Religion and Its Effects on Organ Donation Intentions: Diversity within Non-Catholic Christians

In this study, the effects of Christian Absolutism (CA) and religious orientation on organ donation intentions were examined. Non-Catholic Christians comprise a diverse community with important differences in individual members’ beliefs that are not adequately characterized by religious affiliation. The study’s aim (n = 176) was to distinguish between Fundamentalist Christians and Progressive Christians. The continuous effect of Christian Absolutism (i.e., Fundamentalist vs. Progressive) on organ donation intentions was examined and no relationship was found, p > .99. The effects of religious orientation (i.e., Intrinsic, Extrinsic, Quest) on this variable was assessed. Intrinsic orientation was positively correlated with donation intentions, p = .01, and remained positively associated when controlling for the other types of orientation, p = .001, or CA, p < .001. Christian Absolutism was not significantly associated with intentions, over and above religious orientation, p = .29; however, it exhibited a negative relationship with intentions when Intrinsic and Intrinsic by Absolutism interaction were controlled for, p = .04. Significant Quest by Absolutism and Extrinsic by Absolutism interactions were observed, ps = .01. Within a non-Catholic Christian population, considering an individual’s level of Christian Absolutism provides additional insight into the donation decision-making process and suggests targets for future interventions

Professor Waldron Goes to Washington

In Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House Jeremy Waldron asks how moral philosophy can illuminate real life political problems. He argues that moral philosophers should remind politicians of the importance of adhering to moral principle, and he also argues that some moral principles are absolute and exceptionless. Thus, he is very critical of those philosophers who, post 9/11, were willing to condone the use of torture. In this article I discuss and criticize Waldron’s absolutism. In particular, I claim that the arguments he offers in support of it are either dependent on religious conviction or support only rule utilitarianism, not absolutism. Additionally, I argue that the character of politics is such that it is both undesirable and morally irresponsible for politicians to adopt the absolutist approach favoured by Waldron. We have reason to be glad that Professor Waldron does not go to Washington

Morality, Uncertainty

Non-Consequentialist moral theories posit the existence of moral constraints: prohibitions on performing particular kinds of wrongful acts, regardless of the good those acts could produce. Many believe that such theories cannot give satisfactory verdicts about what we morally ought to do when there is some probability that we will violate a moral constraint. In this article, I defend Non-Consequentialist theories from this critique. Using a general choice-theoretic framework, I identify various types of Non-Consequentialism that have otherwise been conflated in the debate. I then prove a number of formal possibility and impossibility results establishing which types of Non-Consequentialism can -- and which cannot -- give us adequate guidance through through a risky world

Fine's Trilemma and the Reality of Tensed Facts

Fine (2005, 2006) has presented a ‘trilemma’ concerning the tense-realist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. According to Fine, there are only three ways out of the trilemma, consisting in what he takes to be the three main families of tense-realism: ‘presentism’, ‘(external) relativism’, and ‘fragmentalism’. Importantly, although Fine characterises tense-realism as the thesis that reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts, he explicitly claims that tense realists are not committed to their fundamental existence. Recently, Correia and Rosenkranz (2011, 2012) have claimed that Fine’s tripartite map of tense realism is incomplete as it misses a fourth position they call ‘dynamic absolutism’. In this paper, I will argue that dynamic absolutists are committed to the irreducible existence of tensed facts and that, for this reason, they face a similar trilemma concerning the notion of fact-content. I will thus conclude that a generalised version of Fine’s trilemma, concerning both fact-constitution and fact-content, is indeed inescapable