¿Se puede considerar formal la lógica de Aristóteles?

In this paper I discuss the question of whether Aristotle’s logic is a formal logic or not. I answer that, although the doctrines contained in the Organon inaugurate indeed formal logic, there are also good reasons to think that Aristotle did not believe that logic was a discipline that ought to prescind completely from content.En este trabajo planteo la pregunta de si la lógica de Aristóteles es o no una lógica formal. Respondo que, aunque las doctrinas contenidas en el Organon inauguren, efectivamente, la lógica formal, hay también buenas razones para pensar que Aristóteles no creía que la lógica fuese una disciplina que pudiera prescindir por completo del contenido

Apariencia y argumentación falaz en Refutaciones sofísticas de Aristóteles

Este trabajo examina los elementos psicológicos presentes en Refutaciones sofísticas a la luz del tratamiento de la φαντασία en Sobre el alma. En primer lugar, se examina la definición del «argumento erístico» en Tópicos y Refutaciones, enfatizando la importancia que la condición de apariencia tiene en esta caracterización. En segundo lugar, se profundiza el acercamiento aristotélico a la noción de apariencia a partir de Sobre el alma III.3. En tercer lugar, se completa el examen de Refutaciones, analizando el rol de la φαντασία en la tipología y las reglas de solución de las refutaciones aparentes.This paper seeks to analyze the psychological elements contained in Sophistical Refutations under the light of the treatment of φαντασία in On the Soul. Firstly, I will examine the definition of the «eristic argument» in Topics and Refutations. I will emphasize the importance of the appearance condition in that characterization. Secondly, I will enrich the Aristotelian approach to the notion of appearance based upon On the Soul III.3. Finally, I will complete the examination of Refutations by analyzing the role of the φαντασία in the typology and rules for solving apparent refutations.Fil: Villar, Francisco. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Ancestor Worship in The Logic of Games. How foundational were Aristotle\u27s contributions?

Notwithstanding their technical virtuosity and growing presence in mainstream thinking, game theoretic logics have attracted a sceptical question: Granted that logic can be done game theoretically, but what would justify the idea that this is the preferred way to do it?\u27\u27 A recent suggestion is that at least part of the desired support might be found in the Greek dialectical writings. If so, perhaps we could say that those works possess a kind of foundational significance. The relation of being foundational for is interesting in its own right. In this paper, I explore its ancient applicability to relevant, paraconsistent and nonmonotonic logics, before returning to the question of its ancestral tie, or want of one, to the modern logics of games

Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations: A Translation with Introduction, Commentary, and Appendices

Thesis advisor: Gary M. GurtlerAristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (SE) investigates the five devices which sophists employ to appear wise in dialogue. The sophist’s primary device is the sophistical refutation which is a particular kind of fallacy. A sophistical refutation is a merely apparent refutation. Thus, the fallacy has two causes: the “causa apparentiae” and the “causa non existentiae." A genuine refutation is a syllogism based on an interlocutor’s opinions that leads necessarily to a conclusion which contradicts some other established position of the interlocutor. The sophist desires especially the apparent refutation of his opponent because the greatest glory follows upon seeming to expose the ultimate defect in opponent’s understanding, a contradiction. The SE neither accounts for every cause of error nor every type of false reasoning; “ad” arguments like ad baculum or ad hominem are not in investigated in the SE because they are not apparent refutations. After a description of the SE’s subject matter, the dissertation’s introduction locates the role of the SE in Aristotle’s Organon and explains why a dialectician would investigate and untie sophisms. Sophistic is the sham portion of the dialectic which is a universal art (τέχνη) of syllogizing from endoxes to the contradiction of an interlocutor. Unlike principles of demonstrations, endoxes are premises that are in accord “with the expectation (ἔνδοξος) of all or most or the wise, and of all the latter or most or of the most knowing.” They do not need to be certain or true; instead, they must be acceptable to a dialectical opponent. Dialecticians derive endoxes from dialectical places (τόποι), i.e., extrinsic and most universal principles which usually affirm relations between logical intentions and may be employed in any given subject matter. Sophists use sophistical places which may be expressed as universal propositions and provide the foundation for the apparent reasonability of the sophistical refutations. That said, unlike dialectical places, Aristotle does not present sophistical places as universal conditional statements of logical intentions; they are presented as common distinctions—such as the distinction between the different senses of a word—that a sophist may exploit to produce a sophistical refutation. A dialectician will study sophistic for the same reasons he will learn dialectic; it is useful for exercise, conversation, and in the philosophical sciences. Moreover, investigating sophisms facilitates appreciation of distinctions that are fundamental to Aristotelian philosophy, protects the philosopher from error, and preserves his reputation. Although translation of Aristotelian logical works is difficult—especially one which contains many examples of linguistic fallacies—the dissertation provides a faithful and consistent translation of the treatise. The line by line commentary contains explanation of the order, purpose, and meaning of the text, clarification of Aristotle’s difficult examples, discussion of scholarly treatment of controversial passages, and references to other relevant passages in the Organon. The dissertation ends with two appendices to provide a thorough treatment of Aristotle’s two most deceptive fallacies: the fallacy of equivocation and the fallacy of the accident. The first appendix locates equivocation as a kind of proper naming (as opposed to figurative) and offers an original interpretation of Aristotle’s argument for the necessity of equivocation based on his understanding of how we name. Afterward, the appendix unfolds the nature and solution to the fallacy, explains Aristotle’s places (τόποι) for detecting equivocation, and categorizes the kinds of equivocation. The second appendix unfolds a unique and overlooked explanation of the fallacy of the accident that allows Aristotle to be read consistently, distinguishes the fallacy from the other fallacies, and accounts for Aristotle’s examples. The fallacy of the accident occurs when a middle term’s connection to one extreme term is accidental to its connection to the other. The appendix locates the fallacy through a reduction of all fallacies outside of speech to ignorance of refutation, offers four distinct meanings of ‘accident’ in Aristotle, shows which meaning Aristotle attributes to the fallacy, divides the fallacy into three species, and answers objections to its explanation.Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018.Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.Discipline: Philosophy