Language, Truth, and Logic and the Anglophone reception of the Vienna Circle

A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic had been responsible for introducing the Vienna Circle’s ideas, developed within a Germanophone framework, to an Anglophone readership. Inevitably, this migration from one context to another resulted in the alteration of some of the concepts being transmitted. Such alterations have served to facilitate a number of false impressions of Logical Empiricism from which recent scholarship still tries to recover. In this paper, I will attempt to point to the ways in which LTL has helped to foster the various mistaken stereotypes about Logical Empiricism which were combined into the received view. I will begin by examining Ayer’s all too brief presentation of an Anglocentric lineage for his ideas. This lineage, as we shall see, simply omits the major 19th century Germanophone influences on the rise of analytic philosophy. The Germanophone ideas he presents are selectively introduced into an Anglophone context, and directed towards various concerns that arose within that context. I will focus on the differences between Carnap’s version of the overcoming of metaphysics, and Ayer’s reconfiguration into what he calls the elimination of metaphysics. Having discussed the above, I will very briefly outline the consequences that Ayer’s radicalisation of the Vienna Circle’s doctrines had on the subsequent Anglophone reception of Logical Empiricism

Evidence based medicine as science

Evidence based medicine has claimed to be science on a number of occasions but it is not clear that this status is deserved. Within philosophy of science four main theories about the nature of science are historically recognised: inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes. If evidence based medicine is science knowledge claims should be derived using a process that corresponds to one of these theories. This paper analyses whether this is the case. In the first section, different theories about the nature of science are introduced. In the second section, the claim that evidence based medicine is science is reinterpreted as the claim that knowledge claims derived from randomised controlled trails and meta-analyses are science. In the third section the knowledge claims valued within evidence based medicine are considered from the perspective of inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes. In the final section possible counter arguments are considered. It is argued that the knowledge claims valued by evidence based medicine are not justified using inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms or research programmes. If these are the main criteria for evaluating if something is science or not, evidence based medicine does not meet these criteria

Whose Science and whose Religion? Reflections on the Relations between Scientific and Religious Worldviews

Arguments about the relationship between science and religion often proceed by identifying a set of essential characteristics of scientific and religious worldviews and arguing on the basis of these characteristics for claims about a relationship of conflict or compatibility between them. Such a strategy is doomed to failure because science, to some extent, and religion, to a much larger extent, are cultural phenomena that are too diverse in their expressions to be characterized in terms of a unified worldview. In this paper I follow a different strategy. Having offered a loose characterization of the nature of science, I pose five questions about specific areas where religious and scientific worldviews may conflict - questions about the nature of faith, the belief in a God or Gods, the authority of sacred texts, the relationship between scientific and religious conceptions of the mind/soul, and the relationship between scientific and religious understandings of moral behavior. My review of these questions will show that they cannot be answered unequivocally because there is no agreement amongst religious believers as to the meaning of important religious concepts. Thus, whether scientific and religious worldviews conflict depends essentially upon whose science and whose religion one is considering. In closing, I consider the implications of this conundrum for science education

On Component Forces in Physics: A Pragmatic View

Do component forces exist? I argue that the answer lies in the affirmative, on historical and operational grounds

The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism

Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall argue that expressivism does not have the resources to adequately account for ethical vagueness, while cognitivism does. This demonstrates an advantage that cognitivism holds over expressivis

Tumor Suppressor Protein p53 Recruits Human Sin3B/HDAC1 Complex for Down-Regulation of Its Target Promoters in Response to Genotoxic Stress

Master regulator protein p53, popularly known as the “guardian of genome” is the hub for regulation of diverse cellular pathways. Depending on the cell type and severity of DNA damage, p53 protein mediates cell cycle arrest or apoptosis, besides activating DNA repair, which is apparently achieved by regulation of its target genes, as well as direct interaction with other proteins. p53 is known to repress target genes via multiple mechanisms one of which is via recruitment of chromatin remodelling Sin3/HDAC1/2 complex. Sin3 proteins (Sin3A and Sin3B) regulate gene expression at the chromatin-level by serving as an anchor onto which the core Sin3/HDAC complex is assembled. The Sin3/HDAC co-repressor complex can be recruited by a large number of DNA-binding transcription factors. Sin3A has been closely linked to p53 while Sin3B is considered to be a close associate of E2Fs. The theme of this study was to establish the role of Sin3B in p53-mediated gene repression. We demonstrate a direct protein-protein interaction between human p53 and Sin3B (hSin3B). Amino acids 1–399 of hSin3B protein are involved in its interaction with N-terminal region (amino acids 1–108) of p53. Genotoxic stress induced by Adriamycin treatment increases the levels of hSin3B that is recruited to the promoters of p53-target genes (HSPA8, MAD1 and CRYZ). More importantly recruitment of hSin3B and repression of the three p53-target promoters upon Adriamycin treatment were observed only in p53+/+ cell lines. Additionally an increased tri-methylation of the H3K9 residue at the promoters of HSPA8 and CRYZ was also observed following Adriamycin treatment. The present study highlights for the first time the essential role of Sin3B as an important associate of p53 in mediating the cellular responses to stress and in the transcriptional repression of genes encoding for heat shock proteins or proteins involved in regulation of cell cycle and apoptosis

Emotion and ethics: an inter-(en)active approach

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this paper we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective interconnectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself

Reassessing Britain’s ‘post-war consensus’: the politics of reason 1945–1979

Since the late-1970s, scholars have been engaged in a vibrant debate about the nature of post-war British politics. While some writers have suggested that the three decades that succeeded the Second World War witnessed a bi-partisan consensus on key policy questions, others have argued that it was conflict, not agreement, that marked the period. This article offers a novel contribution to this controversy by drawing attention to the epistemological beliefs of the Labour and Conservative parties. It argues that once these beliefs are considered, it becomes possible to reconcile some of the competing claims made by proponents and critics of the ‘post-war consensus’ thesis. Labour and Conservative leaders may have been wedded to different beliefs, but they also shared a common enthusiasm for empiricist reasoning and were both reluctant to identify fixed political ‘ends’ that they sought to realise. Consequently, they were both committed to evolutionary forms of change, and they eschewed the notion that any social or political arrangement was of universal value