40 research outputs found
Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo
status: publishe
Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional
In this article, we consider Wittgensteinâs approach to non-inferential knowledge, its relation to special propositions, and the nature of the justification of these propositions. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of non-inferential knowledge whose rational status is not the result of basic beliefs (in a foundational sense) that justify it. In Wittgensteinâs rule-following analysis, Fregeâs theory is criticized. This theory is based on the idea that having a conceptual repertoire prior to the understanding of any rule, requires having grasped the conditions of verification of a rule, which is a source of problems. Following Wrightâs construing of Wittgensteinâs ideas, we maintain that understanding concepts cannot be prior to the linguistic ability.
RIFL (2018) Vol. 12, n. 2: 70-82. DOI: 10.4396/2018020
Not knowing a cat is a cat: analyticity and knowledge ascriptions
It is a natural assumption in mainstream epistemological theory that ascriptions of knowledge of a proposition p track strength of epistemic position vis-Ă -vis p. It is equally natural to assume that the strength of oneâs epistemic position is maximally high in cases where p concerns a simple analytic truth (as opposed to an empirical truth). For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that one's epistemic position vis-Ă -vis âa cat is a catâ is harder to improve than one's position vis-Ă -vis âa cat is on the matâ, and consequently, that the former is at least as unambiguous a case of knowledge as the latter. The current paper, however, presents empirical evidence which challenges this intuitive line of reasoning. Our study on the epistemic intuitions of hundreds of academic philosophers supports the idea that simple and uncontroversial analytic propositions are less likely to qualify as knowledge than empirical ones. We show that our results, though at odds with orthodox theories of knowledge in mainstream epistemology, can be explained in a way consistent with Wittgenstein's remarks on 'hinge propositions' or with Stalnaker's pragmatics of assertion. We then present and evaluate a number of lines of response mainstream theories of knowledge could appeal to in accommodating our results. Finally, we show how each line of response runs into some prima facie difficulties. Thus, our observed asymmetry between knowing âa cat is a catâ and knowing âa cat is on the matâ presents a puzzle which mainstream epistemology needs to resolve
Appropriate Belief Without Evidence
ABSTRACT
In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Wittgenstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy
Wittgenstein: Uma Solução Fundacionista ao Problema do Regresso EpistĂȘmico
As notas que compĂ”em a obra Da Certeza (Ăber Gewissheit) expressam nitidamente a preocupação de Ludwig Wittgenstein com os problemas clĂĄssicos da epistemologia, em especial o uso dos termos epistĂȘmicos tradicionais e os erros costumeiros dos filĂłsofos que negligenciam suas profundas estruturas gramaticais. Em diversas passagens Ă© fĂĄcil observar a tentativa de esclarecer os erros de realistas, idealistas e cĂ©ticos no que diz respeito Ă s nossas alegaçÔes ordinĂĄrias de conhecimento em contextos cĂ©ticos moderados. A questĂŁo do ceticismo sobre a justificação Ă© um tema recorrente na epistemologia analĂtica contemporĂąnea e, de certo modo, as soluçÔes ofertadas a este problema ainda nĂŁo sĂŁo completamente adequadas. Existem muitas passagens de Da Certeza que possuem o potencial de lançar luz sobre questĂ”es fundamentais que encontram-se imbricadas neste debate, cuja discussĂŁo contemporĂąnea tem sido fomentada pela instigante anĂĄlise de Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2005, 2007). O objetivo deste artigo Ă© justamente tentar esboçar uma reposta wittgensteiniana ao problema do regresso epistĂȘmico
Going Deeper into Description of Situations
UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020This paper outlines the major topics addressed in my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018), anticipates some possible misunderstandings and discusses issues that warrant further investigation.publishersversionpublishe
Lyotard, 'The Differend', and the Philosophy of Deep Disagreement
This paper examines the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard in relation to the analytic philosophy of deep disagreement. It argues not just that his work has relevance for this debate, but that it offers a challenge to the âepistemic paradigmâ present in its academic literature, represented by the two most prominent sets of theories within it â the âfundamental epistemic principleâ and âhinge epistemologyâ views, arguably most strongly represented by Michael Lynch and Duncan Pritchard, respectively. Focussing on Lyotardâs text âThe Differendâ, I show how its conceptual framework and philosophy of language locates the cause of deep disagreement not in the epistemic realm, but in things which do not fully submit to epistemic evaluation: the radically incomplete and open nature of language, and our increasingly politically pluralistic world full of incommensurable differences that do not always admit of rational resolution. Lyotardâs work calls for us to conceptualize deep disagreements as problems of politics, not epistemology, and to find new ways of dealing with disagreements that do not force a solution on them (which often comes at the cost of one party being wronged, or worse) and to create new ways of speaking so that our collective conceptual resources can be increased to better deal with specific cases of dispute. Lyotardâs relevance for the philosophy of deep disagreement is also further discussed with references to Miranda Frickerâs work on âepistemic injusticeâ, which Lyotard, in a different vocabulary, is also concerned with and analyses in âThe Differendâ