Selective vs. Broad-Spectrum Pesticides: When Do Private Decisions Differ from Socially Optimal Decisions?

This paper examines the spatial externalities of conventional and organic pest control methods to determine if, and how, the two types affect each other. These interactions make the problem more complicated than the usual analysis of a single externality. The numerical simulation model includes one organically managed and one conventionally managed field. One pest and one predator of the pest move between the two fields over five seasons. In each season, the conventional grower has the option of applying a broad-spectrum pesticide that kills the predator a selective pesticide that has no adverse effects on the predator but is either more expensive or less effective than the broad-spectrum pesticide. The organic grower can apply an organic pesticide, augment the predator population, or both. The simulation model identifies the socially optimal pest control decisions and the Nash equilibrium decisions of both growers over the five growing seasons. The relative price and efficacy of the selective pesticide, the type of predator, and the type of pest introduction all influence whether or not either or both growers make inefficient decisions. Under certain conditions, regional pest management, equivalent to coordination of pest control across growers, could increase total regional profits.spatial-dynamic games, spatial externalities, non-cooperative games, organic agriculture, biological control, agricultural policy, Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, C61, C72, Q18, Q52, Q57,

MODELING THE EFFECT OF SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES ON INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT

Changes in production conditions associated with biological invasions can be complex. As a result, modeling invasive species management decisions can be difficult. Modeling these decisions is further compounded by externalities associated with spatial relationships among growers. In order to calculate optimal management decisions, an accurate bioeconomic model of the feedback between grower decisions and the new biological interactions created by an invasive species population is needed. In this paper, a bioeconomic model is used to explicitly analyze how externalities caused by spatial relationships among agricultural producers affect optimal invasive species management decisions. The example of the coordinated greenhouse whitefly management in the Oxnard, CA, area is discussed. This is an interesting example because of the complex cycle of host crops used by the whitefly and the effect this cycle has on the optimal whitefly management decisions for strawberry growers. Three research objectives achieved in this paper include first, using the model to assess how the spatial relationship among growers affects incentives for regional invasive pest management. Second, analyze whether current policies could be adjusted to substitute for coordination among growers. Third, the use of the bioeconomic model to identify factors for this specific case that affect whether or not growers may voluntarily coordinate their management decisions. We find that spatial relationships among growers affect the need for coordination in the strawberry/whitefly case. Whitefly migrations across host crop fields require growers to manage the whitefly on a regional basis in order to maximize strawberry producer welfare. The results also indicate that the amount of effort needed to achieve coordination required is limited; the only requirement is that information related to field management be shared among growers of whitefly host crops. The results from the bioeconomic model describe the biological and economic feedback of the grower's decision which allows policymakers to identify the willingness of producers to coordinate at various times of year. In the Oxnard strawberry/whitefly case, for example, growers will not find it optimal to adjust their application timing for a second immigration of adult greenhouse whiteflies when they occur near the end of the season, such as in May or June, but will for earlier points in the season. Three policy implications of the results from the strawberry/whitefly case are also discussed in the paper. First, adjustments to current policies regulating whitefly management do not remove the need for coordination among growers to them. Also, it was found that current policies do not, by themselves, generate the need for coordination. Finally, the results show it is not always necessary to create a central agency for regional invasive species management.Invasive species, strawberry, greenhouse whitefly, externality, optimal management, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

IMPACTS OF PESTICIDE REGULATION ON THE CALIFORNIA STRAWBERRY INDUSTRY

Environmental regulation of agriculture is becoming increasingly important, and growers are increasingly concerned about the effects of regulations on their profitability. Regulations governing the use of a pesticide affect its economic value. Further, growers often face a choice among pesticide alternatives, each with its own set of regulatory restrictions. In this environment, the introduction of a new regulation can have complex effects on growers' profit-maximizing pesticide choices. Buffer zones and regional emissions caps mean that pesticide choices can have important spatial components. Our paper presents an optimization model that incorporates spatial considerations at the field and regional level. We apply our model to fumigant choice by California strawberry growers. The industry is facing an impending ban on the use of methyl bromide, which in conjunction with chloropicrin was the standard fumigant for over forty years. In addition to the forthcoming ban, the state government has imposed regulations governing methyl bromide application, including buffer zones, etc. These extreme use restrictions provide us with an interesting environment for modeling the effects of pesticide regulations. There are currently two legally available fumigants that may substitute for methyl bromide in strawberries: 1,3-D and chloropicrin. 1, 3-D is subject to township caps and other restrictions. Township caps limit total application in an area. The California Department of Pesticide Regulation is currently undertaking air monitoring and other activities to determine whether or not buffer zones and other restrictions should be applied to chloropicrin. We evaluate the effects of current and proposed regulations on field-level decisions and industry costs and returns. Methodology To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the role of pesticide use regulations in determining growers' profit-maximizing pesticide choices at the field level. We do so by combining three datasets with a field-level spatial model of the profit-maximizing fumigation decision. The first dataset includes detailed field-level information regarding the costs and yields associated with alternative fumigants obtained from a multi-disciplinary research project. The second includes chemical-specific California use regulations regarding treatment rates, buffer zones, and other restrictions. The third includes information on the shapes and sizes of strawberry fields in California. Using these data, the optimization model computes the profit-maximizing treatment for each field including pattern of treatment and number of acres treated per day, etc. Field-level results are aggregated to evaluate the impact of regional pesticide regulations, and then to estimate the industry-level effects of current and proposed pesticide use regulations. We model the effects of the entire regulatory system on the fumigation decisions made by farmers. The restrictions on fumigants are integrated into a field-level programming model of a grower's fumigant decision choice. The program calculates the optimal fumigation plan for a field, given the field's size and shape, and use regulations, and per-acre costs and returns associated with each fumigant. The resulting field-level choices are aggregated in order to check for consistency with township caps. If caps are exceeded, the model is rerun using a number of allocation rules. All choices for all fields are aggregated in order to obtain industry-level results. We perform this procedure for the current set of restrictions and for several alternative sets, assessing the profitability of each alternative. For example, we remove the existing township caps on 1,3-D and evaluate how much the results change. We include varying buffer zone restrictions on chloropicrin, and evaluate whether growers' fumigant choices are sensitive to the size of the buffer zone. Relevance Environmental regulation of agriculture is becoming increasingly important. By explicitly analyzing the effect of regulations affecting methyl bromide alternatives in a model that includes both the spatial dimensions of some regulations and the costs and yields associated with each alternative, we will obtain a more detailed and accurate assessment of the costs of these regulations than is currently available. Our results will provide a greater understanding of the effects of these regulations on industry profitability, and how these regulations interact. Our model can be applied to other cases of pesticide regulations. Given the increasing importance of environmental regulation in agriculture, it is important to aid policymakers in understanding how regulations interact with each other, possibly in unexpected ways.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Implications of GATT for Eastern Europe and the Baltics

The story of agriculture in Eastern Europe during the last quarter century is a story of policy driven by politics, rather than by sound economics. Even in the highly distorted economics of the socialist period, agricultural policy stands out as being singularly colored by ideological imperatives, and singularly vulnerable to interest group pressures. While the revolutions of 1989-91 did mark a sharp move towards liberalization, these moves are now being slowed and even reversed, as countries of the region adopt Western style interventionism on preparation for accession to the European Union

Развитие творческих способностей учащихся на учебных занятиях по трудовому обучению и на занятиях дополнительного образования

Секция 1. Технический труд и техническое творчеств

Costs of 2001 methyl bromide rules estimated for California strawberry industry

The California Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) restricts pesticide use to reduce negative impacts on human health and the environment. The DPR implemented methyl bromide use regulations in 2001. Our study demonstrates that the estimated 2001 costs of these regulations for the California strawberry industry were quite substantial (more than $26 million total), equivalent to roughly 25% of estimated industry returns over total cash costs in 2001. These impacts were unevenly distributed across growers. Growers with small fields in urban areas had higher peracre costs than growers with large fields in agricultural areas