The detection of airborne transmission of tuberculosis from HIV-infected patients, using an in vivo air sampling model

Background. Nosocomial transmission of tuberculosis remains an important public health problem. We created an in vivo air sampling model to study airborne transmission of tuberculosis from patients coinfected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and to evaluate environmental control measures. Methods. An animal facility was built above a mechanically ventilated HIV‐tuberculosis ward in Lima, Peru. A mean of 92 guinea pigs were continuously exposed to all ward exhaust air for 16 months. Animals had tuberculin skin tests performed at monthly intervals, and those with positive reactions were removed for autopsy and culture for tuberculosis. Results. Over 505 consecutive days, there were 118 ward admissions by 97 patients with pulmonary tuberculosis, with a median duration of hospitalization of 11 days. All patients were infected with HIV and constituted a heterogeneous group with both new and existing diagnoses of tuberculosis. There was a wide variation in monthly rates of guinea pigs developing positive tuberculin test results (0%–53%). Of 292 animals exposed to ward air, 159 developed positive tuberculin skin test results, of which 129 had laboratory confirmation of tuberculosis. The HIV‐positive patients with pulmonary tuberculosis produced a mean of 8.2 infectious quanta per hour, compared with 1.25 for HIV‐negative patients with tuberculosis in similar studies from the 1950s. The mean monthly patient infectiousness varied greatly, from production of 0–44 infectious quanta per hour, as did the theoretical risk for a health care worker to acquire tuberculosis by breathing ward air. Conclusions. HIV‐positive patients with tuberculosis varied greatly in their infectiousness, and some were highly infectious. Use of environmental control strategies for nosocomial tuberculosis is therefore a priority, especially in areas with a high prevalence of both tuberculosis and HIV infection

Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive v. Optional Remedies

Law and economics scholars have always had a strong interest in contract remedies. Perhaps the most explored issue in contract law has been the desirability of various contract remedies, such as expectation damages, specific performance, or liquidated damages, to name the most common. Scholars have been debating for years, from various perspectives, the comparative advantage of these remedies. Yet, most scholars have assumed that each of these remedies is exclusive, and their work has compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract. Interestingly, an analysis that assumes these remedies are optional (or cumulative) has not yet been explored, in spite of the fact that contract law provides the non-breaching party with a variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a breach, and in spite of the fact that parties themselves write contracts which provide such an option. In this paper we attempt to start filling in this gap by studying the relationship between these remedies. Specifically, we study the conditions at which a contract that grants the non-breaching party an option to choose from optional remedies is superior to an exclusive remedy contract. We show that under conditions of double-sided uncertainty and asymmetric information between a seller (who might breach) and a buyer (who never breaches) the interaction of the parties\u27 distributions should determine whether a contract provides for exclusive or optional remedies. Specifically, if the buyer\u27s conditional expected valuation is larger than the seller\u27s conditional expected valuation (in both cases - conditional that their expected valuation is above the buyer\u27s mean valuation), then a contract which provides the buyer an option to choose between liquidated damages or specific performance (or actual damages) is superior. Our analysis in this paper informs transactional lawyers of the relevant economic factors they should consider when deciding the optimal composition of remedies in a given context. Moreover, our analysis is relevant for courts that interpret contracts because it will help them to better understand whether rational parties would have agreed that a particular remedy would be an exclusive remedy or an optional remedy when the language of the contract is ambiguous. Lastly, our analysis provides yet another economic rationale for why courts should enforce parties\u27 liquidated damages clauses even if it seems ex-post over, or under, compensatory. We present a model which shows when parties will agree on a non-exclusive liquidated damages clause. Under such a contract the parties stipulate ex-ante that the buyer will have the option to choose upon breach whether she prefers an optional remedy, such as actual damages or specific performance, to the pre-determined liquidated damages. We focus on the ex-ante design of the contract in light of the new information that the parties anticipate they will gain after they draft the contract. Therefore, we assume that no renegotiation or investments are involved. We demonstrate the optimal way to design contract clauses which takes advantage of the information that the seller and the buyer receive between the time they enter into the contract and the time of the actual breach. We further suggest that parties indeed use such clauses and that courts honor them. After laying out the basic model we provide some extensions to it. As is well known, an exclusive liquidated damages contract is equivalent to granting the seller a call option to breach and pay, where the exercise price is equal to the amount of the agreed liquidated damages. What is perhaps less known is that a non-exclusive, or optional, contract, where the buyer can choose performance, is equivalent to giving the buyer a consecutive call option with the same exercise price. Yet, the consecutive call option to the buyer does not have to have the same exercise price but can rather have a higher one. We call this new contract a two-price contract and show that it is even more efficient than the basic contract we have explored before. Next, we introduce more rounds of sequential options and show that while the regular ex-ante contract can achieve on average about 4 Indeed, in an environment of asymmetric information renegotiation costs are high. More on this below. 90% of the first-best allocative efficiency, an n-rounds contract approaches the first best, as n goes to infinity. We show numerically that within just 4 rounds, 96% of the allocative efficiency can be achieved. Section two describes the legal background against which we have designed our model. Section three surveys the literature that evaluates contract remedies from an economic perspective. Section four presents a simple model with two-sided incomplete information and with a liquidated damages clause. In section four we compare the performance of a regime with optional remedies with a regime of exclusive remedy and then determine the conditions at which each regime should be applied. Section five discusses some interesting extensions meant to approach the first-best allocative efficiency. The appendix provides a more rigorous mathematical demonstration of the model

Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform

The United States economy is struggling to recover from its worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. After several huge doses of conventional macroeconomic stimulus - deficit-spending and monetary stimulus - policymakers are understandably eager to find innovative no-cost ways of sustaining growth both in the short and long runs. In response to this challenge, the Kauffman Foundation convened a number of America’s leading legal scholars and social scientists during the summer of 2010 to present and discuss their ideas for changing legal rules and policies to promote innovation and accelerate U.S. economic growth. This meeting led to the publication of Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform, a comprehensive and groundbreaking volume of essays prescribing a new set of growth-promoting policies for policymakers, legal scholars, economists, and business men and women. Some of the top Rules include: • Reforming U.S. immigration laws so that more high-skilled immigrants can launch businesses in the United States. • Improving university technology licensing practices so university-generated innovation is more quickly and efficiently commercialized. • Moving away from taxes on income that penalize risk-taking, innovation, and employment while shifting toward a more consumption-based tax system that encourages saving that funds investment. In addition, the research tax credit should be redesigned and made permanent. • Overhauling local zoning rules to facilitate the formation of innovative companies. • Urging judges to take a more expansive view of flexible business contracts that are increasingly used by innovative firms. • Urging antitrust enforcers and courts to define markets more in global terms to reflect contemporary realities, resist antitrust enforcement from countries with less sound antitrust regimes, and prohibit industry trade protection and subsidies. • Reforming the intellectual property system to allow for a post-grant opposition process and address the large patent application backlog by allowing applicants to pay for more rapid patent reviews. • Authorizing corporate entities to form digitally and use software as a means for setting out agreements and bylaws governing corporate activities. The collective essays in the book propose a new way of thinking about the legal system that should be of interest to policymakers and academic scholars alike. Moreover, the ideas presented here, if embodied in law, would augment a sustained increase in U.S. economic growth, improving living standards for U.S. residents and for many in the rest of the world

Drug treatment program patients' hepatitis C virus (HCV) education needs and their use of available HCV education services

BACKGROUND: In spite of the disproportionate prevalence of hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection among drug users, many remain uninformed or misinformed about the virus. Drug treatment programs are important sites of opportunity for providing HCV education to their patients, and many programs do, in fact, offer this education in a variety of formats. Little is known, however, about the level of HCV knowledge among drug treatment program patients, and the extent to which they utilize their programs' HCV education services. METHODS: Using data collected from patients (N = 280) in 14 U.S. drug treatment programs, we compared patients who reported that they never injected drugs (NIDUs) with past or current drug injectors (IDUs) concerning their knowledge about HCV, whether they used HCV education opportunities at their programs, and the facilitators and barriers to doing so. All of the programs were participating in a research project that was developing, implementing, and evaluating a staff training to provide HCV support to patients. RESULTS: Although IDUs scored higher on an HCV knowledge assessment than NIDUs, there were many gaps in HCV knowledge among both groups of patients. To address these knowledge gaps, all of the programs offered at least one form of HCV education: all offered 1:1 sessions with staff, 12 of the programs offered HCV education in a group format, and 11 of the programs offered this education through pamphlets/books. Only 60% of all of the participating patients used any of their programs' HCV education services, but those who did avail themselves of these HCV education opportunities generally assessed them positively. In all, many patients were unaware that HCV education was offered at their programs through individual sessions with staff, group meetings, and books/pamphlets, (42%, 49%, and 46% of the patients, respectively), and 22% were unaware that any HCV education opportunities existed. CONCLUSION: Efforts especially need to focus on ensuring that all drug treatment program patients are made aware of and encouraged to use HCV education services at their programs

Sustainable Financing of Innovative Therapies: A Review of Approaches

The process of innovation is inherently complex, and it occurs within an even more complex institutional environment characterized by incomplete information, market power, and externalities. There are therefore different competing approaches to supporting and financing innovation in medical technologies, which bring their own advantages and disadvantages. This article reviews value- and cost-based pricing, as well direct government funding, and cross-cutting institutional structures. It argues that performance-based risk-sharing agreements are likely to have little effect on the sustainability of financing; that there is a role for cost-based pricing models in some situations; and that the push towards longer exclusivity periods is likely contrary to the interests of industry

Impact of volatile phenols and their precursors on wine quality and control measures of Brettanomyces/Dekkera yeasts

Volatile phenols are aromatic compounds and one of the key molecules responsible for olfactory defects in wine. The yeast genus Brettanomyces is the only major microorganism that has the ability to covert hydroxycinnamic acids into important levels of these compounds, especially 4-ethylphenol and 4-ethylguaiacol, in red wine. When 4-ethylphenols reach concentrations greater than the sensory threshold, all wine’s organoleptic characteristics might be influenced or damaged. The aim of this literature review is to provide a better understanding of the physicochemical, biochemical, and metabolic factors that are related to the levels of p-coumaric acid and volatile phenols in wine. Then, this work summarizes the different methods used for controlling the presence of Brettanomyces in wine and the production of ethylphenols

Income-Tested College Financial Aid and Labor Disincentives

Working has become commonplace among college students; however, this activity can have unexpected financial consequences. Federal formulas implicitly tax the amount of financial aid students are eligible to receive by as much as 50 cents for each marginal dollar of income. This tax creates an incentive for college students to reduce income, though abstruse formulas and the timing of financial aid receipt are likely to limit responses. Using data from a national sample of financially independent college students in the United States, I do not find that students bunch below earnings protection thresholds in a manner that would indicate attempts to avoid reductions in financial aid in total or grants specifically. Moreover, I do not find evidence that implicit income taxes predict lower earnings in a manner that suggests that students meaningfully reduce earnings in response to the tax. Therefore, while economically efficient, the reduction in aid has the potential to burden low-income students who need to both work and receive financial aid in order to afford college expenses