162 research outputs found
Default Logic in a Coherent Setting
In this talk - based on the results of a forthcoming paper (Coletti,
Scozzafava and Vantaggi 2002), presented also by one of us at the Conference on
"Non Classical Logic, Approximate Reasoning and Soft-Computing" (Anacapri,
Italy, 2001) - we discuss the problem of representing default rules by means of
a suitable coherent conditional probability, defined on a family of conditional
events. An event is singled-out (in our approach) by a proposition, that is a
statement that can be either true or false; a conditional event is consequently
defined by means of two propositions and is a 3-valued entity, the third value
being (in this context) a conditional probability
A Description Logic of Typicality for Conceptual Combination
We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to
account for the phenomenon of combining prototypical concepts, an open problem
in the fields of AI and cognitive modelling. Our logic extends the logic of
typicality ALC + TR, based on the notion of rational closure, by inclusions
p :: T(C) v D (“we have probability p that typical Cs are Ds”), coming
from the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics. Additionally,
it embeds a set of cognitive heuristics for concept combination. We show that the
complexity of reasoning in our logic is EXPTIME-complete as in ALC
To Preference via Entrenchment
We introduce a simple generalization of Gardenfors and Makinson's epistemic
entrenchment called partial entrenchment. We show that preferential inference
can be generated as the sceptical counterpart of an inference mechanism defined
directly on partial entrenchment.Comment: 16 page
The lexicographic closure as a revision process
The connections between nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision are
well-known. A central problem in the area of nonmonotonic reasoning is the
problem of default entailment, i.e., when should an item of default information
representing "if A is true then, normally, B is true" be said to follow from a
given set of items of such information. Many answers to this question have been
proposed but, surprisingly, virtually none have attempted any explicit
connection to belief revision. The aim of this paper is to give an example of
how such a connection can be made by showing how the lexicographic closure of a
set of defaults may be conceptualised as a process of iterated revision by sets
of sentences. Specifically we use the revision process of Nayak.Comment: 7 pages, Nonmonotonic Reasoning Workshop 2000 (special session on
belief change), at KR200
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