Have Betting Exchanges Corrupted Horse Racing?

Betting exchanges allow punters to bet on a horse to lose a race. This, many argue, has opened up the sport to a new form of corruption, where races will be deliberately lost in order to profit from betting. We examine whether anecdotal evidence of the fixing of horses to lose—of which there are many examples—is indicative of wider corruption. Following a “forensic economics” approach, we build an asymmetric information model of exchange betting and take it to betting data on 9,560 races run in 2013/2014. We find no evidence of the widespread corruption of horse racing by the betting exchanges

Evidence of in-play insider trading on a UK betting exchange

International audienceAn open question in market microstructure is whether 'informed' traders have an advantage due to access to private, inside, information; or due to a superior ability to process public information. In this paper we attempt to answer this question with data from a sports betting exchange taken during play. Uniquely, this allows us to time-stamp information events to the nearest second, and to ensure we are observing all relevant information regarding the value of an asset. We find evidence of inside information but not of a superior ability to process public information. The first finding suggests that a subset of the betting population are observing the action before the wider public (possibly due to delays in the television signal), and betting using this informational advantage

The Distribution of Information in Speculative Markets: A Natural Experiment

We use a unique natural experiment to shed light on the distribution of information in speculative markets. In June 2011, Betfair – a UK betting exchange – levied a tax of up to 60% on all future profits accrued by the top 0.1% of profitable traders. Such a move appears to have driven at least some of these traders off the exchange, taking their information with them. We investigate the effect of the new tax on the forecasting capacity of the exchange (our measure of the market's incorporation of information into the price). We find that there was scant decline in the forecasting capacity of the exchange – relative to a control market – suggesting that the bulk of information had hitherto been held by the majority of traders, rather than the select few affected by the rule change. This result is robust to the choice of forecasting measure, the choice of forecasting interval, and the choice of race type. This provides evidence that more than a few traders are typically involved in the price discovery process in speculative markets

The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests

Contests are ubiquitous in economic, organizational and political settings. Contest designers often use tools to make a contest among asymmetric contestants more even, in order to either elicit higher effort levels, or for ethical reasons. Handicapping – in which stronger participants are a priori weakened – is one successful tool that is widely used in sports, promotional tournaments and procurement auctions. In this study we show theoretically that participants may also increase their destructive effort, and sabotage their rivals’ performance, when handicapping is employed. We empirically verify this prediction using data on 19,635 U.K. horse-races in 2011 and 2012. Our results suggest that while a level field may be conducive to heightened positive effort in general, in a setting where both handicapping and sabotage are present it also lays the ground for greater destruction

Selection and incentives in contests: evidence from horse racing

The designer of internal labour market promotion contests must balance the need to select the best candidate with the need to provide incentives for all candidates. We use an extensive data set from horse racing – where there is abundant variation in contest design features – to analyse if there are particular features that help to achieve these two objectives. We find that contests with higher prize money and fewer participants are the most successful at achieving the dual remit of selection and incentives

Forecasting with social media: evidence from Tweets on soccer matches

Social media is now used as a forecasting tool by a variety of firms and agencies. But how useful are such data in forecasting outcomes? Can social media add any in- formation to that produced by a prediction/betting market? We source 13.8m posts from Twitter, and combine them with contemporaneous Betfair betting prices, to fore- cast the outcomes of English Premier League soccer matches as they unfold. Using a micro-blogging dictionary to analyse the content of Tweets, we find that the aggregate tone of Tweets contains significant information not in betting prices, particularly in the immediate aftermath of goals and red cards

The wisdom of large and small crowds: Evidence from repeated natural experiments in sports betting

Prediction markets have proved excellent tools for forecasting, outperforming experts and polls in many settings. But do larger markets, with a wider participation, perform better than smaller markets? This paper analyses a series of repeated natural experiments in sports betting. The Queen’s Club Tennis Championships are held every year, but every other year the Championships clash with a major soccer tournament. We find that tennis betting prices become significantly less informative when participation rates are affected adversely by the clashing soccer tournament. This suggests that measures which increase prediction market participation may lead to a greater forecast accuracy