1,680 research outputs found
Against moral theories: reply to Benatar
D Benatar argues that in the authorâs recent article Moral theories in teaching applied ethics, the author overlooked important roles that could be played by moral theories in such teaching. In this reply, the cases that Benatar suggests are considered and for each an alternative approach is suggested that will avoid the costs discussed in the original paper and will also be a more effective response to that particular issue
Better No Longer to Be
David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that â for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence â it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatarâs arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life, one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism and pro-mortalism. This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman â she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are âawfulâ, it follows that âwe would be better off to kill ourselvesâ. Though we agree with Harmanâs conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatarâs arguments for non-pro-mortalism deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatarâs position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatarâs position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatarâs treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatarâs ro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatarâs anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be
Global Health Challenges: The Need for an Expanded Discourse on Bioethics
Benatar and colleagues argue that the world has changed profoundly since the birth of modern bioethics in the 1960s, and that bioethics needs to address today's global health problems
Are Lives Worth Creating?
In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things considered wrong to procreate, such that if everyone acted in a morally ideal way, humanity would elect to extinguish the species. I aim to carefully question the premises and inferences that lead Benatar to draw this anti-natalist conclusion, indicating several places where one could sensibly elect to disembark from the train of argument heading toward such a radical view
How Procreation Generates Parental Rights and Obligations
Philosophical defenses of parentsâ rights typically appeal to the interests of parents, the interests of children, or some combination of these. Here I propose that at least in the case of biological, non-adoptive parents, these rights have a different normative basis: namely, these rights should be accorded to biological parents because of the compensatory duties such parents owe their children by virtue of having brought them into existence. Inspried by Seana Shiffrin, I argue that procreation inevitably encumbers the wills of children in otherwise morally objectionable ways. Such subjection generates duties to compensate children, even if the childâs life is on balance a benefit to her. The right to procreate is thus conditioned on prospective parentâs willingness to compensate for the harms of procreation. And because parents bear such compensatory duties, they must be accorded permissions (i.e., rights) to fulfill these duties. These rights include familiar exclusionary rights to promote childrenâs welfare, etc. Moreover, because subjecting children to harms or the risks thereof violates their autonomy, parental duties (and rights) include the provision of education and other goods that enable their subsequent autonomy as adults. Grounding parental rights in compensatory procreative duties avoids problems associated with appeals to the interests of children (e.g., that these interests do not seem to generate exclusive parental rights) or to the interests of parents (e.g., that these interests do not appear strong enough to permit the creation of a new, vulnerable human individual)
They call it "patient selection" in Khayelitsha: the experience of MĂ©decins Sans FrontiĂšres-South Africa in enrolling patients to receive antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS
Better never to have been believed: Benatar on the harm of existence
In Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that existence is always a harm (Benatar 2006, pp. 18--59). His argument, in brief, is that this follows from a theory of personal good which we ought to accept because it best explains several 'asymmetries'. I shall argue here (a) that Benatar's theory suffers from a defect which was already widely known to afflict similar theories, and (b) that the main asymmetry he discusses is better explained in a way which allows that existence is often not a harm
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