Does the use of the dynamic system approach really help fill in the gap between human and non human primate language ? Commentary to S. Shanker and B. J. King " the Emergence of a New Paradigm in Ape Language Research"

The highly recommended transposition of the dynamic system approach for tackling the question of apes’ linguistic abilities has clearly not led to a demonstration that these primates have acquired language. Fundamental differences related to functional modalities – namely, use of the declarative and the form of engagement between mother and infant –can be observed in the way humans and apes use their communicatory systems

‘Putting apes (body and language) together again’, a review article of Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Taylor, T. J., and Shanker, S. G. Apes, Language, and the Human Mind (Oxford: 1999) and Clark, A. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (MIT: 1997)

It is argued that the account of Savage-Rumbaugh’s ape language research in Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker and Taylor (1998. Apes, Language and the Human Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford) is profitably read in the terms of the theoretical perspective developed in Clark (1997. Being There, Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA). The former work details some striking results concerning chimpanzee and bonobo subjects, trained to make use of keyboards containing ‘lexigram’ symbols. The authors, though, make heavy going of a critique of what they take to be standard approaches to understanding language and cognition in animals, and fail to offer a worthwhile theoretical position from which to make sense of their own data. It is suggested that the achievements of Savage-Rumbaugh’s non-human subjects suggest that language ability need not be explained by reference to specialised brain capacities. The contribution made by Clark’s work is to show the range of ways in which cognition exploits bodily and environmental resources. This model of ‘distributed’ cognition helps makes sense of the lexigram activity of Savage-Rumbaugh’s subjects, and points to a re-evaluation of the language behaviour of humans

How to do things without words

Clark and Chalmers (1998) defend the hypothesis of an ‘Extended Mind’, maintaining that beliefs and other paradigmatic mental states can be implemented outside the central nervous system or body. Aspects of the problem of ‘language acquisition’ are considered in the light of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather than ‘language’ as typically understood, the object of study is something called ‘utterance-activity’, a term of art intended to refer to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of interacting humans. It is argued that utterance activity is plausibly regarded as jointly controlled by the embodied activity of interacting people, and that it contributes to the control of their behaviour. By means of specific examples it is suggested that this complex joint control facilitates easier learning of at least some features of language. This in turn suggests a striking form of the extended mind, in which infants’ cognitive powers are augmented by those of the people with whom they interact

How to Do Things Without Words: Infants, utterance-activity and distributed cognition

Clark and Chalmers (1998) defend the hypothesis of an ‘Extended Mind’, maintaining that beliefs and other paradigmatic mental states can be implemented outside the central nervous system or body. Aspects of the problem of ‘language acquisition’ are considered in the light of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather than ‘language’ as typically understood, the object of study is something called ‘utterance-activity’, a term of art intended to refer to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of interacting humans. It is argued that utterance activity is plausibly regarded as jointly controlled by the embodied activity of interacting people, and that it contributes to the control of their behaviour. By means of specific examples it is suggested that this complex joint control facilitates easier learning of at least some features of language. This in turn suggests a striking form of the extended mind, in which infants’ cognitive powers are augmented by those of the people with whom they interact

The plight of the sense-making ape

This is a selective review of the published literature on object-choice tasks, where participants use directional cues to find hidden objects. This literature comprises the efforts of researchers to make sense of the sense-making capacities of our nearest living relatives. This chapter is written to highlight some nonsensical conclusions that frequently emerge from this research. The data suggest that when apes are given approximately the same sense-making opportunities as we provide our children, then they will easily make sense of our social signals. The ubiquity of nonsensical contemporary scientific claims to the effect that humans are essentially--or inherently--more capable than other great apes in the understanding of simple directional cues is, itself, a testament to the power of preconceived ideas on human perception

The Symbolic Mind: Apes, symbols, and the evolution of language

Ape language research provides an opportunity to study empirically the relationship between language and thought, a question notoriously difficult to address. The conclusions reached till also inform theories of language evolution. The research in this dissertation was conducted with language-trained bonobos, Pan paniscus, at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa, utilizing a computerized matching method. The data provide evidence that the possession of symbols facilitate categorization of natural categories, a foundation for many cognitive operations. However, the data does not support the theories suggestions a primacy of gestural or other visual communication in the evolution of language. Rather, a multimodal origin of language is more likely. To explain how the ape subjects in this study came to acquire symbolic competencies, social niche construction theory is utilized

Evolution of Symbolisation in Chimpanzees and Neural Nets

from Introduction: Animal communication systems and human languages can be characterised by the type of cognitive abilities that are required. If we consider the main semiotic distinction between communication using icons, signals, or symbols (Peirce, 1955; Harnad, 1990; Deacon, 1997) we can identify different cognitive loads for each type of reference. The use and understanding of icons require instinctive behaviour (e.g. emotions) or simple perceptual processes (e.g. visual similarities between an icon and its meaning). Communication systems that use signals are characterised by referential associations between objects and visual or auditory signals. They require the cognitive ability to learn stimulus associations, such as in conditional learning. Symbols have double associations. Initially, symbolic systems require the establishment of associations between signals and objects. Secondly, other types of relationships are learned between the signals themselves. The use of rule for the logical combination of symbols is an example of symbolic relationship. Symbolisation is the ability to acquire and handle symbols and symbolic relationships

Morgan's canon, Garner's phonograph, and the evolutionary origins of language and reason

`Morgan's canon' is a rule for making inferences from animal behaviour about animal minds, proposed in 1892 by the Bristol geologist and zoologist C. Lloyd Morgan, and celebrated for promoting scepticism about the reasoning powers of animals. Here I offer a new account of the origins and early career of the canon. Built into the canon, I argue, is the doctrine of the Oxford philologist F. Max Mu$ller that animals, lacking language, necessarily lack reason. Restoring the Mu$ llerian origins of the canon in turn illuminates a number of changes in Morgan's position between 1892 and 1894. I explain these changes as responses to the work of the American naturalist R. L. Garner. Where Morgan had a rule for interpreting experiments with animals, Garner had an instrument for doing them: the Edison cylinder phonograph. Using the phonograph, Garner claimed to provide experimental proof that animals indeed spoke and reasoned