configured with provider independent addresses. Incoming and outgoing packets are processed by the P-SHIM6 box, which can assign different locators to a given communication, either when it is started, or dynamically after the communication has been established. As a consequence, changes required for provider portability are minimized, and fine-grained Traffic Engineering can be enforced at the P-SHIM6 box, in addition to the fault tolerance support provided by SHIM6.This project has been supported by the RiNG project IST-2005-035167 and by the IMPROVISA project TSI2005-07384-C03-02.Publicad

An Architecture for Network Layer Privacy

We present an architecture for the provision of network layer privacy based on the SHIM6 multihoming protocol. In its basic form, the architecture prevents on-path eavesdroppers from using SHIM6 network layer information to correlate packets that belong to the same communication but use different locators. To achieve this, several extensions to the SHIM6 protocol and to the HBA (Hash Based Addresses) addressing model are defined. On its full-featured mode of operation, hosts can vary dynamically the addresses of the packets of on-going communications. Single-homed hosts can adopt the SHIM6 protocol with the privacy enhancements to benefit from this protection against information collectors.IEEE Communications SocietyPublicad

Efficient security for IPv6 multihoming

In this note, we propose a security mechanism for protecting IPv6 networks from possible abuses caused by the malicious usage of a multihoming protocol. In the presented approach, each multihomed node is assigned multiple prefixes from its upstream providers, and it creates the interface identifier part of its addresses by incorporating a cryptographic one-way hash of the available prefix set. The result is that the addresses of each multihomed node form an unalterable set of intrinsically bound IPv6 addresses. This allows any node that is communicating with the multihomed node to securely verify that all the alternative addresses proposed through the multihoming protocol are associated to the address used for establishing the communication. The verification process is extremely efficient because it only involves hash operationsPublicad

An API for IPv6 Multihoming based on HBA and CGA

EUNICE 2005. IFIP International Workshop on Networked Applications, Colmenarejo, Madrid/Spain, 6–8 July, 2005. (Proceedings of the 11th Open European Summer School EUNICE 2005: Networked Applications)This paper proposes an API for Multihoming in IPv6. This API is based on the Hash Based Addresses and Cryptographically Generated Addresses approaches, which are being developed by the IETF multi6 Working Group. The support of Multihoming implies several actions such as failure detection procedures, reachability tests, re-homing procedures and exchange of locators. Applications can benefit from transparent access to Multihoming services only if per host Multihoming parameters are defined. However, more benefits could be obtained by applications if they will be able to configure these parameters. The proposed Multihoming API provides different functions to applications which can modify some parameters and invoke some functions related with the Multihoming Layer.This work has been partly supported by the European Union under the E-Next Project FP6506869 and by OPTINET6 project TIC-2003-09042-C03-01

Avoiding DAD for Improving Real-Time Communication in MIPv6 Environments

Joint International Workshops on Interactive Distributed Multimedia Systems and Protocols for Multimedia Systems, IDMS/PROMS 2002 Coimbra, Portugal, November 26–29, 2002 ProceedingsCurrent specification of address configuration mandates the execution of the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) mechanism to prevent address duplication. However, a proper support for real time multimedia applications in mobile IPv6 nodes is undermined by the disruption imposed by DAD. In order to overcome this limitation, the usage of randomly generated IPv6 Interface Identifiers without previously performing DAD is proposed, based on the statistic uniqueness of the addresses generated through this method. The address duplication risk is quantified through the calculation of the probability of an Interface Identifier collision among the nodes sharing a link. The calculated probability is deemed to be negligible compared to other causes of communication failure, such as network outages.This research was supported by the LONG (Laboratories Over Next Generation Networks) project IST-1999-20393 and Moby Dick (Mobility and Differentiated Services in a Future IP Network) project IST-2000-25394

Electric System Vulnerabilities: a State of the Art of Defense Technologies

Vulnerability of the European electrical infrastructure appears to be growing due to several factors: - demand is always growing, and, although this growth may be forecast, it cannot be anytime easily faced; - transactions increase, following electrical system liberalisation, and this involves operating the whole infrastructure closer to the system capacity and security limits; - an increased control systems complexity, required for secure system operation, may in turn raise system vulnerability, due both to accidental faults and malicious attacks; - critical infrastructures, and the electrical system primarily, are well known to be a privileged target in warfare, as well as terrorist attacks. In recent years, both Europe and America have experienced a significant number of huge blackouts, whose frequency and impact looks progressively growing. These events had common roots in the fact that current risk assessment methodologies and current system controls appear to be no longer adequate. Beyond the growing complexity of the electrical system as a whole, two main reasons can be listed: - system analysis procedures based on these methodologies did not identify security threats emerging from failures of critical physical components; - on-line controls were not able to avoid system collapse. This report provides a state-of-the-art of the technology on both regards: - as far as risk assessment methodologies are concerned, an overview of the conceptual power system reliability framework is provided, and the current N-1 principle for risk assessment in power systems is introduced, together with off-the-shelf enforcement methodologies, like optimal power flow. Emerging methodologies for dynamic security assessment are also discussed. The power system reliability approach is compared with the global approach to dependability introduced by computer scientists, and the conceptual clashes pointed out. Ways ahead to conciliate both views are outlined. - concerning power system controls, the report overviews the existing defense plans, making specific reference to the current Italian situation. The two major recent blackout events in the American North East and Italy are analysed, and the drawbacks of the existing arrangements and the installed control systems are discussed. Emerging technologies, such as phasor measurement units and wide area protection are introduced. Their likely impact on the existing control room is discussed. Finally, potential cyber vulnerabilities of the new control systems are introduced, the role of communication standards in that context is discussed, and an overview of the current state of the art is presented.JRC.G.6-Sensors, radar technologies and cybersecurit

A QoS-Driven ISP Selection Mechanism for IPv6 Multi-homed Sites

A global solution for the provision of QoS in IPng sites must include ISP selection based on per-application requirements. In this article we present a new site-local architecture for QoS-driven ISP selection in multi-homed domains, performed in a per application basis. This architecture proposes the novel use of existent network services, a new type of routing header, and the modification of address selection mechanisms to take into account QoS requirements. This proposal is an evolution of current technology, and therefore precludes the addition of new protocols, enabling fast deployment. The sitelocal scope of the proposed solution results in ISP transparency and thus in ISP independency.This research was supported by the LONG (Laboratories Over the Next Generation Networks) project IST-1999-20393.Publicad