The Alternative Provision Academies (Consequential Amendments to Acts) (England) Order 2012

"Draft Order laid before Parliament under section 78(4) of the Education Act 2011, for approval by resolution of each House of Parliament" -- page 1

FINANCING OF GROWTH IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

Sources and uses of funds in agricultural cooperatives are examined and compared to the aggregate of nonfinancial corporations for the period 1973-1987. Cooperatives are observed to finance nearly half their growth with equity. The equity financing proportion of cooperatives is statistically indistinguishable from the national average of nonfinancial corporations in the years 1973-1983 and is consistently higher than the national average since 1984. This finding contradicts the hypothesis of equity shortage in cooperatives.Agribusiness,

MERGERS, CONSOLIDATIONS, ACQUISITIONS: EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

Reorganization has been promoted as a means to strengthen the position of cooperatives within the agricultural economy. The purpose of this study is to determine if agricultural cooperatives that reorganized through merger, acquisition, or consolidation have improved their financial performance. Although the research suggests reorganization may not be beneficial to the strongest cooperative in either the short or longer run, at least 33% of the observed reorganizations can be classified as unqualified successes. The data include 53 cooperatives involved in 24 reorganizations.Agribusiness, Industrial Organization,

COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF FOOD-PROCESSING COOPERATIVES AND INVESTOR-OWNED FIRMS

Agribusiness,

TWIN CITY NATURAL FOOD CO-OPS: THE ROLE OF CUSTOMER PREFERENCES AND CHARACTERISTICS WHEN CHOOSING AMONG STRUCTURAL OPTIONS

The demand for natural foods has been growing steadily over the past decade. As more mainstream grocers and investor-owned, natural food chains respond to this increased demand, the viability of local, independent natural food co-ops (TCNFCs) was used to assess organizational options. The study employed a customer survey to determine characteristics and preferences of co-op shoppers. The survey results were used in conjunction with a schema that analyzed the interaction among market forces, store differences, and customer factors to make recommendations to the TCNFCs. This analysis suggests that in the short run, these stores should employ a federated cooperative structure to accommodate a city-wide co-op membership and increase joint ventures among the co-ops. In the long run, the scale and scope of the federated co-op should be increased to enter new markets as a centralized co-op.Agribusiness, Consumer/Household Economics, Industrial Organization,

Parliament membership during the single-party system in Turkey (1925-1945)

The official legitimization of the single-party regime in Turkey lay with Parliament, which, as a representative of the people, controlled the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. However, the parliamentary period after 1925 was highlighted by a lack of freedom of speech, with scope for political discussion limited. This paper aims to establish the role of MPs during this period. At the head of the single-party system, the President was free to choose every party member for Parliament. This meant competition was very restricted, be it in the form of short-lived opposition parties or independent candidates. During the selection process, some social classes, for example high-ranking officer and bureaucrats were privileged. These two groups were the most common in Parliament. On the other hand, local ties were sometimes respected by the regime: rural notables with close relations with party headquarters were easily elected, and remained in Parliament. A MPs’ chance of re-election was significant if he performed his duty with loyalty to the party. The author underlines a stabilization of political personnel throughout this period

Outside income and moral hazard : the elusive quest for good politicians

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a unique dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. Conversely, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in many respects, like voting attendance and bills sponsorship

Coercion Gone Wrong: Colonial Response to the Boston Port Act

On March 25, 1774, the British Parliament passed the Boston Port Act, closing Boston Harbor to commerce. The act was meant to force Boston into paying for tea dumped into the harbor four months earlier during the Boston Tea Party. Parliament believed that the colonies would not support Boston and it would be only a short time before Boston acquiesced and paid for the tea, reestablishing British authority in the colonies.1 They could not have been more wrong. The thirteen colonies were deeply disturbed by the Boston Port Act, and came together in a way that shocked Parliament. Rather than separating Boston from the rest of the colonies, the Boston Port Act ignited all of the colonies into anti-British actions

The problem of authority and the proposal for an Indigenous advisory body

INTRODUCTION: Proposals for the establishment of an Indigenous advisory body within the Australian Constitution are genuinely innovative and exciting. Designing such a body is a challenge. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians have long sought better political representation. Indigenous Australians constitute approximately 3 per cent of the population, therefore—even with proportionate reserved seats—such a micro-minority will struggle to assert itself in the Federal Parliament. For this and other reasons, the Cape York Institute rejected proposals for reserved seats in the Federal Parliament as unworkable. Noel Pearson expressed the dilemma well: There’s no way that we’re going to regularly have members to speak on our behalf in the parliament, and yet parliament is regularly making laws about us. So a provision which makes us part of the formal process of parliament, I think that has got to be part of the discussion. A constitutional Indigenous advisory body is one way of resolving that dilemma

EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ON RECREATION USE AND VALUE: AN APPLICATION TO OFFSHORE RIGS IN CALIFORNIA

Environmental Economics and Policy,