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    A study on the Effect of Volume Incentive to Transshipment Cargo of port of Busan

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    Northeast Asia ports including Busan, Shanghai, Ningbo, Yokohama, Kaohsiung were in full activities to increase cargo throughput in maritime and port industry of the world. In particular, these ports engaged in the fierce competition with other ports to enlarge cargo in various ways. Under this circumstances China is both a threat and an opportunity for port of Busan. for port of Busan in order to be a hub port in the Northeast Asia, transshipment cargo must be increased continuously. Transshipment cargoes are more than 40% among whole cargo throughout of port of Busan. but transshipment cargoes are very changeable in accordance with port condition. From 1991 to 2000 transshipment cargo of port of Busan had increased average 37.8% per year. However transshipment cargo of port of Busan became dull recently because of 'China effect' and change of maritime and port industry of the World. Therefore volume incentive has put in force to maintain cheaper port expense and to induce competition of cargo attraction since 2004. The purpose of this studies is to verify the effect of volume incentive to transshipment cargo of port of Busan that is absolute necessary to be northeast hub port. But it is not so easy to measure the effect of volume incentive system of port of Busan. because the factors of shipping's calling port is extremely diverse. in other words, a number of complicating factors affected on transshipment cargo have to work for shipping companies to choose the calling's port. To rate effect of volume incentive in port of Busan, survey intended for public official, professor, researcher, business man engaged in port logistics took effect during one month. collected data were analysed with SPSS 12.0 of statistics solution. The results of these studies are as follows. It is true volume incentive go far toward increasing port cargo, but it is extraordinarily difficult to estimate the amounts of cargo generated by volume incentive in port of Busan. so I convert estimated increase rate by the volume incentive into cargo amount. The amounts that is generated by volume incentive are 5,408teu~265,024teu per year. also volume incentive had main problem such as placing too much emphasis on a large size shipping company and doubt of accurate effect. so the opinion that must revised volume incentive are ranked 71.1% among the whole. Consequently, from now on volume incentive must be revised to promote cargo increasing effect and competitiveness of port of Busan. this studies had a limitation to measure effect of volume incentive due to various complicating factors affected on transshipment cargo. In next study accurate measure ways about volume incentive are developed and deserve study. also it is necessary to examine relation closely between transshipment cargo throughout and vast sums of money paid by volume incentive system.์ œ 1์žฅ ์„œ๋ก  4 ์ œ 1์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฝ๊ณผ ๋ชฉ์  4 ์ œ 2์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• ๋ฐ ๋ฒ”์œ„ 7 ์ œ 2์žฅ ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ ๋ถ„์„ 8 ์ œ 1์ ˆ ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ ์‹œ์„ค ๋ฐ ๋ฌผ๋™๋Ÿ‰ ์ถ”์ด 8 ์ œ 2์ ˆ ์„ธ๊ณ„ ํ•ด์šดํ•ญ๋งŒ ๋ฌผ๋ฅ˜์‹œ์žฅ์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™” ๋™ํ–ฅ 18 ์ œ 3์žฅ ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ ๋ณผ๋ฅจ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ์ œ๋„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ณ ์ฐฐ 25 ์ œ 1์ ˆ ๋ณผ๋ฅจ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ์˜ ๊ฐœ๋…๊ณผ ๋ชฉ์  25 ์ œ 2์ ˆ ํ™˜์ ํ™”๋ฌผ์˜ ๊ฐœ๋…๊ณผ ์œ ํ˜• 26 ์ œ 3์ ˆ ๋ณผ๋ฅจ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ์˜ ๋ณ€์ฒœ ๊ณผ์ • 29 ์ œ 4์ ˆ ๋ณผ๋ฅจ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์„ ํ–‰ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ 38 ์ œ 5์ ˆ ํ•ด์™ธ ๊ฐ๊ตญ์˜ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ ์ •์ฑ… 41 1) ์ค‘๊ตญ ํ•ญ๋งŒ์˜ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ ์ •์ฑ… 41 2) ์ผ๋ณธ ํ•ญ๋งŒ์˜ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ ์ •์ฑ… 42 ์ œ 4์žฅ ๋ณผ๋ฅจ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ์ œ๋„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํšจ๊ณผ๋ถ„์„ 44 ์ œ 1์ ˆ ์กฐ์‚ฌ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฐœ์š” 44 1) ์กฐ์‚ฌ๋ชฉ์ ๊ณผ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• 44 ์ œ 2์ ˆ ์กฐ์‚ฌ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ๋ถ„์„ 45 1) ์„ค๋ฌธ ์‘๋‹ต์ž ์ผ๋ฐ˜ ํ˜„ํ™ฉ 45 2) ํ™˜์ ํ™”๋ฌผ ๋ฌผ๋™๋Ÿ‰ ์ „๋ง 46 3) ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ ํ™˜์ ํ™”๋ฌผ ์œ ์น˜ ์ฃผ์ฒด๋ณ„ ์ˆœ์œ„๊ฒ€์ • 47 4) ๋ณผ๋ฅจ ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ ์ œ๋„์˜ ํšจ๊ณผ ๋ถ„์„ 48 5) ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ๋ ฅ ๊ฐ•ํ™” ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ 53 ์ œ 5์žฅ ๊ฒฐ๋ก  ๋ฐ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์  56 ์ œ 1์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์š”์•ฝ 56 ์ œ 2์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์  ๋ฐ ํ–ฅํ›„ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ณผ์ œ 59 ์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ—Œ โ… . ๊ตญ๋‚ด ๋ฌธํ—Œ 62 โ…ก. ์™ธ๊ตญ ๋ฌธํ—Œ 64 ์„ค๋ฌธ์ง€ 6

    ์ˆ˜์ถœ๊ณผ FDI๊ฐ€ ๊ณ ์šฉ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋น„๊ต์—ฐ๊ตฌ- ๋ถ€์‚ฐ ์ธ์ฒœ์„ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ

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    Abstract The Effect of Export and Foreign Direct Investment on Employment Growth in Busan and Incheon Busan and Incheon are the second or the third largest city in the economic volume and population level basis in Korea. These also have something in common as export city and one of the biggest ports in the northeast Asia. This paper aims at doing empirical analysis on the impact of export and Foreign Direct Investment(FDI) on employment growth and at explaining what happens to two areas by comparing the results. When it comes to the empirical analysis, I apply three kinds of the methods, the correlation coefficient analysis, Granger casuality test and multi-regression model. The estimated equations for the multi-regression model is derived from Cobb-Douglas production function. The data over the period 1991-2009 is obtained from several sources including regional statistics yearbook. The main conclusions of this paper come from the three parts-the empirical results from Busan, the empirical ones from Incheon and the comparison of two city's results. The results of estimation of this paper are as follows. First of all, the results of estimation show that employment growth in Busan has been influenced by domestic growth more than by export and also by FDI more than by export. So it should be noted that the job creation of FDI is superior to that of export. In case of Busan, estimated export coefficient has surprisingly negative sign on employment. This result is due to the de-industrialization that become widespread fast in Busan economy since 1990 as is often the case in Korea economy as well as advanced countries such as USA, Japan, etc. It is recognized the fact that Busan economy is undergoing structural changes toward service industry like Incheon economy. This changes in intra-economy seem to substantially influence the effect of export on employment. The next result is the effect of FDI on employment. The estimated coefficient of FDI is positive sign of 0.0087. It indicates that when FDI rise 1%, employment is 0.0087% increasing in Busan. FDI has influenced on improving employment. When it comes to the employment policy in Busan, It is judged that Busan city should focus on implementing the policies which enhance the investment for the domestic growth just like FDI rather than which encourages the export. Afterwards, although Incheon economy is also undergoing structural changes toward service industry, the estimated coefficient on the effect of export on employment turns out to be positive sign contrary to Busan case. Subsequently, it is shown that the export can be one of the significant factor of employment growth and then of regional economy growth through increasing export in Incheon. According to the results of statistical analysis, as noted above, even though Incheon economy entered into the stage of de-industrialization at employment level, the effect of real output. export volume on employment outgoes almost twice than that of Busan city. As for FDI, The estimated coefficient of FDI records 0.0018. Another important factor, FDI has influenced employment growth more than export. In other words, because the presence of FDI is affecting employment growth confirmatively, it is a good ways to improve the regional economy. Accordingly, Incheon city should concentrate on implementing the policies which help attract the FDI more than export. To conclude, based upon the estimated results of two cities, I reach the conclusion in terms of the policy that Busan should focus on FDI more than export and Incheon should do on export and FDI at the same time to improve employment. ์ œโ… ์žฅ ๅบ ่ซ– 1 ์ œ1์ ˆ ็ก็ฉถ่ƒŒๆ™ฏ๊ณผ ็›ฎ็š„ 1 ์ œโ…ก์žฅ ๅ…ˆ่กŒ ๆ–‡็ป็ก็ฉถ 6 ์ œโ…ข์žฅ ้‡œๅฑฑ ็ถ“ๆฟŸ็พๆณ๊ณผ ็”ฃๆฅญๆง‹้€  14 ์ œ1์ ˆ ้‡œๅฑฑ็ถ“ๆฟŸ์˜ ็™ผๅฑ•้Ž็จ‹ 14 ์ œ2์ ˆ ้‡œๅฑฑ็ถ“ๆฟŸ ๆˆ้•ท์˜ ็‰นๅพต 17 1) GRDP ์ „๊ตญ ๋น„์ค‘์˜ ์ถ”์„ธ์  ํ•˜๋ฝ 17 2) ํƒˆ๊ณต์—…ํ™” ๊ฐ€์†๊ณผ ๊ณ ์šฉ์ฐฝ์ถœ๋ ฅ ์•ฝํ™” 20 3) ๋ถ€์‚ฐ๊ฒฝ์ œ์˜ ํƒˆ๊ณต์—…ํ™” ํ˜„ํ™ฉ 21 4) ์‚ฐ์—…๊ธฐ์ˆ ์ธ๋ ฅ ๋ถ€์กฑ ์‹ฌํ™” 25 5) ์„œ๋น„์Šค์—… ์„ฑ์žฅ๋ฅ  ํ•˜๋ฝ 27 6) ์ด์š”์†Œ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์„ฑ 29 ์ œ3์ ˆ ้‡œๅฑฑ์˜ ่ฒฟๆ˜“็พๆณ๊ณผ ็”ฃๆฅญๆง‹้€  33 ์ œ4์ ˆ ้‡œๅฑฑๆธฏ ็พๆณ๊ณผ ็™ผๅฑ•ๆˆฐ็•ฅ 39 1) ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ ๊ฐœ๊ด€ 39 2) ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ ์‹œ์„ค ํ˜„ํ™ฉ 42 3) ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ์˜ ํ•ญ๋งŒ ๋ฌผ๋™๋Ÿ‰ ์ถ”์ด 45 4) ๋ถ€์‚ฐํ•ญ์˜ ๋ฏธ๋ž˜ ์„ฑ์žฅ์ „๋žต 49 ์ œ5์ ˆ ้‡œๅฑฑๅœฐๅŸŸ ๅค–ๅœ‹ไบบ ็›ดๆŽฅๆŠ•่ณ‡ ็พๆณ 51 1) ์™ธ๊ตญ์ธ ์ง์ ‘ํˆฌ์ž์˜ ๊ฐœ๋…๊ณผ ์ ˆ์ฐจ 51 2) ์™ธ๊ตญ์ธ ์ง์ ‘ํˆฌ์ž์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ํšจ๊ณผ 53 3) ์™ธ๊ตญ์ธ ์ง์ ‘ํˆฌ์ž ๋™ํ–ฅ 56 ์ œโ…ฃ์žฅ ไปๅท ็ถ“ๆฟŸ็พๆณ๊ณผ ็”ฃๆฅญๆง‹้€  61 ์ œ1์ ˆ ไปๅท็ถ“ๆฟŸ์˜ ๆงช่ง€ 61 ์ œ2์ ˆ ไปๅท์˜ ็”ฃๆฅญๆง‹้€  ่ฎŠๅŒ– 62 1) ์ธ์ฒœ ์‚ฐ์—…๋‹จ์ง€ ํ˜„ํ™ฉ 62 2) ์ธ์ฒœ์˜ ์‚ฐ์—…๊ตฌ์กฐ 65 3) ์ธ์ฒœ์ง€์—ญ GRDP์™€ ๊ณ ์šฉ์‹œ์žฅ ํ๋ฆ„ 67 4) ์‚ฐ์—…๊ธฐ์ˆ ์ธ๋ ฅ ์‹คํƒœ 67 ์ œ3์ ˆ ไปๅท์˜ ่ผธๅ‡บๅ‹•ๅ‘๊ณผ ็‰นๅพต 69 ์ œ4์ ˆ ไปๅท์˜ ๅค–ๅœ‹ไบบ ็›ดๆŽฅๆŠ•่ณ‡ ๅ‹•ๅ‘ 73 ์ œ5์ ˆ ไปๅทๆธฏ ็พๆณ๊ณผ ็™ผๅฑ•ๆˆฐ็•ฅ 75 1) ์ธ์ฒœํ•ญ ์‹œ์„ค ๊ฐœ์š” 75 2) ์ธ์ฒœํ•ญ์˜ ํ•ญ๋งŒ ๋ฌผ๋™๋Ÿ‰ ๋ถ„์„๊ณผ ์ถ”์ด 78 3) ์ธ์ฒœํ•ญ์˜ ๋ฏธ๋ž˜ ์„ฑ์žฅ์ „๋žต 81 ์ œโ…ค์žฅ ๆŽจๅฎšๆจกๅž‹๊ณผ ๅฏฆ่ญ‰ๅˆ†ๆž 83 ์ œ1์ ˆ ็›ธ้—œ้—œไฟ‚ ๅˆ†ๆž 83 ์ œ2์ ˆ ๆจกๅž‹์˜ ้ฉๅˆๅบฆ ๆชขๅฎš 86 1) ๋‹จ์œ„๊ทผ ๊ฒ€์ • 86 2) ๊ณต์ ๋ถ„ ๊ฒ€์ • 91 3) ์˜ค์ฐจ์ˆ˜์ •๋ชจํ˜•(ECM)์˜ ์ถ”์ • 93 4) ๊ทธ๋žœ์ €(Granger) ์ธ๊ณผ๊ด€๊ณ„ ๊ฒ€์ • 94 ์ œ3์ ˆ ๆŽจๅฎšๆจกๅž‹ 96 ์ œ4์ ˆ ้‡œๅฑฑๅœฐๅŸŸ ๅฏฆ่ญ‰ๅˆ†ๆž ็ตๆžœ ๋ฐ ่งฃ้‡‹ 100 1) ์ˆ˜์ถœ์˜ ๊ณ ์šฉํšจ๊ณผ ์ถ”์ • ๋ฐ ํ•ด์„ 100 2) FDI์˜ ๊ณ ์šฉํšจ๊ณผ ์ถ”์ • ๋ฐ ํ•ด์„ 104 ์ œ5์ ˆ ไปๅทๅœฐๅŸŸ ๆŽจๅฎšๆจกๅž‹๊ณผ ๅฏฆ่ญ‰ๅˆ†ๆž 108 1) ์ƒ๊ด€๊ด€๊ณ„ ๋ถ„์„ 108 2) ๊ทธ๋žœ์ € ์ธ๊ณผ๊ด€๊ณ„ ๊ฒ€์ • 111 3) ์ธ์ฒœ์ง€์—ญ ์‹ค์ฆ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ๋ฐ ํ•ด์„ 112 4) ์ˆ˜์ถœ์˜ ๊ณ ์šฉํšจ๊ณผ ์ถ”์ • ๋ฐ ํ•ด์„ 112 5) FDI์˜ ๊ณ ์šฉํšจ๊ณผ ์ถ”์ • ๋ฐ ํ•ด์„ 114 ์ œ6์ ˆ ้‡œๅฑฑ๊ณผ ไปๅท์˜ ๅฏฆ่ญ‰ๅˆ†ๆž ๆฏ”่ผƒ 117 ์ œโ…ฅ์žฅ ็ต่ซ–๊ณผ ็คบๅ”†้ปž 119 ๅƒ่€ƒๆ–‡็ป 121 โ… . ๊ตญ๋‚ด ๋ฌธํ—Œ 121 โ…ก. ๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ, ์›น์‚ฌ์ดํŠธ 124 โ…ข. ์™ธ๊ตญ ๋ฌธํ—Œ 12

    Is It Realy Expenditure Other Than Election Expenses Not Related To Elections? : Actual Situation Analysis On Expenditure Other Than Election Expenses In 2015 and 2016

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    ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ทธ๋™์•ˆ ๊ฐ„๊ณผ๋˜์–ด ์˜ค๋˜ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์ง€์ถœ ์œ ํ˜•์„ ์ •๋ฆฝํ•˜๊ณ , ์ง€์ถœ ์œ ํ˜•๋ณ„๋กœ ์ง€์ถœ์‹คํƒœ๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ์ •์น˜์ž๊ธˆ ์ง€์ถœ์˜ ์ƒ๋‹น ๋น„์ค‘์„์ฐจ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์€ ๋ฒ•๋ฆฌ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฌด์ œํ•œ ์ง€์ถœ์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•จ์—๋„ ๋ถˆ๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ , ๊ทธ๊ฐ„ ํ•™๊ณ„์˜ ๊ด€์‹ฌ์„ ๋ฐ›์ง€ ๋ชปํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ ์ด์œ ๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ ์ง€์ถœ๊ณผ ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ, ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์€ ์ž๋ฃŒ ์ ‘๊ทผ์ด ์–ด๋ ค์šธ ๋ฟ๋งŒ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ์ง€์ถœ ์œ ํ˜•์ด ์ฒด๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฒ”์ฃผํ™”๋˜์ง€์•Š๊ณ  ์žˆ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ฐ€ ์—†๋˜ ํ•ด์ธ 2015๋…„๊ณผ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋˜ ํ•ด์ธ2016๋…„์„ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ง€์ถœ ์œ ํ˜•๋ณ„ ์‹คํƒœ ๋ถ„์„์„ ์‹œ๋„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ณด๋ฉด, ์ฒซ์งธ, ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋˜ ํ•ด์˜ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์€ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ฐ€ ์—†๋˜ํ•ด์™€ ๋น„๊ตํ•˜์—ฌ ์„ ๊ฑฐ ๊ด€๋ จ ์ง€์ถœ ์œ ํ˜•์˜ ๋น„์ค‘์ด ์ƒ๋Œ€์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ปค์กŒ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ์ง€์ถœ์ด ์„ ๊ฑฐ์™€ ๊ด€๋ จ๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๋น„์šฉ์ด๋ž€ ๊ทœ์ •๊ณผ ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ, ์„ ๊ฑฐ์™€ ๊ด€๋ จ๋œ ๋น„์šฉ์ด๋ž€์ถ”์ •์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋‘˜์งธ, ๋‹ค์ˆ˜์˜ ์ง€์ ๊ณผ ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์€ ๊ณ ์ •๋น„์šฉ์ด์ฐจ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„์ค‘์ด ํฌ์ง€ ์•Š์„ ๋ฟ๋งŒ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ, ์ฒซ ๋ฒˆ์งธ ์œ ์‚ฌ์„ฑ์„ ์ œ์™ธํ•˜๋ฉด ์˜์›๋ณ„๋กœ์ƒ๋‹นํ•œ ์ง€์ถœ ๋น„์ค‘์˜ ์ฐจ์ด๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์…‹์งธ, ์˜ˆ์ƒ๊ณผ๋Š” ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ ์—ฌ์„ฑ์˜ ์ •์น˜์  ๊ถŒ์ต์‹ ์žฅ์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ์—ฌ์„ฑ์ •์น˜ ๋ฐœ์ „๋น„ ์ง€์ถœ์ด 2015๋…„๊ณผ 2016๋…„์—๋Š” ์ „ํ˜€ ์—†๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์ด์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌ์€ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ๋ถˆํ‰๋“ฑ์ด ์ •์น˜์  ๋ถˆํ‰๋“ฑ์œผ๋กœ ์ด์ „๋œ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ •์น˜์ž๊ธˆ์˜๊ณ ์ „์  ์ฃผ์žฅ์— ์‹ ๋น™์„ฑ์„ ๋”ํ•ด ์ค€๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์˜ ์žฌ์›์—์„œ ํ›„๋ณด์ž์ž์‚ฐ์ด ์ฐจ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„์ค‘์ด ์ƒ๋‹นํ•˜๊ณ , ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์ด ์‹ค์งˆ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์„ ๊ฑฐ์™€ ๊ด€๋ จ๋˜์–ด ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์˜ ๋ฌด์ œํ•œ์  ์‚ฌ์šฉ์„์ œํ•œํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•˜์—ฌ, ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ ์ง€์ถœ๊ณผ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ์™ธ ์ง€์ถœ์„ ํ•ฉ์‚ฐํ•˜๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋น„์šฉ ์ด์•ก์ œ๋ฅผ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ๋‹ค. This paper is to examine an actual situation on expenditure other than election expenses in Korea. Although this type of money is outside campaign regulations and ocupies a relatively big portion of campaign expenditure, it does not draw academic atention. The reasons are simple: limitations on data aces and clasification of the money. This paper atempts to clasify this type of expenditure and analyze thre selected congresmen and womanโ€™s expenditure in 2015 and 2016. Although many experts argue that the large portion of expenditure other than election expenses is used for a fixed cost, the findings sugest that it does not. The proportion of expenditure related to a fixed cost is not large and varies by congresmen and woman. Second, expenditure other than election expenses is de facto related to elections, unlike the legal provision of campaign finance regulations. Therefore, the findings gives more credibility to the argument that economic inequality leads to political inequality because expenditure other than election expenses is not limited by regulations and the large source of that expenditure comes from candidates. This paper sugests that expenditure other than election expenses should be included in the category of campaign expenditure in general and thus are under surveilance.FALS

    The Perception Gap on Political Tolerance between the Winner and the Loser and Its Effects

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    ๋Œ€์˜๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€ ๊ณต๊ณ ํ™”๋˜์ง€ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•œ ์ •๊ถŒ ๊ต์ฒด์˜ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์ด ํ•ญ์ƒ ์—ด๋ ค์žˆ๊ณ , ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์—์„œ์˜ ์Šน์ž์™€ ํŒจ์ž๊ฐ€ ๋น„์Šทํ•œ ์ˆ˜์ค€์˜ ์ •์น˜๊ด€์šฉ์„ ๋ณด์ด๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ์ค‘์š”ํ•˜๋‹ค. ์ด์— ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋Œ€์˜๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜ํ•˜์—์„œ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•˜์—ฌ ํ•„์—ฐ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์–‘์‚ฐํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜๋Š” ์Šน์ž์™€ ํŒจ์ž๋กœ์„œ์˜ ์ง€์œ„๊ฐ€ ์ •์น˜๊ด€์šฉ์˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ์™€ ๊ด€๋ จํ•˜์—ฌ ์–ด๋– ํ•œ ๊ด€๊ณ„๋ฅผ ํ˜•์„ฑํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ๊ฒฝํ—˜์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํ•œ๊ตญ์—์„œ ์ •์น˜๊ด€์šฉ์€ ์–ด๋– ํ•œ ํŠน์ง•๋“ค์„ ๋ณด์ด๋Š”๊ฐ€์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ดํ•ด๋ฅผ ๋•๊ณ , ๊ทธ ์ˆ˜์ค€์„ ์ œ๊ณ ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ์–ด๋– ํ•œ ์ ‘๊ทผ๊ณผ ๋…ธ๋ ฅ๋“ค์ด ์š”๊ตฌ๋˜๋Š”์ง€์— ๋Œ€ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ œ์•ˆํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ํ•œ๊ตญ์—์„œ ์Šน์ž์™€ ํŒจ์ž์˜ ์ •์น˜๊ด€์šฉ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ธ์‹์€ ์ƒ๋‹นํ•œ ์ฐจ์ด๋ฅผ ๋ณด์ด๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์„ ๋ชฉ๊ฒฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋‹ค์ค‘ ํšŒ๊ท€๋ถ„์„์˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋†“๊ณ  ๋ณผ ๋•Œ์—๋„ ์Šน์ž ๋˜๋Š” ํŒจ์ž๋กœ์„œ์˜ ์ง€์œ„๋Š” ๊ฐœ์ธ์˜ ์ •์น˜๊ด€์šฉ ์ˆ˜์ค€์„ ๊ฒฐ์ •์ง“๋Š”๋ฐ ์žˆ์–ด ์ผ์ • ์ˆ˜์ค€ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ ์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•  ๋•Œ ํ–ฅํ›„ ํ•œ๊ตญ์ •์น˜๊ฐ€ ํŒŒํ–‰์ ์ธ ๊ตญ๋ฉด์œผ๋กœ ์ „๊ฐœ๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ฐฉ์ง€ํ•˜๊ณ  ๋Œ€ํ™”์™€ ํ† ๋ก ์— ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ํ•˜์—ฌ ํ˜‘์˜์ ์ธ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์œผ๋กœ ์šด์˜๋˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ์Šน์ž์™€ ํŒจ์ž ๊ฐ„์— ์กด์žฌํ•˜๋Š” ์ •์น˜๊ด€์šฉ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ธ์‹ ์ฐจ์ด๋ฅผ ์ขํž ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ๋“ค์„ ๋‹ค๊ฐ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ชจ์ƒ‰ํ•  ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ๋ณด์—ฌ์ง„๋‹ค. ํŠนํžˆ ์ด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ์Šน์ž๋…์‹์˜ ์ •์น˜๋ฌธํ™”๋ฅผ ๊ฐœ์„ ํ•˜๊ณ , ์ข€๋” ํ•ฉ์˜์ œ์ ์ธ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์œผ๋กœ ์ œ๋„ ์„ค์ •์„ ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ๊ธด์š”ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ํŒ๋‹จ๋œ๋‹ค. The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the preception gap on political tolerance between the winner and the loser. In addition, this study analyzes its effects in Korean politics. In this vein, this study will be helpful to understand the characteristics of political tolerance as well as to suggest what kinds of approaches or efforts are needed for improving the level of it in Korea. Depending on the statistic analyses, we can witness that a significant perception gap on political tolerance between the winner and the loser does exist in Korea. Also, it effects to determine the level of political tolerance of the individuals. Considering the empirical findings, reducing the perception gap on political tolerance between the winner and the loser is necessary to ameliorate the winner-takes-all culture as well as to adopt the more consensual institutions.์ด ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 2009๋…„๋„ ์ •๋ถ€์žฌ์›(๊ต์œก๊ณผํ•™๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋ถ€ ์ธ๋ฌธ์‚ฌํšŒ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—ญ๋Ÿ‰๊ฐ•ํ™”์‚ฌ์—…๋น„)์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๊ตญํ•™์ˆ ์ง„ํฅ์žฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์ง€์›์„ ๋ฐ›์•„ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋˜์—ˆ์Œ(KRF-2009-328-BOOOll
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