A stochastic delay differential model of cerebral autoregulation

Mathematical models of the cardiovascular system and of cerebral autoregulation (CAR) have been employed for several years in order to describe the time course of pressures and flows changes subsequent to postural changes. The assessment of the degree of efficiency of cerebral auto regulation has indeed importance in the prognosis of such conditions as cerebro-vascular accidents or Alzheimer. In the quest for a simple but realistic mathematical description of cardiovascular control, which may be fitted onto non-invasive experimental observations after postural changes, the present work proposes a first version of an empirical Stochastic Delay Differential Equations (SDDEs) model. The model consists of a total of four SDDEs and two ancillary algebraic equations, incorporates four distinct delayed controls from the brain onto different components of the circulation, and is able to accurately capture the time course of mean arterial pressure and cerebral blood flow velocity signals, reproducing observed auto-correlated error around the expected drift

Cryogenic seal concept for static and dynamic conditions

Seal rings reduce cryogenic pump seal leakage under static and dynamic conditions. The rings are fitted into annular diaphragms, which are affected by cryogenic pressure and temperature, to move against a mating ring, to increase seal-bearing loads under static conditions

Reflections on freedom of religion and conscience : article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights

In this article Judge De Gaetano contributes towards a better understanding of article 9 ECHR (freedom of conscience and religion). The article covers judgments dealing with matters of conscience regarding head-scarves and wearing apparel, as well as conscientious objections to military service and the conflict between secularism and the freedom to outwardly manifest one’s religious beliefs. The article deals with matters which have resulted in dismissal of employees because of their adherence to religious belief or lack of it. Issues dealt with include whether an organist in a Catholic church can be dismissed if he conducts an extra marital affair and whether such dismissal is proportionate when it refers to the main communications officer of the Mormon society; whether a British Airways desk officer can wear a cross in necklace and to what extent states are allowed a wide margin of appreciation in such matters; and whether a marriage registrar can be forced to celebrate civilly a union between persons of the same sex.peer-reviewe

Drug-related crime and criminal justice issues in Malta

When I was first approached some three weeks ago to deliver this paper, I was, I must admit, a bit sceptical about the whole idea of participating in this conference. First of all as a judge I am naturally a bit wary of talking in public about matters which, directly or indirectly, fall within the competence of one or more of the courts to which I am ordinarily assigned by the Head of State. A judge - at least a judge of the 'English' or 'Scottish' mould to which Maltese judges have generally looked for inspiration and emulation as to ethical behaviour - is trained to speak his mind on important issues only in the judgements he delivers, and then only to the extent that may be necessary for the determination of the issue or issues in the case and/or to the extent that the judgement in question would benefit from the expression of such views. On the other hand, as a university lecturer, I am occasionally asked some searching question by the unusually bright student which calls for more than just a statement of what the law is. In that case I usually very readily subscribe, at least temporarily, to the 'continental' model of the judge- on the continent judges are less inhibited when it comes to expressing their views in public and out of court (and in some countries, teaching in universities is the only 'other activity' in which a judge may lawfully and ethically indulge).peer-reviewe

Calleja vs Balzan : reflections on public order

Very often the line of demarcation between proper and improper police conduct is a very thin one indeed, requiring legal skill for its appreciation and judicial interpretation and application for the observance of proper conduct. Until recently, for instance, it was considered to be proper police conduct to release a detainee, for the purpose of safeguarding the rule against detention in excess of forty-eight hours, by simply allowing him to step outside his place of detention and re-arresting him after walking a few feet. The Court of Magistrates of Judicial Police has now set a higher and more exacting standard of police conduct by requiring "manifest and effective" release. This paper seeks to highlight one other vast area characterised by considerable uncertainty as to what are the limits of proper police conduct and of police powers, namely that of the maintenance of public order. No attempt will be made to exhaust the subject: that would be presumptuous. The aim is simply to put forward some arguments. The paper is largely based on a lecture delivered at the invitation of the Commissioner of Police to Gazetted Officers of the Malta Police Force on the 8th January 1981. The case Calleja v. Balzan3 has been included in the title of this paper, and will be discussed at some length, for two reasons. In the first place, although issues of public order are not necessarily tied to situations of public meetings, processions, and public demonstrations and manifestations, it is obvious that these situations often present a greater risk of concentrated public disorder. Secondly, the judgements in Calleja v. Balzan, that is the judgement of the court of first instance and that of the Constitutional Court, touch upon a number of legal principles which are of considerable importance in the context of any discussion on public order.peer-reviewe

Some thoughts on natural law and contemporary society

Way back in 1950, William J. Kenealy S.J., then Dean of the Boston College Law School, delivered an address at a testimonial banquet in honour of twenty· six members of the Federal, State and Municipal Judiciary, alumni of the School of Law of Loyola University, New Orleans. The opening paragraph of the address ran as follows: 'The majesty of the law? In what does it consist? In marble columns or high-backed leather chairs or black silk robes? No. These are but external symbols of an inward majesty. Does it consist, then, in that in visible force which al ways lurks behind the bench: the battalions of police, the regiments of soldiers, the battleships and bombing planes, which can be summoned to put teeth into a nation's laws? No. It is not force. At least not physical force. For the true majesty of the law is more than its coercive sanction. It is a moral power, springing from a rational people's conviction that they see, enshrined in their courts, one of the few enduring elements of civilised life. It is a moral power, arising from a free people's realisation that the law is the means, under Divine Providence, of enjoying in security the inalienable rights founded in their human nature by the natural law. It is a moral power, flowing from a moral people's persuasion that the administration of just human law demands their conscientious obedience, because it is their human participation in-the Eternal Law of God.'N/

The doctor in court - an overview

When, about two weeks ago, I was asked by my friend Dr. Mario Scerri to address you, my first reaction was to say politely "no thank you". What can a lawyer say which can be of interest to medical people gathered to discuss topics in the field of forensic medicine? But then I thought of the many close encounters I have had, both as a prosecutor and now as a judge, with doctors in the court room, encounters that have been in some cases rewarding, in others disappointing, in some cases positively entertaining, in others nightmarish. What is that makes the doctor's role in court, particularly in criminal proceedings, so captivating for the media, so much discussed and criticised by lawyers, and so very often disliked by doctors themselves? After all the doctor in court- unless he happens to be the accused or unless he is giving evidence on something totally unrelated to his medical practice - should be saying in court very much the same thing he would have said in a case conference with colleagues or in a written report submitted to a patient or to whoever requests such a report (e.g. an insurance company). The answer is both simple and complicated. The simple answer is that the moment a doctor is transposed from a purely medical setting into a legal or courtroom setting, the "rules of the game" are changed. The complicated answer is linked to the more or less complex rules of the adversarial legal system, to which are added what to many may seem as quaintnesses and endemic inconveniences peculiar to the Maltese legal system.peer-reviewe