232 research outputs found
Degree of explanation
Partial explanations are everywhere. That is, explanations citing causes that explain some but not all of an effect are ubiquitous across science, and these in turn rely on the notion of degree of explanation. I argue that current accounts are seriously deficient. In particular, they do not incorporate adequately the way in which a causeâs explanatory importance varies with choice of explanandum. Using influential recent contrastive theories, I develop quantitative definitions that remedy this lacuna, and relate it to existing measures of degree of causation. Among other things, this reveals the precise role here of chance, as well as bearing on the relation between causal explanation and causation itself
Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?
The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others
Quantum Particles as Conceptual Entities: A Possible Explanatory Framework for Quantum Theory
We put forward a possible new interpretation and explanatory framework for
quantum theory. The basic hypothesis underlying this new framework is that
quantum particles are conceptual entities. More concretely, we propose that
quantum particles interact with ordinary matter, nuclei, atoms, molecules,
macroscopic material entities, measuring apparatuses, ..., in a similar way to
how human concepts interact with memory structures, human minds or artificial
memories. We analyze the most characteristic aspects of quantum theory, i.e.
entanglement and non-locality, interference and superposition, identity and
individuality in the light of this new interpretation, and we put forward a
specific explanation and understanding of these aspects. The basic hypothesis
of our framework gives rise in a natural way to a Heisenberg uncertainty
principle which introduces an understanding of the general situation of 'the
one and the many' in quantum physics. A specific view on macro and micro
different from the common one follows from the basic hypothesis and leads to an
analysis of Schrodinger's Cat paradox and the measurement problem different
from the existing ones. We reflect about the influence of this new quantum
interpretation and explanatory framework on the global nature and evolutionary
aspects of the world and human worldviews, and point out potential explanations
for specific situations, such as the generation problem in particle physics,
the confinement of quarks and the existence of dark matter.Comment: 45 pages, 10 figure
A Microcosm of the Biomedical Research Experience for Upper-level Undergraduates
The skill set required of biomedical researchers continues to grow and evolve as biology matures as a natural science. Science necessitates creative yet critical thinking, persuasive communication skills, purposeful use of time, and adeptness at the laboratory bench. Teaching these skills can be effectively accomplished in an inquiry-based, active-learning environment at a primarily undergraduate institution. Cell Biology Techniques, an upper-level cell biology laboratory course at St. John Fisher College, features two independent projects that take advantage of the biology of the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, a premier yet simple model organism. First, students perform a miniature epigenetic screen for novel phenotypes using RNA interference. The results of this screen combined with literature research direct students toward a singe gene that they attempt to subclone in the second project. The biology of the chosen gene/protein also becomes an individualized focal point with respect to the content of the laboratory. Progress toward course goals is evaluated using written, oral, and group-produced assignments, including a concept map. Pre- and postassessment indicates a significant increase in the understanding of broad concepts in cell biological research
The Rise and Fall of the Adaptive Landscape?
The discussion of the adaptive landscape in the philosophical literature appears to be divided along the following lines. On the one hand, some claim that the adaptive landscape is either âuninterpretableâ or incoherent. On the other hand, some argue that the adaptive landscape has been an important heuristic, or tool in the service of explaining, as well as proposing and testing hypotheses about evolutionary change. This paper attempts to reconcile these two views
Factive Scientific Understanding Without Accurate Representation
This paper analyzes two ways idealized biological models produce factive scientific
understanding. I then argue that models can provide factive scientific understanding of a
phenomenon without providing an accurate representation of the (difference-making) features of
their real-world target system(s). My analysis of these cases also suggests that the debate over
scientific realism needs to investigate the factive scientific understanding produced by scientistsâ
use of idealized models rather than the accuracy of scientific models themselves
Explaining Models: Theoretical and Phenomenological Models and Their Role for the First Explanation of the Hydrogen Spectrum
Wilholt T. Explaining Models: Theoretical and Phenomenological Models and Their Role for the First Explanation of the Hydrogen Spectrum. Foundations of Chemistry. 2005;7(2):149-169.Traditional nomological accounts of scientific explanation have assumed that a good scientific explanation consists in the derivation of the explanandum's description from theory (plus antecedent conditions). But in more recent philosophy of science the adequacy of this approach has been challenged, because the relation between theory and phenomena in actual scientific practice turns out to be more intricate. This critique is here examined for an explanatory paradigm that was groundbreaking for 20th century physics and chemistry (and their interrelation): Bohr's first model of the atom and its explanatory relevance for the spectrum of hydrogen. First, the model itself is analysed with respect to the principles and assumptions that enter into its premises. Thereafter, the origin of the model's explanandum is investigated. It can be shown that the explained "phenomenon" is itself the product of a host of modelling accomplishments that stem from an experimental tradition related to 19th century chemistry, viz. spectroscopy. The relation between theory and phenomenon is thus mediated in a twofold way: by (Bohr's) theoretical model and a phenomenological model from spectroscopy. In the final section of the paper an account is outlined that nevertheless permits us to acknowledge this important physico-chemical achievement as a case of (nomological) explanation
Should scientific realists be platonists?
Enhanced Indispensability Arguments (EIA) claim that Scientific Realists are committed to the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the Best Explana- tion (IBE). Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism (in particular, IBE) to achieve platonism? (§2) We argue that just because a variety of different inferential strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions concerning which things we should be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferen- tial route which eschews causes (§3), and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Real- ists to change their inferential methods (§4). We suggest that in order to maintain inferential parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations (§5)
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