Special Incentives to Sue

In an effort to strengthen private enforcement of federal law, Congress regularly employs plaintiff-side attorneys’ fee shifts, damage enhancements, and other mechanisms that promote litigation. Standard economic theory predicts that these devices will increase the volume of suit by private actors, which in turn will bolster enforcement and encourage more voluntary compliance with the law. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom. I use empirical evidence to demonstrate that special incentives to sue do not dependably generate more litigation. More crucially, when such incentives do work, they often trigger a judicial backlash against the very rights that Congress sought to promote. This dynamic has been neglected in the academic commentary to date, which has focused on litigant behavior alone while ignoring the role that judges play in any enforcement regime that depends on litigation. I show that caseload pressures and concerns about excessive litigation have driven judges to adopt procedural rules that dampen the effects of fee shifts and damage enhancements. Furthermore, judges have offset incentives to sue by narrowly interpreting the relevant substantive provisions of federal law

Do Disaster Expectations Explain Household Portfolios?

It has been argued that rare economic disasters can explain most asset pricing puzzles. If this is the case, perceived risk associated with a disaster in stock markets should be revealed in household portfolios. That is, the framework that solves these pricing puzzles should also generate quantities that are consistent with the observed ones. This paper estimates the perceived risk of disasters (both probability and expected size) that is consistent with observed portfolios and consumption growth between 1983 and 2004 in the United States. I find that the portfolio choice of households that have less than a college degree can be partially explained by expectations of stock markets disasters only if one allows for a large probability of labor income loss at the same time. Such disaster expectations however, are not revealed in the portfolios of educated and wealthier households; simple per-period participation costs to stock market coupled with preference heterogeneity explain their participation and investment patterns.

An Empirical Investigation of Labor Income Processes

Labor Income Risk, Profile Heterogeneity, Random Walk Model, Incomplete Markets, Idiosyncratic Shocks

Varying-Parameter Supply Functions and the Sources of Economic Distress in American Agriculture, 1866-1914

The agrarian unrest in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century is examined. This unrest is often viewed as stemming from the inability of farmers to adapt to changing conditions in world agriculture. This hypothesis is tested in the context of a distributed lag supply function. Varying parameter estimation methods are used to trace the history of the parameters in the supply function and to decompose observed prices into permanent and transitory components over time. The patterns of variation are tested for conformity with a model of rational price-expectation formation. The conclusion is that farmers behaved as economic theory would predict, but that neither theory nor practice gave them relief from the troubles which plagued them.

On the Mental State of Consciousness of Wrongdoing

Mistake about or ignorance of the law does not exculpate in criminal law, except in limited circumstances. Doctrine and theory cognate to this principle are, by now, well developed and understood. But might an actor\u27s awareness of the illegality or wrongfulness of her conduct inculpate — that is, constitute a form of mens rea that establishes or aggravates liability? Trends in recent adjudication in white collar crime suggest that the answer is yes. This article, part of a symposium issue on Adjudicating the Guilty Mind, takes the first pass at describing the mental state of “consciousness of wrongdoing,” assessing its fit with the conceptual architecture of substantive criminal law, and uncovering the many challenges of proof and adjudication that this concept poses. Three conclusions broadly emerge from this initial, and somewhat truncated, inquiry: first, inculpating an actor for adverting to the legal or normative significance of her conduct is an attractive means of dealing with difficult line-drawing problems presented by many white collar offenses; second, the method can be justified on both retributive and deterrent grounds; and third, the practice requires much more thought and precision at the operational level, lest problems inherent in the structure of criminal adjudication be exacerbated in cases in which liability depends on the idea that an actor “knew what she was doing was wrong

Bridging the gap between police and citizens: what we know, what we've done, and what can be done

Master's Project (M.A.) University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2017There is a long history of distrust between police and citizens and there have been no meaningful and sustained steps to correct this situation. Death and injuries are sustained by citizens and police, but still there has not been a real attempt to prevent this occurring because there is no trust between police and citizens and this lack of trust has created a rift or gap between police and citizens and this projects aim is to address the gap. Research into what causing damage and finding a way to repair the damaged relationship between police and citizens by way of finding approaches that tend to lead to trust between groups of people. Communication, a better ethics base for police, training and education, restorative justice, media, and the studying of social theories will help find a way to repair the damage. A collaboration of all of the aforementioned categories will tend to help bridge the gap between police and citizens. It is believed that by addressing the issues and the roots of the problems between police and citizens, a new relationship built on trust will emerge. By having a more trusting relationship there will be less harm caused to police and citizens

On the Mental State of Consciousness of Wrongdoing

Mistake about or ignorance of the law does not exculpate in criminal law, except in limited circumstances. Doctrine and theory cognate to this principle are, by now, well developed and understood. But might an actor\u27s awareness of the illegality or wrongfulness of her conduct inculpate — that is, constitute a form of mens rea that establishes or aggravates liability? Trends in recent adjudication in white collar crime suggest that the answer is yes. This article, part of a symposium issue on Adjudicating the Guilty Mind, takes the first pass at describing the mental state of “consciousness of wrongdoing,” assessing its fit with the conceptual architecture of substantive criminal law, and uncovering the many challenges of proof and adjudication that this concept poses. Three conclusions broadly emerge from this initial, and somewhat truncated, inquiry: first, inculpating an actor for adverting to the legal or normative significance of her conduct is an attractive means of dealing with difficult line-drawing problems presented by many white collar offenses; second, the method can be justified on both retributive and deterrent grounds; and third, the practice requires much more thought and precision at the operational level, lest problems inherent in the structure of criminal adjudication be exacerbated in cases in which liability depends on the idea that an actor “knew what she was doing was wrong

Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine

Regulation by litigation has driven U.S. merger regulation to crisis. The reliance on private lawsuits to police disclosures and potential conflicts of interest in mergers, takeovers, and other control transactions has resulted in the filing of claims after every major transaction. However, it has failed to achieve meaningful benefits for shareholders and has instead deprived them of potentially valuable rights. Regulation by litigation has devolved into attorney rent-seeking, and the raft of substantive and procedural reforms aimed at resolving the crisis has failed. There is an alternative to regulation by litigation. Drawing upon the code and panel-based models of merger regulation in the United Kingdom and Ireland, this Article explores whether a regulatory model might be better at protecting shareholder interests in merger transactions. A regulatory alternative holds a number of significant advantages, including greater speed, responsiveness, certainty, and lower administrative costs. In light of these potential advantages, it is remarkable that no U.S. state has experimented with a code and panel-based model of merger regulation. We explain the persistent difference between the U.S. and Anglo-Irish models by reference to interest group politics and, in particular, the power of the bar to influence corporate law reforms in the United States