Notional defined contribution pension schemes: Why does only Sweden distribute the survivor dividend?

The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of the survivor dividend in notional defined contribution (NDC) pension schemes. At present, this feature can only be found in the Swedish defined contribution scheme. We develop a model that endorses the idea that the survivor dividend has a strong basis for enabling the NDC scheme to achieve financial equilibrium and that not including the dividend is a non-transparent way of compensating for increases in longevity and/or legacy costs from old pension systems. We also find that the average effect of the dividend remains unchanged for any constant annual rate of population growth, that contribu-tors who reach retirement age always get a higher return than the scheme does, and that population growth enables cohorts with more years of contributions to benefit to a greater extent from the dividend effect

Last lessons learned from the Swedish public pension system

Retirement systems across the world are undergoing major reforms to adapt to continuously changing economic and demographic factors. Among these major changes are the so-called notional defined contribution pension schemes (NDCs), first developed about 20 years ago in countries such as Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden. These pension schemes attempt to reproduce the logic of a financial defined contribution pension plan within a pay-as-you-go framework. Among the countries with NDCs, Sweden is the only one where an automatic balancing mechanism goes hand in hand with the prior calculation of a financial solvency indicator that emerges from an actuarial balance sheet. This chapter describes the Swedish pension experience over the 2007–2015 period through its accounting method, together with the problems faced by the system and the policy responses

Averting the funding-gap crisis: East European pension reforms after 2008

This article analyses pension reforms in Central and East European countries in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis revealed unresolved problems in the implementation of previous reforms, namely the financing of the transition costs. In their attempts to solve the funding-gap issue, the reforms needed to address legacies of past choices as well as the exceptional circumstances of the crisis. The interaction of fiscal constraints and political conditions shaped the variety of these reform outcomes