4 research outputs found
Strategically Equivalent Contests
Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research
Reciprocity in the shadow of threat.
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two
agents differently evaluate a contested stake. Differently from common contest
models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome
of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive
investments in conflict management labeled as talks . The focus is on the
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake: whenever the asymmetry in the evaluation
of the stake is large there is no room for cooperation and a conflict trap emerges;
whenever the degree of asymmetry falls within a critical interval, cooperation seems
to emerge only in the presence of a unilateral concession; as the evaluations of the
stake converge, only reciprocal concessions can sustain cooperation. Finally the
concept of entropy is applied to measure conflict and conflict management