Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has helped transform arbitration law into a radical private-ordering regime in which freedom of contract has come to eclipse public regulation. Arbitration jurisprudence justifies this transformation in part on a profound and longstanding commitment to the ideal of individual autonomy, understood as the freedom—lacking in litigation—to select a disputing process best suited to one’s needs. In this Article, I question the cogency of this justification. I argue, first, that autonomy has had different and sometimes conflicting meanings even within arbitration jurisprudence. Second, depending on the meaning one ascribes to autonomy, it is at best uncertain whether a commitment to it requires enforcing arbitration agreements with minimal regulation by the state. Ironically, the libertarian interpretation of autonomy that lies at the heart of the Court’s recent arbitration decisions turns out to be the least adept at explaining why arbitration agreements should be “‘rigorously enforce[d]’ . . . according to their terms.” To the extent we wish to continue viewing enforcement as important for the value of autonomy in arbitration, therefore, it appears we must rethink what autonomy means in this context and whether in certain circumstances autonomy may be best promoted by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements

Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has helped transform arbitration law into a radical private-ordering regime in which freedom of contract has come to eclipse public regulation. Arbitration jurisprudence justifies this transformation in part on a profound and longstanding commitment to the ideal of individual autonomy, understood as the freedom—lacking in litigation—to select a disputing process best suited to one’s needs. In this Article, I question the cogency of this justification. I argue, first, that autonomy has had different and sometimes conflicting meanings even within arbitration jurisprudence. Second, depending on the meaning one ascribes to autonomy, it is at best uncertain whether a commitment to it requires enforcing arbitration agreements with minimal regulation by the state. Ironically, the libertarian interpretation of autonomy that lies at the heart of the Court’s recent arbitration decisions turns out to be the least adept at explaining why arbitration agreements should be “‘rigorously enforce[d]’ . . . according to their terms.” To the extent we wish to continue viewing enforcement as important for the value of autonomy in arbitration, therefore, it appears we must rethink what autonomy means in this context and whether in certain circumstances autonomy may be best promoted by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements

Constructions of Arbitration\u27s Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and JusticeSymposium

In the wake of a recent three-part series by the New York Times, arbitration is now back in the eye of the storm. The leading critique of arbitration, especially in the consumer and employment space, is that it is unjust both in the sense that it does not comport with basic notions of procedural fairness and/or because it cannot be expected to produce outcomes we would consider substantively just. For example, procedure in arbitration is dictated largely by contract rather than by mandatory rules that have been vetted by public bodies entrusted with safeguarding procedural values. Arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence. There is no substantive merits review. These and other observations have led a growing chorus of critics to declare that arbitration is “an inferior system of justice, structured without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law;” a “deeply unfair end-run around the public courts and our civil justice system;” little more than an instrument of corporate “self-deregulation” that “subvert[s] our system of justice as we have come to know it.” I want to suggest that this almost reflexive embrace of autonomy and efficiency at the expense of justice substantially short-changes arbitration’s legacy as well as arbitration’s future potential to provide a robust alternative to adjudication in public courts

Dracaena Decline and Root Rot

Isolation and inoculation studies attempted to identify the cause of dracaena decline. Suspicion was cast on Pythium graminicola, but further studies were indicated as needed to resolve the decline problem

Anomalous V2 of the left pulmonary vein detected using three-dimensional computed tomography in a patient with lung cancer : A case report

We report one of the rare anatomical variations of the pulmonary vein wherein the left V2 drained into the inferior pulmonary vein. A 63-year-old man was referred to our hospital because of an abnormal shadow in the left lower lung field that was noted on chest X-ray. Computed tomography (CT) revealed a tumor in the left lower lobe. A biopsied tumor specimen was diagnosed as an adenocarcinoma, and thus, left lower lobectomy was performed. Preoperative three-dimensional CT revealed that an anomalous V2 of the left lung drained from the superior segment into the inferior pulmonary vein. This variation type was confirmed during thoracoscopic left lower lobectomy. We were able to perform left lower lobectomy with the preservation of the anomalous V2. The postoperative course was uneventful, and the patient was discharged on postoperative day 12. It is important to identify anatomical variations of the pulmonary vein and reliably preserve and process the affected area to prevent postoperative complications