The World Trade Organization and financial stability: the balance between liberalisation and regulation in the GATs

The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services and its Annex on Financial Services provide the international legal framework for the regulation of cross-border trade in financial services. This paper analyses some of the main provisions of the GATS and the Annex on Financial Services to determine its impact on domestic financial regulation and whether the GATS framework can achieve its objectives of liberalising international trade in financial services while allowing states to maintain adequate domestic regulatory institutions. The paper argues that the GATS provides a flexible framework for states to negotiate liberalisation commitments while allowing sufficient domestic regulatory authority to achieve financial stability objectives. The extent to which states can depart from their GATS obligations to achieve regulatory objectives has become the source of academic debate and policy interest. Although the WTO has played little or no role in the financial regulation debate, the GATS contains certain disciplines that could potentially have significant implications for limiting regulatory discretion over financial markets. The paper suggests that the Doha Development Agenda should address some of these issues as they relate to the regulation of cross-border trade in financial services. The role of the WTO in this area raises important issues regarding the institutional design of financial regulation and related issues of global financial governance

Corporate governance and banking regulation

The globalisation of banking markets has raised important issues regarding corporate governance regulation for banking institutions. This research paper addresses some of the major issues of corporate governance as it relates to banking regulation. The traditional principal-agent framework will be used to analyse some of the major issues involving corporate governance and banking institutions. It begins by analysing the emerging international regime of bank corporate governance. This has been set forth in Pillar II of the amended Basel Capital Accord. Pillar II provides a detailed framework for how bank supervisors and bank management should interact with respect to the management of banking institutions and the impact this may have on financial stability. The paper will then analyse corporate governance and banking regulation in the United Kingdom and United States. Although UK corporate governance regulation has traditionally not focused on the special role of banks and financial institutions, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 has sought to fill this gap by authorizing the FSA to devise rules and regulations to enhance corporate governance for financial firms. In the US, corporate governance for banking institutions is regulated by federal and state statute and regulation. Federal regulation provides a prescriptive framework for directors and senior management in exercising their management responsibilities. US banking regulation also addresses governance problems in bank and financial holding companies. For reasons of financial stability, the paper argues that national banking law and regulation should permit the bank regulator to play the primary role in establishing governance standards for banks, financial institutions and bank/financial holding companies. The regulator is best positioned to represent and to balance the various stakeholder interests. The UK regulatory regime succeeds in this area, while the US regulatory approach has been limited by US court decisions that restrict the role that the regulator can play in imposing prudential directives on banks and bank holding companies. FSA regulatory rules have enhanced accountability in the financial sector by creating objective standards of conduct for senior management and directors of financial companies. The paper suggests that efficient banking regulation requires regulators to be entrusted with discretion to represent broader stakeholder interests in order to ensure that banks operate under good governance standards, and that judicial intervention can lead to suboptimal regulatory results

China’s “Great Wall” of Debt Chinese Debts and their Macroeconomic Implications. Bertelsmann Stiftung GED Focus Paper

The figures of the Chinese debts are subject to ongoing discussion among economists. The question whether the enormous rise in Chinese corporate and private debt over the past decade will lead to another global financial crisis or will be managed by the Chinese government is one of vital importance to the global economy: if China’s debt management fails, the macroeconomic effects are expected to overshadow the catastrophic effects of the 2008 financial and economic crises by large. The Economist (7 May 2016) even goes as far as to state the question not if, but when China’s debt bubble will burst. The term “China’s Great Wall of Debt” coined by Dinny McMahon (2018) to emphasize the connection between recent Chinese growth and corresponding debt seems therefore very well put

Establishing a European securities regulator: is the European Union an optimal economic area for a single securities regulator?

The paper’s purpose is to address the economic, institutional, and legal issues confronting the establishment of a more centralised approach to EU securities regulation and to suggest that the theory of optimum currency areas can be used as a model to assess the economic benefits and costs of further centralisation of securities regulation in the European Union. The European Union’s Financial Services Action Plan seeks to achieve an integrated market in financial services in order to accomplish the economic and political objectives of the Treaty of Rome. The FSAP is premised on the notion that the adoption of legal and regulatory measures to achieve liberalisation in cross-border trade in financial services will also achieve integration of EU financial markets. This paper argues that liberalisation of financial markets does not necessarily lead to integration of financial markets. Furthermore, it argues that the institutional design and scope of financial regulation should be based, in part, on the extent of integration in the financial market. That is, the domain of the regulator should be the same as the domain of the market. European capital and financial markets remain fragmented and segmented. This paper argues therefore that, until EU financial markets become more integrated, a single EU securities regulator would not be an efficient or effective institutional model for EU securities markets. In other words, at present, the EU is not an optimal economic area for a single securities regulator

Reputational Injury Without a Reputational Attack: Addressing Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm

This Note examines the unsettled relationship between defamation and negligence. The law of defamation, through the torts of libel and slander, constitutes a well-developed and complex body of state common law and constitutional considerations. However, some claims for reputational harm may fall outside of this framework, as the law of defamation does not account for all of the ways that an individual’s reputation may be injured. Thus, plaintiffs sometimes bring negligence claims to seek redress for damage to reputation. When a plaintiff brings a negligence claim for pure reputational harm, the court is faced with a variety of options for handling the claim. This Note argues that courts should adopt a multistep approach to handling such claims. The court should first determine whether the claim is communication-based or not. If it is a noncommunicative claim, it should be allowed to stand as a simple negligence claim. If, however, the claim is communication-based, it should be presumptively displaced by the torts of libel and slander

The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption

This contribution to the North Carolina Law Review’s 2010 symposium, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems, considers the compatibility between the common law nature of honest services fraud and the dynamic quality of public integrity offenses. Corruption enforcement became a focal point of recent debates about over- criminalization because it typifies expansive legislative mandates for prosecutors and implicit delegations to courts. Federal prosecutions of political corruption have relied primarily on an open-textured provision: 18 U.S.C. § 1346, the honest services extension of the mail fraud statute. Section 1346 raises notice concerns because it contains few self-limiting terms, but it has also acquired some principled contours through common law rulemaking. Those boundaries are consistent with an animating principle of public corruption prosecutions: ensuring detached decisionmaking in the public interest. The distortive potential of significant personal financial gain may best distinguish actionable corruption from ordinary political dealings. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Skilling, Black, and Weyhrauch trio of cases in part to consider the link between harm and liability for honest services fraud, the Court did not address the issue, instead simply limiting the statute to bribes and kickbacks. Recent public corruption prosecutions illustrate some shortcomings of that decision and indicate that the courts could better confine honest services fraud by building on the harm constraint that had begun to emerge through the common law. The concluding sections here explore both the way in which a purposive interpretation might limit honest services prosecutions and the extent to which unanswered questions in the Skilling decision still allow for development of the harm concept

Narrative, Truth, and Trial

This Article critically evaluates the relationship between constructing narratives and achieving factual accuracy at trials. The story model of adjudication— according to which jurors process testimony by organizing it into competing narratives—has gained wide acceptance in the descriptive work of social scientists and currency in the courtroom, but it has received little close attention from legal theorists. The Article begins with a discussion of the meaning of narrative and its function at trial. It argues that the story model is incomplete, and that “legal truth” emerges from a hybrid of narrative and other means of inquiry. As a result, trials contain opportunities to promote more systematic consideration of evidence. Second, the Article asserts that, to the extent the story model is descriptively correct with respect to the structure of juror decision making, it also gives rise to normative concerns about the tension between characteristic features of narrative and the truth-seeking aspirations of trial. Viewing trials through the lens of narrative theory brings sources of bias and error into focus and suggests reasons to increase the influence of analytic processes. The Article then appraises improvements in trial mechanics—from prosecutorial discovery obligations through appellate review of evidentiary errors—that might account for the influence of stories. For example, a fuller understanding of narrative exposes the false assumption within limiting instructions that any piece of evidence exists in isolation. And to better inform how adjudicators respond to stories in the courtroom, the Article argues for modifying instructions in terms of their candor, explanatory content, and timing