What factors influence training opportunities for older workers? Three factorial surveys exploring the attitudes of HR professionals

The core research questions addressed in this paper are: what factors influence HR professionals in deciding whether to approve training proposals for older workers? What kind of training are they more likely to recommend for older employees and in which organizational contexts? We administered three factorial surveys to 66 HR professionals in Italy. Participants made specific training decisions based on profiles of hypothetical older workers. Multilevel analyses indicated that access to training decreases strongly with age, while highly-skilled older employees with low absenteeism rates are more likely to enjoy training opportunities. In addition, older workers displaying positive performance are more likely to receive training than older workers who perform poorly, suggesting that training late in working life may serve as a reward for good performance rather than as a means of enhancing productivity. The older the HR professional evaluating training proposals, the higher the probability that older workers will be recommended for training. keywords: training; older workers; HR professionals; factorial survey; multilevel model

Estimating the Cost of Executive Stock Options: Evidence from Switzerland

It is often argued that Black-Scholes (1973) values overstate the subjective NEWLINE value of stock options granted to risk-averse and under-diversified executives. NEWLINE We construct a “representative” Swiss executive and extend the certainty- NEWLINE equivalence approach presented by Hall and Murphy (2002) to assess NEWLINE the value-cost wedge of executive stock options. Even with low coefficients NEWLINE of relative risk aversion, the discount can be above 50% compared to the NEWLINE Black-Scholes values. Regression analysis reveals that the equilibrium level NEWLINE of executive compensation is explained by economic determinant variables NEWLINE such as firm size and growth opportunities, whereas the managers’ pay-forperformance NEWLINE sensitivity remains largely unexplained. Firms with larger NEWLINE boards of directors pay higher wages, indicating potentially unresolved NEWLINE agency conflicts. We reject the hypothesis that cross-sectional differences in NEWLINE the amount of executive pay vanish when risk-adjusted values are used as NEWLINE the dependent variable