产品市场竞争的治理效应实证研究

本文实证研究产品市场竞争是否对企业的“第二类代理问题“具有治理作用,结果显示:产品市场竞争以及合理的公司内部治理机制有助于降低大股东的掏空程度;在行业中处于竞争优势的公司其大股东掏空程度往往更大。在对大股东掏空的影响上,产品市场竞争与一些公司内部治理机制之间存在着互补的关系。研究表明要缓解大股东的掏空问题,应在进一步完善公司内部治理机制的同时,更多地降低行业进入壁垒以提高行业内部竞争性。教育部人文社科青年基金“产品市场竞争、公司治理与控制权私利:基于中国上市公司的实证研究”(10YJC630137); 教育部人文社科重点基地重大项目“我国证券市场财务分析师引导机制及其监管研究”(2009JJD790041); 厦门理工学院社会科学研究项目(E2014091)的阶段性成果之

基于不同形态投资的控制权私利攫取研究前沿探析

本文首先阐述了控股股东利用资本投资攫取控制权私利的动机,依据公司治理理论、信息非对称理论和代理理论的相关研究成果,剖析了不同形态投资所形成资产的经济属性以及不同形态投资的控制权私利攫取的作用机制与差异;然后,在评述不同形态投资控制权私利攫取研究现状的基础上,阐释了相应的治理与防范途径;最后指出了未来的研究趋势以及对我国上市公司治理与监管的启示。国家自然科学基金项目《大股东控制下的中国上市公司资本配置行为研究》(编号:70772100);《交叉上市、政府控制与公司治理之演进》(编号:70802067);国家社会科学基金项目《基于期权博弈视角的风险投资研究》(编号:08JY154);教育部博士点基金项目《基于控制权收益的资本配置行为研究》(教技发中心函[2006]226号);重庆大学青年骨干教师创新能力培育基金重点项目、人才引进基金项

An Empirical Study of Earnings Management Based on Real Activities Manipulation——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

以中国上市公司A股2002~2011年的数据为样本,对上市公司的真实盈余管理行为进行了实证研究。研究发现,微盈公司显著存在利用应计项目和真实活动进行正向盈余管理的现象,而在新会计准则实施后,微盈公司利用应计项目进行正向盈余管理的程度显著降低,但利用真实活动进行正向盈余管理的程度显著提高,说明新会计准则的实施促使微盈公司转而利用更加隐蔽的真实盈余管理进行利润操控。进一步研究发现,在控制了资产规模、资产回报率、年持有收益率、操控性应计利润及成长性等影响因素后,上市公司真实盈余管理的程度与其后期的业绩表现显著负相关,说明真实盈余管理行为会损害公司的长期价值。This paper empirically examine the real earnings management behavior of Chinese list companies with the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share from 2002-2011.The results show that small profit companies manage earnings upwards significantly by accruals as well as real activities.Small profit companies use less accrual earning management but more real earnings management significantly after the promulgation of new accounting standards.It suggests that the promulgation of new accounting standards urge small profit companies switch to use more covert real activities to manage earnings.The further research shows that real earnings management is negative related to the subsequent operating performance of list companies after we control other influence factors.It suggests that real earnings management will harm companies' long term value.国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972111); 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2011221035

第十八届美国理论与应用力学大会总结

1会议概况2018年6月5—9日,第18届美国理论与应用力学大会(18th U.S. National Congress of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, USNCTAM2018)在美国芝加哥召开.本次大会由美国力学国家委员会和中国力学学会联合主办,旨在探讨和交流近四年世界范围内在理论和应用力学领域的基础研究、创新技术的最新进展,吸引了来自世界各地的近千名专家学

Capital investment,control character and benefit snatching

基于我国上市公司的所有权控制背景,本文实证考察了不同控制特征下资本投资规模对控制权收益形成的影响。研究结果发现:央企所辖上市公司通过资本投资攫取控制权收益的程度显著低于地方所辖的上市公司;民营上市公司的投资规模对控制权收益的影响程度高于中央企业集团控制的上市公司,低于地方企业集团和国资委控制的上市公司;地方企业集团所控上市公司的资本投资行为不仅挤占了中小投资者的共享利益,而且损害了企业价值。Based on the control character of Chinese listing companies,this paper empirically studies the impact of capital investment on control benefit under different control characters of shareholders.The conclusion is: the companies controlling by the central government snatch less the control benefit from capital investment than the companies controlling by the local governments;the private companies snatch more the control benefit from capital investment than the companies controlled by the central government;such influential effects of private listing companies is higher than those controlled by the central government;the capital investment behavior of the companies controlled by the local governments not only occupies the joint benefits of middle and small shareholders but also does harm to the corporation value.国家自然科学基金项目《大股东控制下的中国上市公司资本配置行为研究》(批号:70772100);重庆大学青年骨干教师创新能力培育基金重点项目《股权分置改革后的控制人行为特征与上市公司投资决策研究》;重庆大学人才引进基金《大股东控制下的中国上市公司投资行为特征研究》的资

Snatching Private Benefit of Control with Capital Investment:Comments and Discussion

控制权结构对企业投资行为的影响作为治理结构影响财务决策的重要方面,随着治理机制中不同利益主体代理冲突的演化而被不断赋予新的研究内涵。基于股权分散和集中两种公司治理模式,本文首先在理论上阐释了企业实际控制人通过资本投资攫取控制权私利的实质;然后,从实际控制人利益动机、控制权结构和资本投向三个方面系统评述了资本投资的控制权私利攫取机制和特征;在此基础上,结合我国上市公司的股权设置特征和控制权配置格局,探析了不同类型的控股股东通过资本投资攫取控制权私利的动机、能力和实现条件;最后,从资本投向之间的挤占、资本投资的结构异化和控制权结构的设置等方面指出了未来该领域的研究趋势及其对我国上市公司的启示。As an important aspect of governance structure impact on finance decision-making,the impaction of control right structure on corporation investment behavior is continuously endowed with new connotation along with the evolvement of agent confliction in different governance behalf.Based on the two typical corporation governance modes,this paper firstly explains the substance that the controlled shareholders snatch the private benefit of control(PBC) through capital investment in theoretic.Then the character and mechanism through capital investment snatching the private benefit of control are reviewed with benefit motive,control right structure and capital collocation.After those reviews,this paper discusses the motive,ability and qualification with snatching the private benefit of control through capital investment under the equity setting and control right character of China's listed companies.At last,the future study trend and the illumination in this field are indicated with the capital investment extrusion,the dissimilation of capital investment structure and the control right setting.国家自然科学基金项目(70902030;70772100;70771118);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630242);重庆大学青年骨干教师创新能力培育基金重点项目;重庆大学人才引进基金项

Study of Ownership Structure on Private Benefits of Control

尽管所有权安排将通过所有权的性质、控制方式和结构比例等主要特征影响大股东控制权私利的攫取行为,但在不同国别和公共治理模式下却存在着利益目标抉择和诉求的相对差异。本文结合分级履行出资人职责的制度背景下,中央和地方国资委分别掌握上市公司终极控制权的基本特征,着重从所有权的控制方式和结构比例两方面阐释了我国上市公司大股东攫取控制权私利的动机、能力和实际效果差异。本文的研究结论将为股权分置改革和国有资产管理中配套法规的建立提供经验依据。The private benefits of corporate control(PBC) expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders presents relative differences in aim-choices and requirements in different countries and different modes of corporate management,though it can be influenced by ownership structure through the characters,control modes and proportions of ownership.On this background central and local governments fulfill the investment person responsibility respectively,the central and local China State-owned Property Committee have become the ultimate controlling shareholder of Chinese listed companies.Based on the theory that ownership structure is the impact of the level of PBC,we conduct a thorough empirical study on the tunneling of majority shareholders from the two perspectives: the ultimate control models and the stake of the largest shareholder.The conclusion of the thesis can provide empirical assistance for the establishment of correlative statute during the reform of split share structure and the management of state-owned assets.国家自然科学基金资助项目(7037204170772100

Ownership control,investment level and control benefit grabbing

基于资本投资形成控制权收益的理论阐释,实证考察了不同国有股权控制特征下资本投资对控制权收益的影响.1)整体而言,投资规模与控制权收益正相关.2)资本投资对控制权收益的影响在不同股权控制分类下呈现显著差异,但对大股东持股比例不敏感;3)地方企业集团所控上市公司,其控制权收益对固定资产和股权投资规模的敏感性最高,分别为央企上市公司的10倍和6倍,为地方国资委上市公司的3.3倍和1.9倍;4)地方企业集团上市公司的资本投资在形成高控制权收益的同时,侵害了公司价值.上述研究为进一步完善股权分置改革后的上市模式选择,加快市场化进程以促进资本投资的私有利益外部化等方面提供了理论和经验依据.Based on the theory of the capital investment results in control benefit,this paper empirically studies the impact of capital investment on control benefit grabbing under different control characters of national shareholders.The conclusion is: 1) As a whole,the capital investment level is positive relativity with the control benefit.2)The relationship between investment level and control benefit is significant under different control characters;but not significantly sensitive to ownership ratio.3) The companies controlled by the local group grab most of the control benefits from capital investment,and the control benefit is 10 times and 6 times more than what the central governments grab,3.3 times and 1.9 times more than what the local governments grab respectively in fixed assets and equity investment.4) While the capital investment of local groups grabs the maximum control benefit,the enterprise value is damaged.These conclusions and findings provide evidence for improving the mechanism of listing after non-tradable shares reform,and propelling the transparency of the private benefit through marketization.国家自然科学基金资助项目(70902030;70772100;70771118);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(09JC730006);重庆大学自主科研面上项