De informatiewaarde van het Belgische auditrapport onder de loep. evolutie vanaf vier jaar vóór faling

In een omgeving met weinig rechtsvervolgingen, zoals België, blijkt het verslag van de commissaris tot 3 jaar vóór falen een adequaat signaal te zijn voor het voorspellen van de kans op faillissement. De commissaris gebruikt de aard van het verslag als signaal. Eerst drukt zij haar bezorgdheid uit aan de hand van een verslag met voorbehoud voor de waarderingsregels (GAAP). Naarmate het faillissement nadert en de problemen acuter worden, schakelt zij over naar een verslag met opmerkingen over de continuïteit eventueel aangevuld met voorbehoud voor de waarderingsregels.

Accounting standaarden als governance mechanisme

Binnen ondernemingen worden diverse maatregelen genomen ten einde het behoorlijk bestuur en de rapportering naar de belangenpartijen te verbeteren. Er wordt echter vaak vergeten dat de kwaliteit van de informatie die een investeerder krijgt, ook mede bepaald wordt door de gebruikte boekhoudstandaard. In deze studie worden de twee boekhoudstandaarden, die wedijveren om de status van wereldstandaard met elkaar vergeleken. De resultaten tonen aan dat financiële informatie een hogere informatiewaarde heeft wanneer ze opgesteld is volgens USGAAP dan IFRS. Dit kan mogelijk verklaard worden door de kenmerken van de standaarden op zich, de institutionele omgeving en de afwezigheid van één toezichtsorgaan voor IFRS, zoals de SEC voor USGAAP.

The impact of legal and voluntary investor protection on the early adoption of IFRS

Prior studies explain the early adoption of international financial reporting standards (ifrs) by firm-specific benefits. However, ifrs adoption also leads to increased disclosure and reduced accounting choices, resulting in a loss of private benefits for company insiders. This paper argues that this loss depends on characteristics of the institutional environment (i.e. The level of investor protection). We find that in countries with strong laws or extensive corporate governance codes ifrs is more likely adopted as the loss of private benefits for company insiders is smaller. Furthermore, corporate governance recommendations are as effective as laws in stimulating ifrs adoption and become more important when laws are weaker

Corporate Governance, Principal-Principal Agency Conflicts, and Firm Value in European Listed Companies

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Using the conceptual framework of Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson, this study examines the impact of principal-principal agency problems on the quality and effectiveness of corporate governance structures in listed companies from 14 European countries between 1999 and 2003. Specifically, we develop an index on the severity of the agency conflict and investigate whether this index explains the quality of governance structures. We also examine whether, given certain environmental complementarities, this index influences the effectiveness of good governance structures. Research Findings/Insights: Using a simultaneous equations model, we find that the conflict index affects the quality and effectiveness of corporate governance. When agency conflicts are severe, the costs of installing good governance are high for the majority shareholders and the quality is low. Once installed, however, good governance structures complemented with a high-quality disclosure environment leads to higher firm value, especially in companies with a severe agency conflict. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study adds to the governance literature by focusing on the costs of installing good governance. Further, it contributes to principal-principal agency studies by examining a number of developed countries and by developing a measure for the severity of the principal-principal conflict. Finally, our study adds to institutional theory by showing how companies' corporate governance choices are affected by the severity of agency conflicts and the way corporate governance is regulated. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our analyses suggest that regulatory approaches to corporate governance issues should move away from a "one-size-fits-all" policy toward one that takes into account the organizational and environmental context. By demonstrating that the severity of principal-principal agency conflicts results in significant differences in the existence and effectiveness of corporate governance, our empirical evidence can guide regulators in developing new regulations or laws intended to reduce private benefits of control or improve the disclosure environment

The impact of corporate governance on IFRS adoption choices

We investigate the association between corporate governance strength and EU listed firms' choices with respect to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in 2005. We measure governance strength by aggregating variables such as board independence, board functioning and audit committee effectiveness. The firms exhibit heterogeneity in both compliance and disclosure quality; some firms do not even meet the minimum disclosure requirements. Regression results show that stronger governance firms disclose more information, comply more fully and use IAS 39's carve-out provision less opportunistically. These findings are germane to accountants, managers and regulators in countries soon to adopt IFRS

Drijfveren voor winstmanagement voor Belgische beurs- en niet-beursgenoteerde bedrijven

status: publishe

Attribute differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS earnings:An exploratory study

* Sofie Van der Meulen is doctoral student at the KULeuven while Ann Gaeremynck and Marlee