Are You Really Living? Rom 6:11

...What does Romans 6:11 say? Romans 6:11 says, consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God. Consider yourself dead to sin. And as I thought about that, I realized this is talking to the Christian that it\u27s saying there, consider yourself dead to yourself. Because sin and self are synonymous. Now, that isn\u27t very popular to say in the world, is it? Because everybody\u27s talking about the self. All the advertisements say, you deserve it, you buy it, you need it, you deserve it. If you don\u27t watch out for yourself, nobody else will. So when we talk about dying to self, it sometimes brings up a rebellion in us. But I\u27m not talking about dying to that self in you that was created in the image of God or that unique personality and characteristic traits that God gave you. I\u27m not talking about putting that down and dying to that. Well, what am I talking about then? I\u27m talking about dying to that self in you that would rise up in rebellion against God. And I think, you know that part, the part that I mean, I don\u27t know about you, but my biggest problem is me. I\u27m always getting me in trouble. And it\u27s that self-enough that would rise up and just push the Lord right off of the throne and take over

Recreation in the ME or is it WE jungle

At this years Thinking Recreation symposium I was inspired by the enthusiasm delegates shared for debating, rather than seeking solutions to, a range of issues such as youth deviance, physical inactivity, resource allocation, and managing the environment. However, it was the discussion about some of the invisible influences on our work that really aroused my curiosity. In particular, the thought-provoking workshop by Robyn Cockburn on Systems Theory inspired some critical ‘thinking about recreation’. In his review of the symposium published in the 06 Spring Issue of Australasian Parks and Leisure, Geoff Canham said that this (i.e. Systems Theory) session “drew the most feedback and stimulated much discussion long after it ended”. It was evident many delegates had a desire to look beyond the pragmatics of recreation although this can pose challenges of the intellectual kind. I recall one delegate saying, “I liked the session on that theory but it can be frustrating when talking about something that seems quite vague even though you know it relates to what happens in your work.” Although ideas such as those espoused by Systems Theory are complex and often seem a little distant from the reality of our work, they are useful in helping explain something about the why and what we do

Antonin Artaud ou l’absence à soi-même et l’expérience du vide

Concerning Antonin Artaud it has been question of some lack of work but in the article we propose to the reading we are talking about another kind of absence. Indeed, in his correspondence and in the writings of his youth, the poet was complaining to be absent to himself. He was saying that words could not convey what he felt, that he had the impression to be a spectator of himself. Over time, he will say that he was feeling some emptiness in him. Is it to fill this emptiness that he spent his time writing on notebooks and that he had replaced speaking by screaming? As a conclusion to this article, we spend some time thinking about the concepts of absence and emptiness, following some writings of Pierre Fédida

A Systematic Theory of Tradition

We still lack a systematic or complete theory of tradition. By referring to the works of many major figures of the last century - Arendt, Boyer, Eisenstadt, Eliot, Gadamer, Goody, Hobsbawm, Kermode, Leavis, MacIntyre, Oakeshott, Pieper, Pocock, Popper, Prickett, Shils and others - I show that a theory of tradition must include insights taken not only from the study of sociology and anthropology, but also from the study of literature and religion (and, it goes without saying here, the study of philosophy and history). The proliferation of separate academic subjects does not make it any less necessary for us to attempt to say in general what we are talking about when we talk about tradition. In this article I distinguish three elements which are found in traditions. I call these continuity, canon, and core. The argument is that traditions can be distinguished in terms of whether there is a core in addition to canon and continuity, a canon in addition to continuity, or only mere continuity. Together these form a theory of tradition which enables us to see what is necessary to all traditions and also what it is which distinguishes different types of tradition from each other. © 2016 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

The Song Sparrow and the Child: Claims of Science and Humanity

For centuries public claims on behalf of science have been made about our nature and the nature of the world as a whole. Over the twentieth century such claims on behalf of science have grown deeper and stronger. More and more they are total claims, cosmological in the largest sense, and they have evoked opposition equally deep and strong. There is the scientist in all of us. There is, too, the lawyer and law in all of us, which we realize the moment we serve as a witness or citizen juror. This book explores what the legal mind and ear can contribute to resolving this deep and growing conflict within and among us. The question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run, anything else affects them. This was the prescient epigraph William James adopted for his lectures on pragmatism at the beginning of the twentieth century. In it is why this conflict is so deep at the beginning of the twenty-first and its resolution so important for our future together. We know that conventional limits and restraints can change with belief about the ultimate nature of things. The twentieth century has its warning examples, most gruesome where total vision has appeared in social and political thought. The connection between what we think about the nature of the world, and what we allow ourselves to do, is now widely felt, and, with good reason, widely feared. Our question here will be whether there are, in fact, openings in the total visions of today. The visions are of the facts of the world. What are the facts about the visions? The juror in us might naturally ask of a person testifying to them, How am I to take what you are saying? Do you actually believe what I hear you to say? This is empirical inquiry that we all engage in all the time without much thinking how we do it. At our best, especially in important matters, we reach for all the evidence. We listen to all a person says before concluding what any part of it might mean, and we treat what a person does as evidence of the meaning of what a person says. In this way we will be addressing here how far belief about the ultimate nature of things has actually changed over the twentieth century, in scientist or nonscientist. We will try to let ourselves be told what science is, on behalf of which people speak, and we will wonder how antiscience could ever really be a stance to take. Throughout, we will be asking how any total vision of the world can claim the true allegiance of human beings living and thinking together in it. This book is also about belief-or not-in spirit. The child learns to speak. The song sparrow comes to sing a beautiful song, special not just to its kind but to its individual throat and tongue. They are often compared, the development of individual song in the song sparrow and language in the child. Experiments that would be gruesome and called atrocity in a human context are performed on the young song sparrow. What is it that holds us back from performing the same experiment on the child-or letting it be done? What really, in thought and actual belief today? On such large questions touching our basic view of each other and ourselves, and other creatures too such as the song sparrow, we should be having a conversation or open meditation. The discussion ought not to be primarily argumentative, as we tend to understand argument. Binding you to me by successful moves of my mind would lose all that can be hoped for. It cannot be merely descriptive, with us absent from the picture. Nor should it try to move from one proposition to another whose meaning or truth depends on having done with the first. In any conversation or meditation we return more than once to the questions and examples with which we begin, and we will do so here. An earlier book of mine took a form that was meant to merge with and give the reader an experience of its subject, which was the legal form of thought. The form of this book too .reflects what we are talking about, a world that really does include ourselves.https://repository.law.umich.edu/books/1112/thumbnail.jp

A Theory without Space & Time

Einstein would have like a theory with no space and no time; he added that he didn’t know how to do it (Klein & Spiro,1996). I guess that Einstein was not excited by the job, all the more that getting rid of space and time requires having accurate definitions beforehand. This is the case today, but, if it’s quite easy to proceed, we can’t ensure that the replacement leads to significant progress in the theory. It’s no doubt paradoxical that Einstein never defined time and space, neither did contemporary researchers like Stephen Hawking. The lack of definitions about space and time is a real disadvantage, insofar as defining something is saying what it is; otherwise, we don’t know what we’re talking about. For example, what is the physical nature of space as such? What are the physical properties of time? Is time a phenomenon or a concept? In addition, a good definition is supposed to bring some theoretical extensions. For this purpose, the definitions of the second and the meter will be clarified; the signification of the covariance of the parameters in a relativistic situation will be reminded. Our target, getting rid of time and space, is based on two ideas:• Given that the international unit of time is defined in relation to the frequency of the cesium, the term which is related to time will be replaced by a term related to the frequency.• The cesium wavelength is a fundamental constant; it’s of course covariant. It turns out that any length is proportional to the cesium wavelength; the proportionality coefficient, which is a multiple of the cesium wavelength, is invariant. The splitting in two parts is not only an arithmetical trick, it allows circumscribing the covariance

Measuring the poverty impact of ACIAR projects: a broad framework

This report sets out some broad ideas about how poverty evaluation could be conducted for ACIAR research projects. As with good benefit–cost analysis, there are good practices that need to be observed when undertaking poverty analysis. While poverty is a broad concept, and can be addressed through many means, these need to be grounded in some common understanding of the economics of poverty. This report is concerned mostly with quantitative evaluation, in the same sense that current ACIAR project evaluations are quantitative. That is, it is concerned with saying something about the order of magnitude of the effects of the project. Of course, qualitative analysis is important, and in most cases is a prelude to quantification — there is little point quantifying if you don’t understand what you are talking about. Quantification, however, provides a discipline and focus for qualitative speculation and provides an important extra dimension when comparing the effects of different projects. When quantifying, there are many sensible approaches that could be adopted. We will focus here on approaches that are broadly consistent with the current approaches to benefit–cost analysis and that could readily be used to augment those approaches. The report begins by reviewing some basic notions of poverty (Chapter 2) and then goes on (Chapter 3) to discuss in principle the ways that agricultural research could influence poverty. Chapter 4 explains, with the use of some examples, a range of analytical approaches that could be taken, and Chapter 5 draws some specific implications for ACIAR.poverty evaluation, benefit-cost analysis, poverty analysis, economics of poverty, quantitative evaluation, analytical, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries, Farm Management, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Food Security and Poverty, International Development, Livestock Production/Industries, Production Economics,

Judicial Criticism

Today I shall talk about the criticism of judicial opinions, especially of constitutional opinions. This may at first seem to have rather little to do with our larger topic, The Constitution and Human Values, but I hope that by the end I will be seen to be talking about that subject too. In fact I hope to show that in what I call our criticism, our values are defined and made actual in most important ways. I will begin with a double quotation. I recently heard my friend and colleague Alton Becker, who writes about language and culture, begin a lecture by saying that one universal aspect of cultural life is the keeping alive of old texts, a reiteration of what was said before in a new context where it can have a life that is at once old and new. (The Javanese even have a name for it.) The text that Becker chose to keep alive in his lecture was a remark made by John Dewey when, toward the end of his long life, he was asked what he had learned from it all. He said, I have learned that democracy begins in conversation. In this lecture I will try, by locating it in a new context, to give that same sentence a continued life. The process of giving life to old texts by placing them in new ways and in new relations is of course familiar to us as lawyers. It is how the law lives and grows and transforms itself, for the law is nothing if it is not a way of paying attention and respect to what is outside of ourselves: to texts made by others in the past, which we regard as authoritative, and to texts made in the present by our fellow citizens, to which we listen. We try to place texts of both sorts in patterns, of what has been and what will be, and these patterns are themselves compositions. The law is at its heart an interpretive and compositional, and in this sense a radically literary, activity. Such at least is my view: for others the law is policy, nothing but policy, and the only question what results we prefer; or power, nothing but power, and the only question who has it; or perhaps it is morality, and the only question what is right or wrong. So in these remarks I will be making a claim for the character of law itself, as a way of reading, composing, and criticizing authoritative texts, and in so doing, as a way of constituting, through conversation, a community and a culture of a certain kind. In doing this I will try to give two other texts renewed life too, namely the opinions of Chief Justice Taft and Justice Brandeis in the famous case of Olmstead v. United States

The Doctrinal Side of Majority Will

What is the Supreme Court\u27s relationship with public opinion? Barry Friedman\u27s answer in The Will of the People scours some 200 years of history to provide a distinctly political view of the Court, and the story he tells is compelling. Yet it is also incomplete. The Will of the People presents a largely external account of the law; it sees the influence of majority will as a force that moves outside the jurisprudence we lawyers spend so much of our time researching, writing, and talking about. By this account, there is what the Justices say is driving their decisionmaking-legal doctrine-and then what, consciously or subconsciously, is really going on. As Friedman has explained elsewhere, The Justices don\u27t tend to give speeches much less write opinions saying \u27we are following public opinion. Or do they? In this symposium contribution, I contend that Friedman is right; Supreme Court decisionmaking is inextricably bound to majority will. But he is more right than he knows, or at least more right than The Will of the People shows. In his focus on an extralegal account of Supreme Court decisionmaking, Friedman misses the best evidence yet of the Court\u27s majoritarian leanings: its widespread use of explicitly majoritarian doctrine. Sometimes-not all the time or even most of the time, but sometimes-the influence of majority will is so strong that it seeps into the legal framework for deciding questions of constitutional law. On these occasions, the Justices do write opinions that say we are following majority will. By and large, the phenomenon simply has gone unnoticed