A Theory Quest for the Third Generation of Development Thinking Based on China’s Economy

作为发展经济学的开山之作，罗森斯坦-罗丹文章的独特之处在于他将发展中国家面临的特殊问题作为写作的焦点。秉承这种风格，本文从发达国家与发展中国家经济大分流的历史背景出发，梳理了基于前沿国家经济增长阶段的增长理论和基于前沿内部国家经济发展轨迹的发展理论，并依据经济大分流的历史事实判定理论大分流——前沿国家的增长理论并不适合于前沿内部国家，发展中国家的独特经济性质需要独特的理论解释和政策体系。作为发展经济学的核心内容，第一波结构主义发展思潮和第二波新自由主义发展思潮并未成功解释和指导发展中国国家的经济发展。近期，一些发展经济学家们开始重新审视一些构成经济发展理论基础的大前提，这激发了第三波发展思潮的...As a building stone in the development economics, it is unique that Rosenstein-Rodan’ paper focus on the special problem of developing ones. Obedience to the style, this paper teases the economic growth theory based on leading ones and the economic development theory based on following ones and asserts that the former doesn’t suit to the later according to the “big divergence” of economic performa...学位：经济学博士院系专业：经济学院_政治经济学学号：1532011015381

城市化与城乡收入——城乡分割制度改革的逻辑与对策

本文采取了“刘易斯+马克思+斯密“的视角,基于中国城乡分割制度变迁以及城乡移民与城市居民之间劳动分工关系的特征事实,提出理论假说:城乡移民对城乡收入的影响受到城乡制度分割程度的调节。来自1995—2008年中国215个地级市的面板数据实证分析量化了该理论假说:城市收入对城乡移民的弹性受到城乡分割显著的负向调节,农村收入对城乡移民的弹性受到城乡分割显著的正向调节。在低程度的城乡分割区间,城乡移民有利于城市收入而不利于农村收入;在高程度的城乡分割区间,城乡移民有利于农村收入而不利于城市收入;在城乡分割程度居中的区间,城乡移民既有利于城市收入又有利于农村收入。因此,户籍等城乡分割制度无法激励相容地自发破除,改革须依赖于利益中性的顶层设计。清华大学农村研究博士论文奖学金(2013—2014年度); 教育部博士研究生学术新人奖(2012); 厦门大学优博培育计划(2011

组织边界扭曲:原因及其识别

委托人与供应商交易的合约若由代理人代理委托人与供应商设计,就可能扭曲组织的边界:原本应该“自制“的治理合约却出现了“外包“,或者原本该“外包“的治理合约却出现了“自制“。解决专用性问题的组织边界会因为边界设计上的委托代理问题而产生扭曲。治理合约与激励合约的互联合约因为边界扭曲而需要被治理。信息不对称问题的解决有利于提高解决专用性问题的效率。内生专用性的方法能识别出组织边界扭曲

An Analytical Framework of the Costs and Benefits of Development Strategy: On theDream,Controversy and Expanding of New Structural Economics

新结构经济学的目标是从比较优势的视角形成一个认识并界定政府和市场在以结构变迁为核心内容的经济发展中的作用的新综合体系。然而,在比较优势分析方法、静态比较优势的动态性质、发展战略的制度基础等关键问题上依然面临着诸多争议。在此基础上,本文尝试构建了如下一个发展战略的成本与收益分析框架。首先,发展中国家的经济性质决定了发展政策的两难困境:由于市场中存在信息、协调、外部性、刚性等等问题,需要积极的发展政策来激励理性的市场个体充分利用发展机会,但被干预了的市场必然存在扭曲,真实的发展绩效取决于发展政策成本与收益的权衡。其次,随着发展水平的提高,发展战略的边际成本增加而边际收益降低,最优的政府干预程度需要削减。最后,在政府及其代理人与市场个体利益相容的条件下,发展战略的最优动态调整能够实现。否则,发展战略的动态调整轨迹就取决于产权分布的变迁。New Structural Economics want to integrate the old structural economics and neo-liberalism economics into a unified framew ork w hich emphasizes the important roles for market and the state in the process of promoting economic development that focus on the structural change.How ever, there are many controversies on basic topics,such as the analytical method of comparative advantage, the dynamic nature of static comparative advantage, the institutional foundation of development strategy.In order to perfect and expand NSE,this paper constructs an analytical framew ork of the costs and benefits of development strategy.Firstly,there are dilemmas depending on the unique economic situation in developing ones: due to market problems of information,coordination,externality, rigidity,etc,rational agents need to be stimulated to utilize the development opportunities by positive development policies, at the same time, w hich induce the distortion in market, and the real development performance depends on the trade- off of the costs and benefits of development policies.Secondly,as the progress of development,the marginal costs of development strategy w ill be increased but the marginal benefits deceased,as result,the optimal degree of government intervention should be cut dow n.Lastly,under the conditions of compatible interest betw een government and market agents, the optimal dynamic adjustment on development strategy can be true; otherw ise, the dynamic adjustment track w ould depend on the distribution of decision- making pow er betw een government and market.教育部博士研究生学术新人奖(2012年度); 清华大学农村研究博士论文奖学金(2013-2014年度); 厦门大学优秀博士培育计划(2011年度)的研究资

An Endogenous Interpretation of Specificity: From Institutional Perspective

“专用性“是新制度经济学,尤其是交易费用经济学的核心概念,但如何对其内生化却悬而未决。与已有的物质论不同,从制度角度对专用性进行系统的解释,发现专用性水平是专用性租金分配的单调递增的反应函数。从单边角度来看,专用性投资者对交易对手敲竹杠行为的弱反应会减少效率损失;从双边角度来看,强反应会减少效率损失。在一定条件下契约安排能够提高有效的专用性水平,最优契约设计的契约替代率必须与特定控制和剩余控制的边际费用比率相等,否则可以调整契约结构以节约交易费用。制度环境通过影响边际交易费用产生替代效应与专用性效应,替代效应加剧了契约多样性,专用性效应解释了相同的交易在不同制度环境中可能存在不同的专用性水平。The"specificity"is a core concept in the field of New Institution Economics,especially Transaction Cost Economics,but it has not been endogenously explained.Different from the material view of specificity,this research,based on institutional perspective,finds that the level of specificity is the increasable function of the distribution of appropriable specialized quasi-rents; the weak response of specific investor to hold-up man could decrease efficiency losses based on unilateral perspective; in contradiction,strong response could decrease efficiency losses based on bilateral perspective.In particular condition,contract arrangement can improve effective level of specificity.The CRS( contact rate of substitution) must be equal to ratio of marginal transactional cost between specific control and residual control in option contract design,or the transaction costs could be economized by adjusting contractual structure.The institutional environments influence marginal transactional cost to produce substitution effects that aggravate the diversity of contract.Specificity-effect can explain why there are different level of specificity among the same transactions in different institutional environments.广东省哲学社会科学“十一五”规划项目“新马克思主义空间视角下的资本危机全球化”(GD10YLJ01);中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目“马克思主义时空视角下的全球性金融与经济危机”(20110490905

Neoclassical Paradigm,Comparative Paradigm and Contract Structure Paradigm:Three Ways for How to get the Equilibrium Transaction Costs

基于新古典范式的交易费用模型化无法触及制度;基于比较制度范式的交易费用模型化对交易的组织细节虽有深刻的洞见,但无法求解均衡交易费用。鉴于此,提出一种创新的交易费用模型化范式——契约结构范式。从契约结构的角度发现:交易参与人的行为品行和信息结构以及标的专用性会导致交易冲突;改善信息结构、提升治理水平是化解交易冲突的必由之路;均衡交易费用出现在信息费用和治理费用的边际效应相等时;制度环境的介入会节约交易费用但会耗费制度费用,二者的权衡导出均衡的制度边界。To model transaction costs by new-classical paradigm is difficult in touching the institution systems.Despite the deep insight into detailed organizational arrangement of transaction,to model transaction costs by comparative institutional paradigm cant answer the problem of how to get the equilibrium transaction costs.From contractual structure perspective,this paper finds:first,transaction conflicts,which result from the specificity of the objects,the information structure and conduct of parties,can be resolved by improving information structure or advancing governance structure;second,the equilibrium transactional costs appear when the marginal effects of information costs are equal to the marginal effects of governance costs;third,the transaction cost will be reduced by intervention of institution,but may produce institutional costs.Therefore,there is a trade-off between them to determine the equalization of the institutional boundary.广东省哲学社会科学“十一五”规划项目“新马克思主义空间视角下的资本危机全球化”(GD10YLJ01