On core solutions in economies with asymmetric information

In a scenario with a continuum of asymmetrically informed agents, we analyze how the initial information of a trader may be altered when she becomes a member of a coalition. In contrast to a perfect competition frame, we first show that neither arbitrarily small coalitions nor large coalitions are enough to block an allocation which is not in the core, due to the market failure produced by asymmetric information. However, under mild assumptions, we extend the characterizations of the core provided by Vind and Schmeidler (1972) to economies with asymmetrically informed traders. We then focus on information sharing rules based on the coalitions' size. Assuming the existence of coalitions to which the sharing rule associates an information finer than all the others, we show that the corresponding cores coincide with the one defined by this finest information. Finally, characterizations for the weak fine, the fine and the private core are obtained as particular cases of this equivalence theorem.Coalitions, asymmetric information economies, information sharing, blocking mechanisms, core

A Cheap-talk Model with Multiple Free-riding Audiences: Reference to Global Environmental Protections

This paper presents a cheap-talk one-sender-multiple-receiver model in which audiences freeride on each other in the context of global environmental protections. The sender observes the magnitude of damage of emission, and sends the same message simultaneously to all audiences, who then play a game to determine individual emission level. The sender may find it impossible to credibly send the truth when externality is large enough because of the incentive to correct free-riding behavior. If a private club is established for sharing information, the sender’s information with more countries may not be optimal because the sender is less truthful when the club is larger

A Cheap-talk Model with Multiple Free-riding Audiences: Reference to Global Environmental Protections

This paper presents a cheap-talk one-sender-multiple-receiver model in which audiences freeride on each other in the context of global environmental protections. The sender observes the magnitude of damage of emission, and sends the same message simultaneously to all audiences, who then play a game to determine individual emission level. The sender may find it impossible to credibly send the truth when externality is large enough because of the incentive to correct free-riding behavior. If a private club is established for sharing information, the sender’s information with more countries may not be optimal because the sender is less truthful when the club is larger

The Role of A-priori Information in Networks of Rational Agents

Until now, distributed algorithms for rational agents have assumed a-priori knowledge of n, the size of the network. This assumption is challenged here by proving how much a-priori knowledge is necessary for equilibrium in different distributed computing problems. Duplication - pretending to be more than one agent - is the main tool used by agents to deviate and increase their utility when not enough knowledge about n is given. We begin by proving that when no information on n is given, equilibrium is impossible for both Coloring and Knowledge Sharing. We then provide new algorithms for both problems when n is a-priori known to all agents. However, what if agents have partial knowledge about n? We provide tight upper and lower bounds that must be a-priori known on n for equilibrium to be possible in Leader Election, Knowledge Sharing, Coloring, Partition and Orientation

The emergence of knowledge exchange: an agent-based model of a software market.

We investigate knowledge exchange among commercial organisations, the rationale behind it and its effects on the market. Knowledge exchange is known to be beneficial for industry, but in order to explain it, authors have used high level concepts like network effects, reputation and trust. We attempt to formalise a plausible and elegant explanation of how and why companies adopt information exchange and why it benefits the market as a whole when this happens. This explanation is based on a multi-agent model that simulates a market of software providers. Even though the model does not include any high-level concepts, information exchange naturally emerges during simulations as a successful profitable behaviour. The conclusions reached by this agent-based analysis are twofold: (1) A straightforward set of assumptions is enough to give rise to exchange in a software market. (2) Knowledge exchange is shown to increase the efficiency of the marketAgent-based Computational Economics, adaptive behaviour, knowledge sharing, market efficiency

Distributed, Negotiable and Hyper-Individual Towards a Definition of Shareable Knowledge

This article presents a definition of sharable knowledge. The study presented in this article shows that knowledge is best shared in the format of high degree of interaction and high degree of use of shared modes.When groups wish to share or co-create knowledge, they often end up exchanging information or experiences instead. This article puts forward the claim, that knowledge cannot be shared like a cake or another physical resource, as it is by definition bound to personal experience. Thus when sharing knowledge, groups are either exchanging knowledge mono-modally, often through language, or they co-create something that either of the group members could have come up with themselves. The latter form of knowledge sharing might actually be knowledge co-creation rather than sharing, but is nevertheless what is sought for in knowledge sharing processes.The article outlines six cases of which three were successful in sharing and co-creating knowledge and three were not. One of the successful cases is submitted to microanalysis and on that basis some fundamental claims are made about multimodal knowledge sharing and -co-creation.The overall conclusion is, that multiple modes are not enough for multimodal knowledge sharing to take place. Rather groups wanting to share knowledge must interact as well as make shared use of the available modes. This in turn has consequences for the definition of knowledge as well as for sharing-practices

Solving the Training Divide

The information society is all very well, but the trouble is ensuring everyone can be trained up for it, especially those who need it most. Countries still do not appear to invest enough in the education of under-skilled adults, although the extent of the problem is difficult to quantify and may be eased somewhat by the presence of informal training. Still, more needs to be done to encourage a more efficient sharing of the costs and benefits of training between employers and employees, thereby increasing the incentives to invest in human capital. Another, more intractable problem, is how to get training to those who need it most. As it is, vulnerable workers have fewer opportunities to acquire new skills. For this reason, some countries are experimenting with co-financing policies for individual investments in human capital, to help workers pay for training themselves when they are not supported by their employer. Despite these measures, without support from their employer, individuals often find training courses unaffordable, not only because of their direct costs but also because of time constraints.demand for skills; training; co-financing; time constraints

Curvature function and coarse graining

A classic theorem in the theory of connections on principal fiber bundles states that the evaluation of all holonomy functions gives enough information to characterize the bundle structure (among those sharing the same structure group and base manifold) and the connection up to a bundle equivalence map. This result and other important properties of holonomy functions has encouraged their use as the primary ingredient for the construction of families of quantum gauge theories. However, in these applications often the set of holonomy functions used is a discrete proper subset of the set of holonomy functions needed for the characterization theorem to hold. We show that the evaluation of a discrete set of holonomy functions does not characterize the bundle and does not constrain the connection modulo gauge appropriately. We exhibit a discrete set of functions of the connection and prove that in the abelian case their evaluation characterizes the bundle structure (up to equivalence), and constrains the connection modulo gauge up to "local details" ignored when working at a given scale. The main ingredient is the Lie algebra valued curvature function $F_S (A)$ defined below. It covers the holonomy function in the sense that $\exp{F_S (A)} = {\rm Hol}(l= \partial S, A)$.Comment: 34 page

Reaching Out to Tribal Communities: Lessons Learned and Approaches to Consider

When transportation safety decision-making is desired, the involvement and engagement with a community is essential. A streamlined delivery of a project or program is more likely to occur when active dialogue and an exchange of ideas occurs in advance and occurs frequently. This is particularly important in tribal communities, who value sustained relationships and represent the focus population of this study. The research team, on six separate occasions, met with local and regional tribal leaders to explore and discuss transportation safety needs within and outside tribal communities, as well as discern the recommended approaches to foster ongoing dialogue about these needs. In all cases these discussions closely correlated with existing research studies or activities; transportation safety and equity is not seen as separate from other tribal foci and community needs. Specific recommendations to consider, in no particular order, included the following: invest respectfully enough time for people to talk; tribes think long-term and consider the impact of any decision from a long-term viewpoint so an iterative process and re-sharing of ideas is critical; the power of decision is in the hands of the tribe and its members; do not lump tribes together as each tribe is sovereign and unique and every community should be expected to think differently; all tribes are unique as is the environmental and social context; to disseminate information widely and iteratively, do so when there is a large group or event; be sure to understand the Tribal governance, decision making, and organizational structure; know who is the tribal Chairman or Chairwoman; and develop an emic and etic understanding of the community