186 research outputs found

    Lexeme derivation and multi-word predicates in Hungarian

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    This paper focuses on predicate formation operations which affect the value and determination of lexical properties associated with Hungarian phrasal periphrastic predicates and, hence, on lexeme-formation (Aronoff 1994). Recent work, following the word and paradigm morphological models of  Robins (1959), Matthews (1972), among others, has argued that periphrasis or multi-word expression is often best viewed as a type of morphological exponence, i.e., as the product of morphological rather than syntactic operations, contra many current theoretical proposals.  In line with this morphological perspective, I argue that, as in inflection, periphrasis is a type of morphological exponence for lexeme-formation.  In support of this claim I explore lexeme-formation for several sorts of phrasal predicates in Hungarian (Ackerman (1987), Komlósy (1992), Kiefer-Ladányi (2000), among others), in particular causative formation, causal predicate formation, so-called reiterated activity formation expressed by reduplicated preverbs, and the interaction of these operations with category changing derivation. The general background for the analysis will be the Realization-based Lexicalist Hypothesis (Blevins 2001) and realizational approaches to morphology (Stump 2001) which are compatible with theories subscribing to representational modularity (Jackendoff 1997; 2002)

    Systemic Polyfunctionality and Morphology-syntax Interdependencies

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    International audienceno abstrac

    Lexeme derivation and multi-word predicates in Hungarian

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    Valence and the Semantics of Causativization

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    Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society: General Session Dedicated to the Contributions of Charles J. Fillmore (1994

    Can Agent Cheap Talk Mitigate Agency Problems in the Presence of a Noisy Performance Measure? An Experimental Test in a Single- and Multi-Period Setting

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    Given traditional agency theory assumptions and unobservable effort in a single-period setting, a moral hazard arises in which the agent is expected to shirk and provide the minimal possible effort after contracting with the principal. Traditional solutions to this agency problem include paying the agent a financial incentive tied to some noisy measure of performance or allowing the agent to develop a reputation over multiple periods. As the noisiness of the performance-measure increases, however, these traditional solutions become increasingly costly and ineffective. In many single- and multi-period agency settings in the firm, however, the agent can communicate a promised level of effort to the principal prior to contracting. We document that this pre-contract communication, which is non-enforceable and therefore considered cheap talk by traditional economic theory, can be highly effective in mitigating the moral hazard problem in agency theory. In a repeating single-period experimental setting where production is observable but is a very noisy indicator of effort, communication of a promised level of effort results in higher pay for the agent, higher effort, and higher expected profit for the principal than the control group. When the principal and agent interact over multiple periods, reputation building is ineffective, but cheap talk continues to yield superior outcomes. These results are consistent with recent economic theory incorporating social norms such as the norm of promise-keeping
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